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The purpose of this thesis is to explore how taste is constructed at the micro-social level 
of a community of practice and to investigate the dynamics that underlie the process of 
taste-making. An ethnographic research was conducted in the context of an arts 
cooperative focusing on how members maintain status boundaries from dissimilar 
others (inter-group dynamics) and how they negotiate intra-group taste heterogeneity 
(internal dynamics). The findings indicate that the community symbolically demarcates 
itself from outgroups in an “us versus them” fashion by continuously juxtaposing its 
practices to those of competitive actors through “sayings” as well as “doings”. They 
also begin to mark out the appropriation processes through which members employ 
distaste to resignify and internalise meaning to their practices (a) by exhibiting tastes of 
outsiders if they can successfully negotiate their intent (recontextualising exo-cultural 
elements), (b) by negating tastes that are prevalent in the field in order to criticise subtly 
outgroup practices (appropriating practice through conspicuous absence) and (c) by 
negotiating the ‘tastefulness’ of objects that are not valued for their aesthetics by 
outsiders in order to provoke (resignifying prevailing aesthetics). Finally, the study 
conceptualises taste-making within the community as an ongoing dialogical process 
amongst members with heterogeneous views about “tastefulness”. Depending on their 
status, members employ strategies that help them either to actualise tastes that they 
favour in the context of the community or to deal with the exhibition of tastes that they 
are not in accordance with. The thesis makes a theoretical contribution to three areas; 
First, to literature on taste formation by accounting for the holistic outlook of 
community-based taste-making practices; Second, to our understanding of negative 
symbolic consumption by exhibiting the appropriation processes through which distaste 
endows meaning to practices; Third, to the stream of works on marketplace cultures by 
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1.1 There is No Accounting for Taste 
 
It has been reported that lying on his deathbed, Oscar Wilde remarked: “This 
wallpaper is dreadful, one of us will have to go”. But where does a man find the courage 
to make such convictions just when he is about to confront his ultimate fate? Judgments 
of taste are known to provoke extreme reactions of disgust or fondness which, aside 
from performing the function of segregating and labelling objects as tasteful or 
distasteful, most importantly tell us a lot about the appraiser. Tastes have the power to 
reflect, to some extent, one’s character, beliefs, upbringing, financial situation, country 
of origin, country of residence, social milieu and ultimately identity. And to showcase 
the wrong taste, by, say, spending your last hours in a room with the wrong tapestry, 
could be perceived as misconduct. 
 
But what exactly is taste and why do people use it to define themselves and others? It 
is perhaps not surprising that during the enlightenment taste was considered to be a 
universal judgment of beauty. This is a view widely expressed in Kant’s ([1892] 1951) 
Critique of Judgment, and best summarised in Burke’s ([1979] 1990, 13) definition: “I 
mean by the word Taste no more than that faculty, or those faculties of the mind which 
are affected with, or which form a judgment of the works of imagination and the elegant 
arts. On a superficial view, we may seem to differ very widely from each other in our 
reasoning, and no less in our pleasures:  but notwithstanding this difference, which I 
think to be rather apparent than real, it is probable that the standard both of reason and 
Taste is the same in all human creatures”.  
 
Later critiques however, with a prominent work being that of Pierre Bourdieu (1930-
2002), have dismissed universality and stability in judgments of taste, opting for a social 
constructivist approach that renders such judgments to be subjective in their entirety. 
Indeed, discrepancy of opinions as to what constitutes “good” or “appropriate” taste 
often results in taste “wars” regarding artistic or musical genres, fashion styles, cuisines, 
decoration styles and even behaviour. These wars not solely concern individuals but, 
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more often than not, they occur amongst varied social groups, whose members find 
comfort in the interaction with peers, members of the ingroup who share similar tastes 
or who are often referred to as “our kind of people” and drama in the competition with 
“them”, i.e. outgroups, supporters of a different genre or style, who just “don’t get it”.  
Tastes are hostile to one another. An individual or group may love what others hate and 
vice versa. And it is precisely this discrepancy that has generated the interest of 
consumer research scholars in the study of taste. Similarly it is not universality of 
judgment, but rather diversity that provides the foundation of this study. In other words, 
the cornerstone of this project lies in the idea that there is no accounting for taste. 
 
The term taste, not unlike other figurative terms, is not quite accurate. “A definition 
may be very exact, and yet go but a very little way towards informing us of the nature of 
the thing defined” (Burke [1979] 1990, 12), but for the purposes of this introductory 
chapter, it is understood as a person’s ability to judge and recognise what is good or 
suitable, especially relating to such matters as: art, style, beauty and behaviour. Taste as 
judgment is not all that different from gustation, perception of which helps one to 
maintain a consistent chemical balance in one’s body. Similarly, judgments of taste help 
one to construct a consistent identity that communicates who one is. The biological 
sense of taste also protects one from unsafe foods, for if a person eats poisonous or 
rotten foods, they will probably spit them out immediately, because they usually taste 
bad. Similarly, judgments on “appropriateness” protect one from choices deemed 
unsuitable to one’s identity, thus ensuring that others do not get the wrong signals as to 
“who I am”. Finally, for someone to enjoy a slice of pizza, they need more than their 
basic taste as they also require their sense of smell. Without it, even though the tongue 
is still able to identify a taste, the food eaten will taste bland. Similarly, for judgments of 
taste to be fully encompassed, one needs a variety of supporting factors in place. 
Family, upbringing, education, peer groups and other social groups that one belongs to, 
all play their role in shaping and enhancing our appreciation or hate towards particular 
objects or practices.  
 
Which brings me to the second question posed earlier, why do people use taste to 
define themselves and others? Why does taste constitute a connecting link between 
members of the same group and a boundary between competing collectives? Taste is a 
reflection of one’s judgment of the world and people will assess others based on that 
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judgment (or as with Bourdieu’s famous quote “taste classifies and it classifies the 
classifier” (1984, 6). Clothing, hairstyles, music and film choices, home décor, holiday 
destinations, sports followed and even choice of partner, all constitute taste judgments 
that reflect just “what kind of person” their adopter is, or at the collective level, just 
what kind of community we are talking about. In an era when consumer culture is 
prevalent in all aspects of our lives, from exercising to motherhood and from traveling 
to education, taste is as important as ever. It would not be a stretch to argue that in 
today’s consumption driven world, taste quickly and easily communicates the position 
that one chooses to take in the social world, for others to see and form opinions. From 
this standpoint it is not hard to guess why people say that “you are what you eat” or 
“you are what you wear”. Consumption is being used as the primary means in order to 
achieve social distinction. 
 
1.2 Approach and Scope of Research 
 
This project is concerned with taste-making at the micro-social level of interaction and 
uses a community of practice as the unit of analysis. Following the principles of social 
constructionism that assume there are no objective standards as to what constitutes good 
or legitimate taste (Bourdieu 1984) and taking into account the instability of meanings 
which are necessarily bound to social interaction (Berger and Luckmann 1967), it seeks 
to understand how taste is negotiated amongst members of collectives and how it is 
used in the ingroup’s attempt to gain distinction and maintain symbolic boundaries from 
outgroups as well as dissimilar others.  
 
The projected is situated in the Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) tradition of 
Consumer Research. In the past decades, consumer research has enriched our 
understanding of consumer behaviour including motivations, preferences and buying 
habits. However, the perspective of consumers behaving like rational human beings, in 
other words, making decisions after processing all the available information in order to 
maximise satisfaction from their purchase, has started to waver against alternative 
schools of thought that challenge the rationality of economic/behavioural models in 
favour of an approach that encompasses the social and cultural aspects of consumption. 
CCT constitutes a paradigmatic challenge to the dominant econometric and cognitive 
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psychology approaches to the study of consumption and comprises a collection of 
theoretical perspectives, borrowing from fields as varied as sociology, anthropology and 
cultural studies, integrating the macro social theories of sociology with the thick 
description of anthropology (Askegaard and Linnet 2011) and placing the focus on how 
consumption, apart from an economic transaction, is an: experiential, symbolic and 
ideological process (Arnould and Thompson 2005).  
 
At the core of these theoretical perspectives is the idea that people are not drawn 
towards the material and tangible properties of market offerings, but instead consume 
the symbolic meanings of products and services (Levy 1959), constructing in the 
process the so-called consumer society (Belk 1988; Gabriel and Lang 1995; Elliott 
1997). Most importantly, however, what CCT has pointed out, is that such meanings are 
neither universal nor stable, and that researchers should account for the existence of 
multiple, heterogeneous and often overlapping cultures that help individuals make sense 
of the world around them, as well as the idea that such cultures are necessarily bound to 
sociohistoric contexts and thus cannot be expected to remain stable throughout time. In 
other words, consumer culture “conceptualises an inter-connected system of 
commercially produced images, texts and objects that groups use –through the 
construction of overlapping and even conflicting practices, identities and meanings- to 
make collective sense of their environments and to orient their members experiences 
and lives” (Arnould and Thompson 2005, 869). Consumption is thus seen as a social 
process that “helps make visible and stable the basic categories of culture which are 
under constant change” (Elliott 1997, 287).  
 
Following the instability of systems of meanings, consumers’ interpretive strategies 
have become a complex matter to be researched, requiring an examination of both what 
is contained in the representation of a product and what individual consumers bring to 
the process of appropriating it (LeVine 1984). Taking into account the idea that 
meanings are always socially constituted (Burger and Luckmann 1966), any attempt to 
account for them would require a close examination and understanding of the systems 
and social contexts in which they are embedded. From this standpoint, in understanding 
taste-making it is necessary to take an approach where socially constituted systems of 




To satisfy these conditions, this research has three important characteristics: 
 
First, it focuses on the micro-social level of interaction (Cova and Cova 2002), or how 
taste is the result of interaction amongst members of collectives, because the meaning of 
market offerings is socially constituted and only significant when it exists as shared 
social knowledge within cultural groups (Berger and Luckmann 1967). For this reason, 
a community of practice, defined as a “group of people who share a concern or a 
passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly” 
(Wenger 1998, 10), is used as the unit of analysis. Accordingly, the project examines 
the manner in which (dis)taste is negotiated through the interaction of members of such 
communities along with the negotiation of their common purpose or joint enterprise 
(Wenger 1998). 
 
Second, it is focused on the notion of distaste just as much as it is on taste, not only 
because it has been argued that the latter is more determining in drawing social 
distinctions (Wilk 1997), but also because distaste constitutes a silent partner to its 
positive counterpart, since every choosing “for” a particular object or practice, also 
means choosing “against” all the other possible options (Douglas 1996, 25). That is, 
distaste is intrinsically bound to relational oppositions and subtly implies a competitive 
relationship amongst cultures adopting different tastes. Douglas (1996), in particular, 
takes an extreme stance by arguing that cultures, which are the “arbiter of taste” (80), 
are at all times “accusing” all other, competing cultures, declaring in the process their 
commitment to a particular cultural stance, a process which forms the basis of 
boundary-making amongst social groups.  
 
Third, it accounts for recent conceptualisations of taste, that dictate the construct is 
best approached as practice (Holt 1998), performance (Hennion 2001; 2003; 2007) and 
regime (Arsel and Bean 2013), by placing the focus on the manner of consumption as 
well as on the normative system underlying practice, as opposed to the object of 
consumption. Applying these conceptualisations, not only to taste, but also to its 
negative counterpart, the study is interested in (a) the understandings underlying why 
rejection behaviour occurs and (b) the manner in which it takes place. For this purpose, 
instead of focusing on avoidance of particular objects or actions, distaste is studied 
through modes of appropriation, in other words through the manner in which 
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communities alter the prevailing meaning of practices, as well as how objects are 
aesthetically and symbolically redefined. 
 
Overall, the project approaches taste-making as a situated activity within the practices 
of the community. These practices constitute constant points of negotiation within the 
group and result in two outcomes: first, the positioning of the community in relation to 
its outgroups in an “us versus them” fashion and second, the reconciling of intra-group 
conflicts of taste that are due to the heterogeneous nature of the community. Theoretical 
contributions are made to the theories of taste/distaste formation, negative symbolic 
consumption and marketplace cultures, by putting together an integrative framework of 
externally driven (“us in relation to them”) and internal (intra-group heterogeneity) 
dynamics that affect the making of taste at the micro-social level. 
 
The main research question that the study seeks to address is: “What are the dynamics 
of taste and how do they influence the taste-making process within communities of 
practice?”. To answer this, a number of issues are investigated, including: “How do 
members of a community of practice maintain the boundaries that distinguish them 
from dissimilar others?”, “Through what processes of appropriation is (dis)taste 
employed to internalise meaning to practices?” and “How is taste negotiated within a 
community of practice?”. 
 
There are three points of differentiation from previous studies. First, although the 
extant literature discusses, both explicitly and implicitly, multiple contexts in which 
collective tastes are developed, maintained, contested and negotiated, a holistic outlook 
of such community-based practice has seldom been discussed. In other words, the thesis 
explores both how collective tastes are relational to the tastes of dissociative outgroups 
(i.e. Arsel and Thompson 2010; Wilk 1997; Schouten and McAlexander 1995) and how 
intra-group dynamics affect community practices (i.e. Chalmers et al. 2013; de Valck 
2007), treating the two as interrelated and focusing on how their interplay constitutes 
the basis for taste-making. Second, unlike the majority of studies on taste that focus on 
the role of the construct in the perpetuation of class structures (Holt 1998; Allen 2002; 
Henry 2005; Üstüner and Holt 2010 etc) this project offers insights as to how tastes 
operate and are practiced within one social stratum. Third, most studies on marketplace 
cultures have treated (either explicitly or implicitly) collective tastes as unified wholes 
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that stand in opposition to the tastes of dissociative others (e.g. bikers versus car drivers 
[Schouten and McAlexander 1995], Burning Man participants versus Disneyland goers 
and Woodstock participants [Kozinets 2002] etc). By contrast, this work acknowledges 
the existence of intra-group heterogeneity and accounts for its effect in taste-making. 
 
At this stage it is also worth clarifying that this is exploratory research, aiming to 
theorise taste-making in communities from a new angle, without the preoccupation (at 
least at this stage) of investigating how the findings could be proven useful for the 
design of marketing strategies of any kind. This is not considered a limitation, on the 
contrary as Askegaard and Linnet (2011) put it, “CCT obviously contributes to the 
noble and highly relevant process of securing culturally and socially informed 
environments at business schools” (382), while such sociocultural knowledge 
constitutes the basis of any kind of behaviour, including that of the consumer. 
 
The study is based on a constructivist framework of inquiry and given that one of its 
aims is to understand the practices and relative perceptions of a particular community 
that has its own distinctive culture, an ethnographic approach was considered to be an 
appropriate methodological match. An “alternative” arts cooperative was selected as an 
appropriate context that enables theoretical payoff (Arnould, Price and Moisio 2006), 
due both to the intensity of taste wars within the domain of the arts, generated from 
passionate attachment of social groups to different genres, movements and style 
expressions, as well as due to the anti-establishment nature of the community that 
renders expressions of (dis)taste to be of grave importance. The cooperative is 
constituted by a group of volunteers who showcase films and host live music and 
performance events, for their own enjoyment as well as for that of the public. 
 
A number of ethnographic methods have been used to gather data: observations, 
unsolicited accounts and non-directive interviews. Participant observation was 
conducted by volunteering in the community, a role which was maintained for one year 
(October 2011-Spetember 2012). Apart from observing the physical activities of the 
group, valuable observations were also conducted by subscribing to the various mailing 
lists that the community uses as decision making forums. Getting closer to the members 
by adopting a volunteering role has helped in extracting the value of pure sociability 
(Hammersley and Atkinson [1983] 1995) as a way of developing trust and provoking 
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small talk. A result of this is the gathering of unsolicited accounts occurring either 
amongst participants or between the participants and the researcher (Hammersley and 
Atkinson [1983] 1995; Agar [1980] 1996). Finally, 15 in depth interviews were 
conducted with members from different backgrounds (e.g. age, occupation) and status in 
the community (core, marginal and peripheral members). The gathered data was 
approached through thematic analysis (McCracken 1988). 
 
 
1.3 Outline of Thesis 
 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
 
The second, third, fourth and fifth chapters provide an in-depth review of the relevant 
literature. They start with consideration of the theories of taste formation (Chapter 2) 
and recent reconceptualization of the construct of taste (Chapter 3), thus accounting for 
the importance of its relatively under researched negative counterpart, namely, distaste 
(Chapter 4). Subsequently, the necessity of conducting research at the micro-social level 
is explained and justification for the choice of communities of practice as an appropriate 
framework to represent the unit of analysis is provided (Chapter 5). These chapters also 
demonstrate how theoretical gaps in the examined literature provide the basis for the 
research questions of the project. 
 
Chapter 6 is made up of an overview of the framework of inquiry, explaining and 
justifying the ontological and epistemological foundations of the thesis, the 
methodological choice of ethnography and the data collection methods. The chapter also 
offers an in-depth description of the context of research, as well as an extensive 
reflexive account of the researcher’s experience in the field. Finally, chapter 6 accounts 
for the limitation of the approach taken. 
 
The research findings are subsequently presented in Chapters 7, 8 and 9, with the first 
two focusing on the externally driven (“us” in relation to “them”) dynamics of taste-
making, whilst Chapter 9 is concerned with internal dynamics and particularly intra-




The last chapter (Chapter 10) presents a holistic picture of the data, by integrating all 
the findings in a single conceptual framework that makes up the main contribution of 
the project. It finally discusses the theoretical contributions of the work in more detail, 







2. Theories of Taste Formation 
 
No analysis of taste would be complete without first understanding the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu. His conceptualisation of taste is largely presenting individual and group 
preferences as the result of class identity, giving rise to the so called homology 
arguments. While this thesis is preoccupied with how tastes are generated and 
manifested within one particular stratum, placing the emphasis on taste wars amongst 
status groups (as opposed to social class based collectives), it is believed that an 
overview of Bourdieu’s work and later criticisms of it, can provide the foundations for 
understanding symbolic distinction, whether amongst or within social strata, and is thus 
essential. 
 
2.1 Taste as Class Identity and the Work of Pierre Bourdieu 
 
From a structuralist perspective, taste is an expression of class ideology, an approach 
encountered primarily in the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1984). Taking social class, 
defined as the position of an actor in an objective social space, as a starting point, 
Bourdieu demonstrates how an actor’s class gained capabilities - including economic, 
cultural and social capital - develop dispositions that drive action, as well as preferences 
that reflect that objective position. Bourdieu draws heavily upon Marxist and Weberian 
thought, by arguing that taste is not independent of class struggles and structures of 
inequality, but is rather an additional component to be used in the conceptualization of 
class, and consequently another way for the dominant classes to maintain their 
privileged position. The field of cultural consumption is essentially seen - similarly to 
the Marxist idea of the superbase - as the field where differences are expressed and 
legitimized. Objective distance in economic terms, thus, becomes subjective distance 
through mastery of tastes.  To gain a better understanding of Bourdieu’s theory of 
tastes, it is worth demonstrating first his use of social class as a concept extending 
outside the field of production and ownership, being dependent upon social relations 





2.1.1 Foundations of Bourdieusian Thought 
 
At the core of Marxist thought is the idea that societies are composed of a multiplicity 
of classes, a variety of social collectives identified primarily through their differences in 
their relationship with production. The great distinction amongst classes lies between 
owners and controllers of the means of production, and owners of labour that can be 
sold in exchange for a wage (Marx [1885] 1974).  Controllers of the means of 
production exploit the proletariat by rewarding them for their labour with an according 
wage which, even though legal, does not account for the surplus value that is enjoyed by 
capitalists. In this sense, surplus value (referring to not only profit but also taxes, new 
capital investment, profits of dividends etc) that is “owed” to the proletariat is enjoyed 
by capitalists, leaving the labourers exploitated (Crompton [1993] 1998). As a 
consequence, economic inequality is constantly reinforced, and the status quo 
continually perpetuated. 
 
Of primary importance to taste analysis is the concept of class consciousness. 
Crompton ([1993] 1998) mentions that Marx makes a distinction between an 
unconscious “class in itself” and a conscious “class for itself”. The ruling class of every 
epoch is seen as a conscious “class in itself”, which therefore thinks and produces ideas. 
Consequently, “the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which 
is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” 
(Marx and Engels [1947] 2004, 64). By contrast, the lower classes, as mere passive 
receivers of these ideas, develop a consciousness that is in disagreement with their own 
benefits, whilst at the same time accepting this as the natural order of things, a state that 
became known by later Marxists as false consciousness. By arguing that “it is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence”, but, on the contrary, “their social 
being that determines their consciousness” (Marx [1859] 1962, 362-3), Marx 
demonstrates the deterministic nature of structure. 
 
Another aspect of Marxist thought that is closely bound to early theories of taste is the 
constitution of society in two parts, namely, base and superstructure. That is, production 
relations comprise the base of society, which subsequently determines the social, 
political and cultural dimensions that constitute the superstructure. In Marx’s ([1859] 
1962, 23) words “in studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish 
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between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which 
can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, 
religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become 
conscious of this conflict and fight it out”.  The base/superstructure approach, which 
was later on adapted and used by Bourdieu, indicates that distance created by 
differences in an actor’s objective position in the mode of production, is reflected in the 
customary aspects of life, including consumption. It is precisely through differentiation 
in everyday subjective practices that objective distance between actors becomes 
obvious. However, the conditions that led to the occurrence of these differences remain 
unknown to the lower classes, who as stated earlier, accept them as naturally occurring. 
 
It is worth noting here that the base/superstructure approach has been highly criticised 
as being simplistic and overtly deterministic, thus leading to the development of two 
directions: a humanistic one where the importance of structure is recognised but is 
complemented with agency, and a scientific one which remains structurally 
deterministic (Crompton [1993] 1998). As will be discussed later on, Bourdieu’s work 
draws upon Marxist structuralism by attempting, however, to reconcile objectivism and 
subjectivism through the concept of the habitus and thus, falling within the humanistic 
tradition.   
 
In line with Marx, Weber considers economic power as a basic criterion for class 
stratification. The “class situation”, he argues “is in this sense ultimately a “market 
situation”” (Weber [1968] 1979, 928). However, classes are not seen by Weber as 
communities that form the basis for communal action and instead, he argues that: “we 
may speak of a 'class' when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal 
component of their life chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented 
exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for 
income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour 
markets” (Weber [1968] 1979, 181). Consequently, following Weber’s definition of 
class there is no evidence that class cultures are in any way taste cultures, and members 
of a specific class are only linked together by similar amounts of wealth.  
 
Most importantly, Weber recognises the existence of another factor that shapes social 
groups, one missing from Marxist thought, namely stand, which refers to status groups 
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who are defined by a social estimation of honour. “In content, status honour is normally 
expressed by the fact that a specific style of life can be expected from all those who 
belong to the circle” (Weber [1968] 1979, 187). It is important here to make a 
distinction between wealth, being a component of class and prestige being a component 
of status. Money by no means equals social honour, although the opposite might be true, 
in other words latter may be the basis for economic power.  Consequently, according to 
Weber, status group stratification is not in line with class stratification and references to 
social order are references to social honour rather than wealth.  
 
In his portrait of Weber, Bendix (1960) refers to “rank consciousness” (rather than 
class consciousness) as a result of status stratification, where collective actions of a 
group cannot be understood solely in economic terms. In this sense, estimates of relative 
prestige and membership in a particular status group are made from visible lifestyle 
markers and formal positions. As such, taste, as the ability to use status markers in order 
to reflect one’s position, is much more central to the Weberian rather than the Marxist 
approach and it comes as no surprise that in accounting for taste formation, the former 
approach of status stratification, has often been proven to be superior to the class 
stratification one. 
 
In synthesizing the two approaches Bourdieu (1984) conceptualizes class as a 
structural positions space, where an actor’s place is defined by two resources: economic 
and cultural capital. Class fractions may also be derived from different proportions of 
the two resources. Following from this, Bourdieu’s conception of class, in line with 
Marx, encompasses economic resources as a central structural element but in addition, 
following Weber, it recognises that economic criteria are not the only basis for 
stratification and collective action. More specifically, Bourdieu uses the concept of 
cultural capital to explain how dominant groups maintain symbolic distance. Cultural 
capital becomes the basis for status boundaries and “is used to exclude and unify 
people, not only lower status groups but equals as well and so social exclusion exists to 
various degrees throughout the social fabric” (Bourdieu 1984, 31). However, it must be 
noted that unlike Weber, who explicitly separates the concept of status from that of 
economic capital, for Bourdieu the two are related by a similar distance from necessity 
and a “taste for freedom”. Social classes, thus, can be status groups in their own respect, 
although within a particular stratum, different proportions of economic and cultural 
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capital trigger the formation of intra-class status groups.  
 
For this study, Bourdieu’s continuation of Marxist and Weberian thought in the 
understanding of taste is useful primarily in tracing the relationship between taste and 
ideology. Defining ideology  as “a world- view readily found in the population, 
including sets of ideas and values that cohere, that are used publicly to justify political 
stances, and that shape and are shaped by society” (Dawson 2001, 4-5), in Bourdieu’s 
work taste is ideology. It constitutes an expression of the generalized worldview of its 
carrier as well as a reflection of the conditions that cultivated this particular taste to its 
bearer.   
 
Most importantly, Bourdieu seeks to move away from the structuralist extreme 
represented by Marx and later Marxist theorists, where class accounts for human action 
in a purely deterministic way by controlling the superstructure. However, he does not 
encompass the opposite, extreme subjectivist view of Schutz’s phenomenology - where 
actors build up the meaning of their own actions -, nor Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology. 
His contribution stands in his attempt to present structure and agency in a dialectical 
relationship. He has characterised his work as constructivist structuralism or 
structuralist constructivism (Wacquant 1989), as from a structural point of view he takes 
into account objective structures that constrain individuals, while from a constructivist 
point of view he accounts for the social genesis of the habitus, as a scheme of 
perceptions, and that of the field, as the setting in which agents are placed. 
 
2.1.2 The Social Construction of Taste: from Critique of Judgment to Judgment 
of Taste 
 
Bourdieu’s dismissal of universality and stability in judgments of taste constitutes 
another foundational aspect of his work. The social constructivist approach that renders 
taste mechanisms to be socially constructed has sparked intensive debates and has given 
birth to numerous scholarly works, all trying to come to grips with the idea that if what 
is good taste is not universal or objective, then what is it that enables individuals to form 
taste judgments?  
 
 Distinction (1984) represents a critique on another major work on aesthetic 
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judgments, that of Immanuel Kant. Even the subtitle of the book, “A Social Critique of 
the Judgment of Taste”, is said to be a playful response to Kant’s “Critique of 
Judgment” ([1892] 1951). Kant is primarily preoccupied with the question of how are 
judgments about beauty possible and argues that the power of judgment might be 
organized and directed by a fundamental a priori principle that is unique to it. Kant 
should not be misread for suggesting an object signification approach, in other words 
that objects can universally be considered as beautiful because there is an intrinsic 
quality to them. On the contrary, his approach suggests that universality in judgment 
stems from features of the human mind – as opposed to from the object itself - that he 
subsequently calls “common sense”. Apart from universality, the philosopher identifies 
three more features in aesthetic judgments. The first, and most highly criticised by 
Bourdieu in particular and Marxist theorists in general, is the feature of 
disinterestedness: an individual will firstly judge an object to be beautiful and 
subsequently derive pleasure from it. In this sense, aesthetic judgment is free of both 
interest of the senses (which comes as a result of the judgment) and conceptual interest 
or interest of reason, meaning that the object is good and moral. The other features 
identified by Kant are purposiveness (i.e. the claim that a beautiful object has a purpose 
which however we cannot grasp) and necessity, which in line with universality states 
that everyone must have the same judgment, according to “principle”.  
 
Bourdieu’s criticism of Kantian aesthetics lies primarily in the idea of 
disinterestedness, whereby for someone who does not possess the necessary cultural 
code, the gaze of an aesthetic object can only have “sensible properties” and no 
secondary meanings. Moreover, in contrast to the principles of Kantian aesthetics, he 
contends that working class individuals expect every image to perform a function and 
their judgments on objects are usually related to either agreeableness or morality. 
Bourdieu further argues that working class judgments usually involve a reduction of the 
object of art to things of everyday life, whereas by contrast, Kant’s pure aesthetic 
requires exactly the opposite, the ability to separate the object from everyday life. 
However, from a Bourdieusian point of view, to be able to appreciate objects in a pure 
way the subject needs to be free from economic necessity. Bourdieu sees this as “moral 
agnosticism” (1984, 5), at a distance from the natural and social world. It is further 
argued that “this aesthetic which subordinates the form and the very existence of the 
image to its function is necessarily pluralistic and conditional” (42), meaning that a 
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single object may be interpreted differently by different audiences and so one cannot 
expect a universal reaction. In Bourdieu’s empirical work (1984), images shown to 
subjects were also often judged by their legibility - their ability to convert information-, 
thus contradicting essentially another Kantian faculty, that of finality without purpose.  
 
It is worth adding here that the Bourdieusian approach of attributing taste wholly to 
social construction has not been left without criticism either. Jenkins (1992) argues that 
even though a rejection of Kantian aesthetics is well justified, Bourdieu leaves 
untouched the question of individual psychology in aesthetic preference, failing to 




2.1.3 Taste as a Product of the Habitus 
 
Taste has been conceptualized as the mechanism through which individuals classify, 
judge and distinguish the world around them. In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu is 
describing the manner in which tastes are developed and expressed and examines the 
appropriation processes through which cultural objects are used in socially legitimate 
ways to convey the status of a particular social group. Tastes are seen as the result of 
social origin (usually measured by a father’s occupation), upbringing within a particular 
social environment and education. Even though Bourdieu’s work is mostly addressing 
the reception of various forms of art, there is no area of practice where aestheticization 
of life cannot take place and in fact it is particularly challenging and rewarding to apply 
this to the most commodified every day practices, like food or home decoration (1984). 
 
Taste constitutes a classification mechanism, not only because it represents patterns of 
choice and rejection but also, and perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this 
project, its ability to “classify the classifier” (6). In other words, judgements of taste 
signify their adopter’s identity and position in social space. Following a perhaps general 
and reductionist classification, taste can be divided in three categories: legitimate or 
highbrow, middlebrow and popular. Highbrow taste allows the top bourgeoisie as well 
as artists and intellectuals (who might lack economic capital but are rich in cultural) to 
incorporate art and aesthetics in their everyday lives. Middlebrow taste of the petite 
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bourgeoisie is distinguished by a constant anxiety and feeling of discomfort as to 
whether the actors have managed to “get it right”. As for popular taste, this can only be 
considered as a negative reference point by the other classes (57). Even though this 
classification scheme fails to illustrate the complexities of what is considered good, bad, 
elite or popular taste, it is nevertheless one that has been incorporated in numerous 
studies following the publication of Distinction (1984). 
 
Bourdieu has come up with a formula, [(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice (101), to 
demonstrate what directs the lifestyle choices of a particular class or class fraction. 
Taste, reflects class identity because of the existence of the habitus. In order to grasp the 
concept of the habitus one must take into account three dimensions that construct the 
objective space of positions: volume of capital (economic and cultural), its composition 
and trajectory. Differences in the overall volume of capital are responsible for defining 
different classes, while differences in its composition distinguish the various class 
fractions. The composition of capital also has an indirect effect on practices by giving 
specific forms to other individual characteristics, including age and sex (e.g. Bourdieu 
argues that there are as many ways of realising femininity as there are class fractions). 
In Bourdieu’s social space things become even more complex when considering the 
third dimension of trajectory, which refers to the different positions an agent will 
occupy in social space throughout his or her lifespan. This does not occur in a random 
way; rather the possible trajectories for a certain initial position are pre-determined, 
even in cases when random events have occurred (e.g. a war). Finally, an actor’s current 
position is never enough to define his or her habitus, as the way the acquisition of 
capital took place (e.g. through upbringing or through the education system) is also 
important. The trajectory effect may also play a role in blurring the existence of classes 
when individuals in the same current position are mistaken as “equals”. However, for 
Bourdieu, those who have moved to the new position form an already privileged one 
and will possess distinguished tastes that are naturalised in them, unlike those who have 
achieved mastery of the same tastes along the way. 
 
Homogenous conditioning for individuals who occupy similar positions in the 
objective space will in turn provide them with similar dispositions which constitute the 
habitus. For Bourdieu this has “the capacity to produce classifiable practices and works, 
and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products (taste)” 
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(170). To rephrase, objectively classifiable conditions of existence (class) produce the 
habitus which in turn produces classifiable practices and systems of perception (taste) or 
to put more simply expressions of taste translate objective differences to symbolic 
practices. Following this definition, taste becomes a product of the habitus and taste 
cultures are essentially class cultures.  
 
It is worth mentioning here that in Bourdieu’s social space, status groups engage in 
different lifestyles, however, this is not a conscious process to gain distinction. It is 
precisely here that Bourdieu’s (1984) work is different to that of Thorstein Veblen. 
Veblen (1899), in his critique of consumerism, came up with the term “conspicuous 
consumption” to refer to the spending of money and resources by people, in order to 
display higher status than others. For the author, exhibition of these tastes is the result of 
conspicuous leisure time, in other words, people strategically invest time in learning 
how to engage legitimately into showing-off practices. Bourdieu agrees with Veblen 
(1899) in seeing culture as a system of class symbols that reveal individual social 
positions, however, the first argues for an unconscious natural process that takes place 
through the habitus, while for the latter conspicuous consumption has a conscious 
strategic element in it. Following from this, Gartman (1991) argues that legitimate 
cultural tastes from a Bourdieusian point of view make their possessor look gifted in 
contrast to a Veblenian perspective where the exhibition of such tastes may result in the 
individual being perceived as an exploiter. 
 
Bourdieu’s work has been highly influential and cited by numerous authors, inevitably 
receiving both praise and criticism. Multiple empirical projects, particularly by the 
sociologist Paul DiMaggio, provide supporting evidence for his theory, particularly in 
examining the role of social class in relation to unequal arts consumption (DiMaggio 
and Useem 1978; DiMaggio and Ostower 1990) as well as partner selection and 
participation in highbrow culture events (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985). Other scholars, on 
the other hand, have often stated that the homology argument may be a characteristic 
particular to the French society that does not find application in other contexts, 
especially in the United States where individual tastes, scholars argue, are unrelated to 
social class positions (for example, Lamont and Lareau 1988; Lamont 1992; Hall 1992; 





2.2 The Role of the Market in Taste Formation 
 
Volume and composition of capital, as well as trajectory in the objective space, may 
be the catalysts for an actor’s judgment of taste in Bourdieusian thought, however, even 
Bourdieu himself was not oblivious to other, non-class related factors that may affect 
taste mechanisms. Most importantly, tastes are inevitably dependent on market 
availability. This is not surprising as it is the field of production that gives rise to that of 
stylistic possibles from which individuals choose features in order to develop a lifestyle. 
Following this, a vicious circle is created where tastes can only be expressed and 
realised following production offerings and subsequently, production can only function 
if different tastes provide a market for their products. An immediate consequence is that 
a change in the field of production triggers changes in tastes and similarly a shift in 
tastes, due to transformations in the conditions of existence, will trigger changes in 
production by favouring the products that best satisfy new preferences, thus resulting in 
the role of strategic actors in the market becoming crucial. In other words, the choice of 
a product will not only depend on the alignment of the logic of products and individual 
tastes, but will also usually be mediated by institutions, critics and the media, which in 
turn are also defined by their position in the field and are judged by actors according to 
this position.  
 
To sum up, for Bourdieu, the market presents individuals with choices for cultural 
products whose appropriation mirrors an actor’s social position and reinforces 
distinctions. A very different approach, however, is taken by Frankfurt School theorists, 
who argue that the market’s cultural offerings conceal class positions by imposing a 
mass market for all, making all culture ideological. Even though Bourdieu, recognises 
that objects’ correspondence to tastes is manufactured by professionals, he still sees 
tastes as the result of another mechanism (that of the habitus), while in contrast, Adorno 
and Horkheimer ([1944] 1972, 121-124, 154-56) argue that preferences for cultural 
products by specific classes are marketing-created and based on a strategy of 
pseudoindividuality:  cultural products are not characterised by any distinction since 
capitalism has turned them into commodities. As such, taste becomes pseudotaste 




Gartman (1991), in his comparison of the two points of view on culture, critiques 
Bourdieu for being ahistorical and failing to grasp the specificity of capitalism. 
Frankfurt School arguments, on the other hand, are criticised for their lack of 
explanation as to how or why capitalism commodifies culture to conceal the existence 
of stratification. That is,  Gartman finds the idea of elites consciously manipulating 
culture in order to reinforce the subordination of the masses instrumentalist (428), while 
it is further argued that Frankfurt School arguments, to an extent, fail to recognize the 
persistence of (class) relations that were stronger in precapitalist society.  
 
A central point in the debate “mass culture for all versus stratification of culture 
according to social stratification”, is that late capitalist societies have to a great extent 
multiplied and massified the number of offerings. A consequence of this is that the 
homology between market offerings and classes seems to be non-existent, since one 
may observe members from all strata consuming the same massified types of goods and 
services. The phenomenon was picked up by researchers who attempted to explore 
whether differences in class position are indeed mirrored in consumption patterns, or 
whether capitalism has transformed the way people consume completely. Results point 
towards two different theoretical approaches: the univore-omnivore distinction in taste 
and individualisation arguments. 
 
 
2.3 The Omnivore-Univore Distinction in Tastes 
 
Empirical work in the past years does not always confirm the strict homology between 
class and taste. Instead, research shows the increased extinction of “snobs” (in the sense 
of individuals rejecting all but highbrow culture) and their replacement by omnivores 
(Peterson and Simkus 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996; Chan and Goldthorpe 2005; 
2007a; 2007b; Longhurst and Savage 1996; Warde, Olson and Martens 1999). 
Omnivores are more likely to be involved in a wide range of activities ranging from 
highbrow to popular. In theorizing omnivorousness, Peterson and Kern (1996) 
demonstrate that it does not involve consuming just any type of culture without 
discrimination. That is, the authors leave some space for research on the way in which 
omnivores construct symbolic boundaries, not through what they consume but the way 
they consume it. In other words, omnivores are experimenting with the appreciation of 
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various types of culture by getting to know its values and rules. They get educated on 
how to pass aesthetic judgements on these forms of culture, taking into account the 
cultural producers involved and by using their cultural capital make meaningful 
comparisons of one culture to another. However, one must not forget that omnivores are 
judging various cultures from the relative point of view of the position they occupy in 
the social space, which reinforces Bourdieu’s argument that preferences cultivated by 
these social positions maintain (or build) symbolic status boundaries. Similar findings 
are revealed in Chan and Golthorpe’s (2005, 2007a, 2007b) empirical work on the 
social stratification of cultural consumption (including dance, theatre and cinema 
attendance) in contemporary England and consequently the authors attempt to revive the 
distinction between class and status, first introduced by Weber and later on dismissed 
by Bourdieu.  
 
It is worth stating here that the distribution of omnivores is not random across the 
population, for to the contrary, omnivores are more likely to be found higher in the 
social strata. In trying to account for this type of homology, Chan and Goldthorpe reject 
social class (measured in relations in labour markets) and identify education and 
particularly social status as the best ways to account for the stratification of cultural 
consumption. However, the distinction between status and class in the way the authors 
account for it is debatable. This is because, status in these studies has been measured by 
the occupational structure of friendship (2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b) and as the authors 
argue “the closer together any two categories in the scale are, the more similar 
occupationally, are their members’ friends” (2005, 196) Following from this, even 
though status is treated as separate from class, it is still measured taking into account 
positions in the labour market, leaving in the outset alternative ways of gaining social 
honour. With work being accused to lose its ability to shape the lives of individuals 
(Offe 1985) Chan and Goldthorpe’s approach has been criticized as inadequate.  
 
Conceptually, omnivores present similarities with the fraction of intellectuals that 
Bourdieu describes as individuals with high cultural capital within the dominant class, 
able to take multiple popular forms of culture and infuse them with an aesthetic 
dimension. Indeed, other authors have also claimed that omnivorousness is a 
characteristic to be encountered in those free from economic necessity and rich in 
cultural capital (for example, Smith 1994; Holt 1998). Holt, in particular, explains that 
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in a society where “market offerings have somewhat tainted the possible alternatives” 
(1998, 5), the high cultural capital fraction, in an attempt to gain differentiation, 
employs strategies that focus on practices, manner of consumption and synthesizing of 
objects, in order to shape a distinct lifestyle. An alternative explanation for the existence 
of omnivores comes from Gans (1999) who argues that “omnivores have blossomed 
because more people have the time, money and education to choose more culture from 
several taste levels, making all forms and genres of culture potential hinting grounds for 
them” (12). Indeed, better living conditions, in general, along with plurality of choice, 
have been recognised as yet others factor contributing to cultural democracy and 
pointing towards the disappearance of class and its effects.  
 
 
2.4 Taste as Free Choice: Individualisation Arguments 
 
Individualisation refers to differentiation of lifestyles free from the determinations 
imposed by social class. Tastes, following the individualisation argument, move “from 
habitus to freedom”, as Warde (1997) would put it. In contrast to the Bourdieusian 
view, this approach renders that agents develop tastes irrespective of restrictions 
imposed by structure. However, scholars warn that individualisation does not signify 
emancipation, in the sense that individuals can self-create the world, but rather freedom 
to choose and build an identity for themselves among a given set of options (Beck 
1992). The role of the market in the process of taste formation remains, thus, as the only 
indisputable one. 
 
In his analysis of the concept of freedom as a social relation, Bauman (1988) discusses 
the theme of individualisation and how it has evolved, hand in hand, with changes in 
societies. More specifically, it is argued that freedom comes together with capitalism 
and is defined as choices guided solely by a means-ends calculus. For freedom to exist, 
it is required that some individuals become subordinates and are used to serve the 
freedom of others or as Bauman puts it (45) “the effectiveness of freedom demands that 
some other people stay unfree”.  A question here arises of who is entitled to freedom 
and who isn’t. At this point Bauman’s arguments on individualisation are not too far 
from Bourdieu’s view, as individualisation exists only for those who experience 
freedom from necessity and so it would be wrong to try and interpret the unequal 
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distribution of the means to achieve freedom outside material factors, like the ownership 
and control of the means of production (Albrow 1997). 
 
Bauman (1988) goes on to argue that the progression to a late stage capitalism has 
opened a new world that allows freedom to a much larger number of people, namely, a 
universe of consumption. The new phase “offers a space for human freedom greater 
than any other known society, past or present” (57). Following from this, the struggle 
for wealth and power has turned into competition for symbols and their sign value, a 
competition of tastes. Bauman further recognises that this freedom is a new, more 
efficient form of control that has come to replace bureaucracy, as it allows for the 
reproduction and perpetuation of capitalism. His argument is not unlike that made by 
Frankfurt School theorists and Marcuse ([1964] 1991), in particular, deeming 
consumerism to be a form of social control. It is ironic though that for Marcuse – in 
contrast to Bauman -this signifies a “state of unfreedom” in which people buy for 
happiness. Aware that scholars would criticise consumer rivalry and theorise it as “not 
really true freedom” as it is concealing the real competition, Bauman replies that such 
an approach would “change little, whatever is the truth” (59).  
 
Giddens (1991) attempts to identify the conditions that explain the plurality of the 
modern age. First, alternatives offered in the post traditional order give individuals 
options among which to choose from. Second, drawing upon Berger et al. (1974), he 
highlights that unlike in the past when people lived in relatively closed social settings, 
modern social life has placed individuals in settings that are much more diverse, 
essentially creating a pluralisation of life worlds. Bauman makes a similar point by 
stating that urban housing projects also seem to have played a role, bringing together in 
neighbourhoods people from all kinds of backgrounds and thus forming new social 
networks. Finally, mediated experience through the spoken word of the globalised 
media has made accessible a number of potential lifestyle choices. Giddens (1991) also 
highlights that individuals “have no choice but to choose” (81) a lifestyle among this 
plurality and in line with Bourdieu (1984), argues that lifestyles “give material form to a 
particular narrative of a self-identity” (81). At this point it is worth asking the question, 
to what extend does Giddens (1991) sees this plurality of choice as freeing individuals 
from determinism? The answer would be to some. That is, on the one hand, it is 
recognised that multiplicity of choices does not imply that choices are accessible to 
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everyone. On the other, he suggests that even for the most underprivileged, modernity 
has changed the possibilities and that construction of lifestyles may become a new 
weapon for some. 
 
In an attempt to examine the relationship between individualisation and taste creation 
it is worth pointing out that individualisation arguments give more weight to the 
material rather than the cultural aspects of consumption, when the latter calls for 
specific attention (Chan and Goldthorpe 2010). Following from this and taking into 
account specifically the effects of access to education in cultural consumption, it is 
worth going back to Bourdieu (1984), who clarifies that education opportunities may be 
present for all, but work differently for each person. The reasons for this can be 
summarized as follows: firstly, mastery of tastes acquired by upbringing becomes 
naturalised in an actor, while in those cases where cultural knowledge is firstly acquired 
at school it remains rather alien to the individual. Secondly, the legitimate way of 
appropriating culture taught at school essentially favours those who have had a 
domestic acquisition of it and thirdly, cultural mastery is often confused with school 
merit. In addition to this, individualisation arguments do not take into account 
stratification of the education system, whereby different institutions will have different 
status, providing individuals with different opportunities and social capital. 
 
With regards to Berger’s et al. (1974) argument that “pluralisation of life worlds” has 
brought people from different backgrounds  together in the same settings, Bourdieu 
(1984) presents us with a counter argument based on his idea that while actors who are 
closely placed in social space often find themselves close in geographic space as well,  
the opposite is also very common. Individuals who are very distant in social space can 
encounter each other in the physical world and interact all the time. For Bourdieu these 
interactions only mask the structures behind them and one must not forget that “the 
truth of any interaction is never entirely to be found within the interaction as it avails 
itself for observation” (1989, 16). 
 
No matter how strong the arguments against individualisation, it would be inaccurate 
to argue that late capitalist societies with their plurality of choice and expanded universe 
of consumption have had no impact on the way people consume and make use of 
culture. Altered living conditions have, indeed, presented individuals with different 
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opportunities, at the very least creating new and more subtle relationships between class 





















3. Critical Approaches on Taste 
 
Since the publication of Distinction the construct of taste has appeared in numerous 
studies within the fields of sociology, social psychology, cultural studies, consumer 
research and more recently organisation studies. Many of these works were conducted 
as a response to the ideas presented in Distinction, whether to provide additional 
evidence to homology arguments (for example Levine 1988; Warde 1997; Holt 1998; 
Allen 2002; Henry 2005; Üstüner and Holt 2010), to support partly Bourdieu’s theory 
(for example Thornton 1996; Frith 1996; Turner and Edmunds 2002; Ollivier 2006) or 
to dismiss major aspects of it (for example Hennion 2007).  Especially within consumer 
research, multiple studies not explicitly dealing with taste relate issues can be “read” for 
their reliance on the construct, i.e. taste as play (Holt 1995), taste as embodied feeling, 
including desire (Belk, Ger and Askegaard 2003) and love (Ahuvia 2005), taste as a 
determinant of fashion narratives (Thompson and Haytko 1997) etc. In this chapter, I 
focus on post-Bourdieusian critical works on taste that have contributed towards the re-
conceptualisation of the construct by rethinking its properties. Most notably, taste is 
examined as practice (Holt 1998), performance (Hennion 2001; 2003; 2007) and regime 
(Arsel and Bean 2013). 
 
 
3.1 Taste as Practice 
 
Holt’s (1998) work is preoccupied with the relationship between cultural capital and 
consumption and is largely supportive of Bourdieusian thought, arguing, however, that 
the relationship between class and tastes expressed in consumption preferences is much 
more subtle than previously thought. In examining the role of cultural capital in relation 
to consumption, it has been argued that different levels of cultural resources are 
influencing the consumption practices of individuals, including not only their tastes for 
products or services, but even more importantly the way that actors choose to combine 
and make use of market offerings, as well as the meanings that are derived from the 
process (Holt 1998). Holt emphasised the manner in which HCCs (individuals with high 
cultural capital resources) consume as opposing to what they consume, placing an 
emphasis on practices rather than objects. Through such practices HCCs attempt to 
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achieve differentiation, a task that becomes more and more challenging given the 
massified nature of market offerings which provides limited - if any - space for 
individuals to pursue authenticity.  
 
The distinction between the object of consumption and manner of consumption is not 
completely absent from Distinction, where Bourdieu (1984, 282) argues that “the 
pursuit of exclusiveness has to be content by developing a unique mode of 
appropriation. Liking the same things differently, liking different things, less obviously 
marked out for admiration – these are some of the strategies for outflanking, and 
displacing, which by maintaining a permanent revolution in tastes enable (...) those 
whose appropriations must, in the main be exclusively symbolic, to secure exclusive 
possessions at every moment”. However, it is with Holt’s work on cultural capital that 
practices and modes of appropriation came to the forefront of discussions around taste.  
 
 
3.1.1 Revisiting Cultural Capital 
 
The construct of cultural capital, since its conception by Bourdieu and Passeron in 
1964, has appeared in studies from a variety of disciplines ranging from sociology of 
culture and anthropology to organization studies and marketing. It describes the 
intellectual capabilities of individuals, not in the sense of intelligence, but rather 
socially acquired skills and knowledge that ultimately shape dispositions towards 
various aspects of life (to name a few: profession, partner selection, consumption 
choices and social milieus in which one feels at ease). It is cultural capital that generates 
embodied and manifested preferences and in this sense provides the basis on which 
tastes and distastes operate. From this standpoint, studying taste-making goes hand in 
hand with exploring the intellectual resources underlying it, because it is those resources 
that will direct both what is preferred/rejected and the manner in which the 
choice/rejection is practised.  
 
While cultural capital is a versatile construct, indeterminacy about its meaning and 
operationalisation has not gone unnoticed and criticisms over its conceptual clarity are 
common. In this project, Bourdieu’s use of cultural capital in Distinction (1984) is 
revisited, while, drawing upon consumer culture works, Holt’s (1997, 1998) use of the 
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term is also found to be illuminating. Cultural capital is embodied in the form of inward 
skills, aptitudes and understandings, however, it is argued that it can also exist 
objectified in objects (e.g. works of art) and institutionalized (e.g. in university degrees). 
For Bourdieu (1984), the concept is directly linked to social origin and was initially 
conceived to explain how class structures are reproduced in the cultural sphere. 
Consequently, in most works it has been treated as a class attribute and as a basis for 
exclusion for those who do not possess it. The concept’s value, however, lies in its 
ability to explain how individuals can gain differentiation - or a sense of distinction - by 
creating and maintaining symbolic distances, as well as to account for stratification 
amongst status groups of all sorts. It provides, in other words, the foundation for status 
boundaries and as argued, “it is used to exclude and unify people not only in lower 
status groups but equals as well” (Bourdieu 1984, 31).  
 
In the sphere of consumption, cultural capital is seen as a code. Those possessing it 
have the competence to consume culturally charged products and services that are 
inaccessible to those who don’t. Ability to master comfortably such consumption 
practices has further benefits in that it provides the possessor of capital with access to 
exclusive social environments. Indeed, a number of works in consumer research 
examine how mastery of “the code” affects various aspects of life including educational 
choices that “feel right” (Allen 2002) and distinctive financial management styles 
stemming from an individual’s sense of power and status (Henry 2005). Cultural 
capital’s ability to exclude and set boundaries is always highlighted in that those not 
possessing it are left trapped in constrained educational opportunities (Allen 2002) and 
poorer budgeting respectively (Henry 2005). 
  
Holt (1997) criticizes previous works in their treatment of cultural capital solely as 
universal and for disregarding both the particularities of different fields and the 
sociohistoric conditions surrounding them. This nomothetic treatment of the construct is 
apparent in studies that equate it to high culture or culturally acceptable practices 
(DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; DiMaggio and Useem 1978). For example, Lamont and 
Lareau (1988, 156) argue that “for a signal to be considered a form of cultural capital it 
needs to be defined as a high status cultural signal by a relatively large group of people: 
the institutionalized or shared quality of these signals make them salient as status 
markers”. However, inability to set universal standards as to what constitutes high or 
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legitimate culture and social constructionism’s rejection of universality in judgement 
and disregard for objective standards that can determine the quality of various cultural 
objects and practices, have led to obstacles in the process of identifying how cultural 
capital operates. Since cultural offerings are not intrinsically divided to highbrow or 
popular, cultural capital and its expressions in tastes can only impose status distinctions 
amongst individuals and groups in very subtle ways.  
 
The arbitrariness of what constitutes legitimate culture is evident throughout 
Bourdieu’s Distinction (LiPuma 1993) not only with regards to the absence of intrinsic 
values that make up the meanings of cultural objects, but in addition to this, in the idea 
that there are no a priori reasons why or how certain tastes exhibited by one status group 
or another are distinguished as legitimate or not. The stability of cultural boundaries is 
fragile especially in large and differentiated societies, where cultural practices cannot be 
constantly compared to one another (Lamont and Lareau 1988) and where smaller status 
groups develop their own signs and standards which operate autonomously. Such 
collectives will adopt different cultural frameworks (meaning sets of values, beliefs, 
traditions and myths, followed by aggregates of people at any given time), appropriate 
them in their own unique way and possibly give them up when they become 
contaminated or lose their meaning. Inability to impose status differences because of the 
arbitrariness of cultural meanings calls for an approach that will operationalise cultural 
capital for the purposes of studying micro settings each time.  
 
A proposed resolution to this problem suggests the breaking down of the concept into 
two components: abstracted and realized. More specifically, it is argued that “while not 
always clear in Distinction, it appears that Bourdieu and his interpreters now agree that 
it is the institutional logic particular to a consumption field located in a particular socio-
historical setting that invests objects and activities with cultural capital”(Holt 1997, 99). 
Under this lens, abstracted cultural capital refers to knowledge, skills and dispositions 
that are universally transportable (e.g. critical thinking, creativity). However, 
consequential expressions of cultural capital exist as field related capital, which only 
has value within the particular field in question (e.g. an individual not interested in 
wristwatches is unlikely to appreciate another’s knowledge of fine craftsmanship). The 
distinction between the two forms of capital indicates, firstly, the need to study matters 
related to taste within the boundaries of specific fields, since cultural capital is only 
 41 
 
consequential when field-related, and secondly that in studying taste-making, both 
universal and field specific skills need to be taken into account.   
 
 
3.1.2 On Modes of Appropriation 
 
Going back to Holt (1998), at this point it is worth attempting to define just what 
appropriation is and what it involves. We often talk about appropriation in relation to art 
movements and art forms, but these processes are not absent from some of the most 
mundane aspects of daily life either. In art history, appropriation has been defined as 
“the direct duplication, copying or incorporation of an image (painting, photograph, 
etc.) by another artist who represents it in a different context, thus completely altering 
its meaning and questioning notions of originality and authenticity” (Stangos 1994, 19). 
The avant-garde movement of Dadaism, born out of rejection of the capitalist, bourgeois 
ideology and the horrors of World War I, was an appropriation movement due to its 
reliance on found materials (i.e. Duchamp’s porcelain urinal), abstract collages of 
existing images (i.e. Hausmann’s Elasticum) and mockery of existing works of art (i.e. 
Duchamp’s reproduction of Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa), aiming to change public perception 
of what is considered art and provide images and items with an alternative meaning, one 
which the public has not thought of before and perhaps one that shocks. In daily life, it 
has been argued that technology in itself is a dominant mode of appropriation. It has 
allowed, for example, the recording of sound, thereby appropriating music in a raw 
material that is ready to be bought and used by humans (Boon 2007). In its turn, music 
moves humans and in doing so it appropriates them through “affection” (Boon 2007). In 
these cases appropriation refers to alterations in form and alterations in one’s state of 
being, respectively. Finally, examples of appropriation could involve changes in the 
“status” of an object. For instance, increased popularity of quinoa outside its native 
home of Bolivia, has changed perceptions surrounding the ingredient, turning it from a 
working class cereal to a delicacy. This intangible change in perception was 
accompanied by a tangible increase in price, ironically making quinoa less affordable to 
its original consumers. In another case, Stewart and Lacassagne (2005), explain how 
sports bear “hard work” connotations for Moroccans, while on the contrary have 
“recreational” meanings for the French and the discrepancy between the appropriation 




Appropriation is not absent from consumer studies where it has been discussed in a 
multiplicity of forms, including but not limited to, the: manner of consumption (Holt 
1998), meaning making through combination of narratives (Thompson and Haytko 
1997), paradoxical embracement of  anti-consumption ideology in advertising (Zhao 
and Belk 2008)  and most commonly cultural appropriation, which refers to the use of 
material elements across cultural boundaries (for example Howes 1996; Ziff and Rao 
1997; Schneider 2003).  
 
After close observation, there are some common characteristics in all the uses 
mentioned above. First, they all imply taking something and using it differently to the 
manner that it is commonly used, in other words resignifying it. This gives rise to the 
second and most important attribute of all modes of appropriation, namely ownership. 
That is, what these processes imply is that by taking something and using it in a 
different way, attributing a different meaning to it, or combining it with something it 
has never been combined before, essentially resignifying it, the appropriator is during 
the process gaining ownership of its new mode of existence. Cultural appropriation, in 
particular, is defined as “the taking – from a culture that is not one’s own – of 
intellectual property, cultural expressions or artefacts, history and ways of knowledge” 
(Schneider 2003, 218). By explaining appropriation as “taking”, Schneider highlights 
the alterations in traditional uses and the new ownership of tangible and intangible 
cultural elements.  
 
Boon (2007) recognises two different but contradictory meanings for appropriation. 
The first refers to taking something and claiming it as one’s own, bearing an underlying 
assumption that this “something” that belongs to someone else from whom it is being 
seized. The second relates to the etymology of the word and refers to that which is 
“proper” or “appropriate” to a situation or a person and thus rightfully belonging to him 
or her. Heidegger in his work on Enowning (1999), translated as “of appropriation”, 
criticizes the metaphysic tradition in philosophy which grounds all beings in essence. 
Rejecting the idea that “essence” is not transferable, Heidegger argues that essence, in 
other words the attributes that make an entity what it fundamentally is and give 
character to it, can only be appropriated to things. It is thus through processes of 




What is interesting about Heidegger’s approach is that in rejecting metaphysics, our 
world can be seen as full of “mutually co-constituting and interdependent 
appropriations” (Boon 2007). Accepting that appropriations are everywhere, one may be 
able to distinguish between dominant and emerging modes of appropriation (i.e. 
traditionally pins are used to keep garments in place but in an emerging mode, they are 
a common accessory amongst the punk subculture) as well as to identify appropriation 
wars in cases when particular taste cultures threaten to change the essence of an object 
or practice. Finally, appropriation may also be thought of as “framing” of elements 
previously not connected to each other in any obvious way.  
 
In examining the concept, however, both the characteristics of “ownership” and 
“properness” pose a problem to our understanding of it. If we accept that by owning 
something one can define its essence, how can any sense of belonging be constituted 
(Boon 2007) apart from legal ownership? Secondly, it is also unclear how “properness” 
can be constituted, although Heidegger argues that proper is that which is nearer to us. 
Apart from philosophical questions surrounding the nature of “ownership” and 
“properness”, consumer research can attempt to shed some light on several other issues. 
In relation to taste, what processes of appropriation can we distinguish (i.e. meaning 
making, changes in use, changes in status) and what are the characteristics of wars of 
appropriation amongst status groups? Does a mode of appropriation need to be 
collectively understood to acquire power and validity? And most importantly, through 
what processes of appropriation is taste employed to internalise meaning to practices?  
 
Going back to taste, modes of appropriation, as discussed by Holt (1998), refer to 
aesthetic redefinitions of objects which are attributed different meanings by different 
users or status groups. Taking into account Heidegger’s argument, the embedded 
cultural value of objects is of less significance compared to the symbolic value 
generated through the mode of appropriation. From this standpoint, the cultural capital 
of a social group orchestrates the taste-making by directing both what it is that is 
preferred or rejected and the manner in which the choice or rejection is performed 
through different practices. Modes of appropriation are the result of the application of 
“presuppositional interpretive frameworks of taste” (Holt 1997, 116) which draw upon 
both abstracted and field related cultural capital. In other words, interpretive 
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frameworks of taste operate based on general intellectual capabilities and knowledge of 
specific fields, and direct the object and manner of preference or rejection as well as the 
rationale underlying such choices and aversions. Approaching taste as a mode of 
appropriation rather than as isolated preference of objects/services/institutions etc. is a 
first step towards a more dynamic conceptualisation.  
 
 
3.2 Taste as Performance 
 
Going back to reviewing recent re-conceptualisations of taste and summing up the 
various approaches on taste formation presented in the second chapter, they are either 
treated as a resource in the game of social reproduction and perpetuation of existing 
structures or, at the other end of the spectrum, as a process of continual selection 
amongst the plurality of offerings. Two points of criticism arise here. Firstly, taste is 
largely treated as unconscious. Hennion (2004), in particular, argues that deterministic 
approaches present actors as largely ignorant about the nature of what they do, placing 
aside the possibility of preferences being the result of an actor’s reflexivity. Following 
this, Hennion calls for a pragmatic lens that moves away from simple connoisseurship 
of practice by including discursive devices, ways of acting and objects, as well as the 
body and mind. Secondly, taste is treated as a static concept, both in its structuralist and 
agentic form. Far from an observance centred on knowledge of objects, taste’s 
performative nature involves actors using resources and capabilities reflexively in order 
to derive symbolic meanings (Hennion 2004). 
 
Rather than looking into the deterministic external dynamics of social origin or the 
aesthetics of consumption objects, Hennion (2001) is examining the behaviours and 
materials involved in consumption, in the context of music. His focus is not on the 
process of selection of type of music, nor on the status one can enjoy from consuming a 
particular kind, but rather in the process of actualization (in this case the listening) and 
how this defines taste. In contrast to both Bourdieu (1984) and Holt (1998), social labels 
are dismissed in the author’s work. It is possible, however, to find similarities between 
Hennion’s performative taste and Holt’s taste practices, in that both scholars agree that 
taste cannot simply be reduced to the choice for a product or service. However, whilst 
Holt is focusing on the meaning that individuals attach to their choices and their 
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referential interpretations of them, Hennion focuses on their actualization. That is, for 
Holt it is the symbolic analysis taking place behind choices that is important, whereas 
for Hennion consumption is not a static process but an “unpredictable event happening 
in real time” (2001, 2). By looking into the different ways that people experience music, 
he describes a taste for “ways of doing things”, which includes Holt’s “interpretation of 
doings”, but is not reducible to it. Instead, taste is described as an “active process” and a 
“meticulous activity” (13). Following this perspective, the role of actors in this process 
is a purely reflexive one (Hennion 2007), in a sense that it is actors themselves that have 
to unfold the properties of objects in order to perceive them as tasteful or not.  
 
For the purposes of this project, the performative properties of the construct of taste 
are considered of interest, particularly because they can open up new ways of answering 
questions, not only in relation to how tastes are formed, but also to how they can be 
used in an: active, strategic and conscious manner. 
 
3.3 Taste as Regime 
 
A more recent theorisation of taste that takes a critical stance to previous approaches is 
that of Arsel and Bean (2013), which sees the construct as regime. Similarly to this 
project, in their study, while tastes are still bound to differential consumption, the 
distinctions in question do not concern social hierarchies as in the majority of previous 
works. That is, the effects of social class on taste are not dismissed, but are set aside in 
order to direct focus on how tastes operate and are practised within one social stratum. 
Such an approach comes in response to calls for research on the cultural and horizontal, 
rather than social stratifications, as directed by Thornton (1996) and Frith (1996). 
Indeed, a few scholars have empirically examined those systems of distinctions that 
divide contemporary culture, with subcultural capital and subcultural taste - as opposed 
to class taste - becoming all the more relevant (Thornton 1996).  
 
Arsel and Bean (2013) focus on the existence of “discursive normative systems” that 
are able to guide and orchestrate the aesthetics of practice and that are created and 
spread through particular organisations or through transmedia. The concept of “regime” 
presents a much more holistic approach to taste, as it encompasses not only the 
preference for particular objects, but also Holt’s (1998) symbolic interpretations, by 
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looking at the “meaning” behind practices, and Hennion’s (2001, 2004, 2007) emphasis 
on the actualisation and continual achievement of taste by looking at the “doings”. More 
specifically, taste regimes are composed of practices of problemitisation, ritualisation 
and instrumentalisation, which in turn gain specificity through compliance to normative 
systems (Arsel and Bean 2013). What is important to take from this study is the idea 
that practices that in a first instance may seem unrelated to one another, should be 
examined for “recognizable and repeatable patterns” (902), which are orchestrated by 
the regime underlying the practice.  In other words, if a taste regime is the glue that 
holds practices together, any empirical work on tastes should be looking to trace the 
normative system that dictates which practices are acceptable and which should be 




4. The Silent Partner: On the Importance of Distaste 
 
 
Distaste is a research domain that has attracted less attention from scholars compared 
to its positive counterpart, yet one which could potentially be revealing, primarily 
because rejection is more determining in drawing social distinctions (Wilk 1997). The 
reason the construct has remained relatively underresearched is presumably its invisible 
nature, which renders dislikes difficult to be displayed in public (e.g. someone may 
display a preference for jazz, but that doesn’t say much about his or her taste in other 
genres). The construct has been defined by Bourdieu (1984) as refusal of the taste of 
others and it constitutes a constant, yet silent, partner to our choices and preferences 
since one’s taste “starts with the comparison with others' tastes” (Hennion 2004, 135). 
Distaste is intrinsically bound to relational oppositions and subtly implies a competitive 
relationship amongst cultures displaying different preferences. Douglas (1996) in 
particular takes an extreme stance by arguing that cultures, which are the “arbiter of 
taste” (80), are at all times “accusing” all other, competing cultures, declaring in the 
process their commitment to a particular cultural stance. Similarly, Bourdieu recognises 
the hostility that delineates heterogenous tastes by arguing that “tastes (i.e. manifested 
preferences) are the practical affirmation of an inevitable difference. It is no accident 
that, when they have to be justified, they are asserted purely negatively, by the refusal of 
other tastes. In matters of taste, more than anywhere else, all determination is negation, 
and tastes are perhaps most and foremost distastes, disgust provoked by horror or 
visceral intolerance (“sick making”) of the tastes of others” (56). From this standpoint, 
it can be argued that the distinction between taste and distaste is practically non-
existent, since one constitutes a reflection of the other. This project is preoccupied with 
distaste just as much as it is with taste-making and this chapter is aiming to provide a 
better understanding of rejection and setting up a research agenda with regards to 
boundary-making. 
 
A significant point of criticism that arises with respect to the dialectic of tastes and 
distastes is their treatment as binary opposites. Douglas (1966), for example, in her 
analysis of the relativity of what is considered as “dirt” in different societies, argues that 
symbolic boundary making is achieved by drawing the line between what is pure and 
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what is dirty, in a sense that anything outside a particular system of perceptions is 
considered disordered and will be condemned. Such a classification system, however, is 
only addressing concepts that are diametrically antithetical to one another (e.g. the 
vulgar and the refined), and despite it being easy to grasp by painting a clear picture of 
how each society classifies artefacts, this perspective ignores  the wide range of 
possibilities that may exist in between. Rejecting the binary relationship between tastes 
and distastes, Wilk (1997) attempts to demonstrate that individuals may be driven by a 
range of emotions, from dislikes to utter disgust. His work identifies four ways in which 
people may place boundaries through the use of (dis)tastes. Firstly, the more 
straightforward strategies of “us versus them” may be employed through simple 
exhibition of likes and dislikes, e.g. we all love wine or we all hate beer. Secondly, 
exclusion of others is also possible on the basis of not sharing similar tastes (e.g. they 
don’t appreciate wine) or of not sharing similar distastes (e.g. they like beer). In sum, 
Wilk rejects the idea of tastes forming perfect oppositions and suggests that the 
relationship between the two is far more complex. 
 
A second point of clarification concerns the conceptualisation of (dis)tastes as 
collectively –as opposed to individually- performed. Taking into account the instability 
of meanings which are necessarily bound to social interaction (Berger and Luckmann 
1967), for this project it is assumed that consumption cannot be understood as 
individual choices, for it is the basic choice of the type of society and culture that one 
wishes to live in that will subsequently define ones preferences (Douglas 1996). 
Explaining the relationship between culture of belonging and preference for and 
rejection of objects, Douglas suggests that “commodities are chosen because they are 
not neutral; they are chosen because they would not be tolerated in the rejected forms of 
society and are therefore permissible in the preferred form. Hostility is implicit in their 
selection” (81). From this standpoint, one’s taste for commodities is mediated through 
participation in a particular culture and signifies the actor’s belonging to that culture and 
his or her non-membership in all competing ones. 
Having clarified the foundations of the approach that this study is taking towards 
distaste, the next sections aim to address shortfalls of recent conceptualisations. Aside 
from distaste’s reductionist treatment as a binary opposite to its positive counterpart, the 
construct has been incorporated in static models in the fields of social psychology and 
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consumer research, where individuals are portrayed as rejecting behaviours exhibited by 
dissociative groups or stereotyped others. However, such theorisations treat the concept 
as taken for granted and do not account for the manner in which dislikes are not solely 
driven by outgroup behaviour, but are instead constantly negotiated amongst members 
of a social group. Finally, it has been argued that distastes can in some cases be 
inconspicuous and innocent of social consequences. Despite this argument having 
validity in certain contexts, it is argued that the current understanding of the distinction 
between conspicuous distaste and unassuming rejection is only partial. The chapter 
takes a closer look at these approaches, starting from negative symbolic consumption 




4.1 “Us versus Them”: Boundary-Making and Negative Symbolic Consumption 
 
Consumer research has examined distaste within the scholarship of negative symbolic 
consumption. Empirical work has explored the construct primarily at the level of the 
self, meaning that an actor’s likes and dislikes help him/her achieve his/her ideal self or 
avoid the undesired self. Negative symbolic consumption is divided in non-choice 
(usually inconspicuous and is due to affordability, availability or accessibility reasons) 
and anti-choice (commonly related to abandonment, avoidance or aversion behaviour) 
(Hogg 1998; Hogg et al. 2009), which may be related to whole product categories or 
specific brands with the purpose of avoiding undesired identities (Ogilvie 1987; Wilk 
1994; 1997; Hogg 1998; Hogg and Banister 2001; Banister and Hogg 2004). 
The coordinates for what constitutes a desired or undesired identity, and by extension 
which tastes should be rejected as well as which are deemed as appropriate, are said to 
be provided by reference groups (Simmel 1955; Hogg 1998; Hogg, Banister and 
Stephenson 2009). The term was conceived by Hyman (1942) decades ago and has 
since appeared in various studies and taken multiple forms (e.g. dissociative others, 
avoidance groups, outgroups and stereotyped collectives). Consequently, its definition 
varies significantly. A common usage, however, is that a reference group constitutes 
that which serves as a point of reference in making comparisons and forming judgments 
about one’s self or group (Shibutani 1955). This frame of reference can have both 
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positive and negative connotations, in the sense that such a group can be both a 
collective that one aspires for membership of or one to avoid.  
 
Reference groups constitute the cornerstone of social identity theory. Originally 
formulated by Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986), this theory attempts to explain the 
relationship between the self and social categorisation by suggesting that intergroup 
behaviour, in other words behaviour of an actor that is based on the actor’s 
identification of themselves as belonging to a particular social group, overtakes 
interpersonal behaviour determined by individual characteristics. Social identity theory 
focuses on intergroup conflict, arguing that individuals who are members of opposing 
groups will behave in competition to each other as their respective group membership 
dictates. Competition amongst groups is not only present when conflict of interest 
occurs, since the mere existence of an outgroup is sufficient to provoke it (Tajfel and 
Turner 1979), but later research suggests that it will only concern dimensions that 
provide a meaningful basis for self-other definition (Reynolds, Turner and Haslam 
2000). Therefore, a group is perceived as a collection of individuals who share a 
“common definition of themselves” and consensus over the “evaluation of their group 
and membership of it” (1979, 40).  
 
Consumer research with the help of social psychology has well established the 
relationships between tastes and social groups, the main argument being that individuals 
develop tastes consistent with their membership groups or ingroups and adopt habits 
consonant with their aspirational groups, in order to realise their desired identities. For 
example, Muniz and Hamer (2001) demonstrate how consumers actively avoid 
particular brands through rivalries with the consumer group that is loyal to those brands, 
while Bearden and Etzel (1982) demonstrate how reference group influence varies 
depending on whether the tastes in question refer to luxury or everyday goods and 
whether use of such goods is public or private. Antithetically, distastes are developed 
when consumers are acting in specific ways in order to avoid outgroup membership 
(Escalas and Bettman 2005), which is based on the idea that dislikes are especially 
developed when individuals relate specific preferences to groups that they do not wish 
to be associated with. In other words, the point of reference for distastes is usually 
stereotyped collectives, with the degree of coherence and stability of these collectives  
varied (e.g. from nationality [White and Dahl 2007] and occupation [Hogg 1998], to a 
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fan subculture [Banister et al. 2005]). White and Dhal (2007) extend this view by 
arguing that it is not just any outgroup that individuals will try to avoid, but rather 
dissociative reference groups, in particular, that will most strongly influence negative 
consumption. It is further argued that when ingroup identity is stronger, individuals are 
even more motivated to refuse tastes of dissociative reference groups (e.g. White and 
Dhal (2007) give the example of Canadians expressing distaste towards elements 
associated with American identity) and that competition is more intense amongst 
collectives that are closer in social space. The importance of distaste in drawing 
symbolic boundaries is best exhibited by Wilk (1994), whose work demonstrates that 
negative consumption is a much more effective means of signalling identity, for it 
expresses a level of commitment to one’s ingroup far stronger to what can be achieved 
simply by exhibiting similar tastes. 
 
The underlying principles of the above mentioned studies is that rejection of tastes by 
members of the ingroup occurs to make sure that others understand where the group 
stands in the social space, in relation to the external and often competitive “them” 
(Berger and Heath 2008). However, research shows that the distinction between “their 
tastes” and “ours” is not always straightforward. In a more complicated case, Arsel and 
Thompson (2010) explore how the indie field of consumption gets contaminated by the 
hipster myth. In this case, respondents often had to assert their identity against 
outgroups through the use of the same or similar products and services and it was 
differentiation of the practices and manner of consuming that could distinguish these 
consumers from outsiders. From this standpoint, distaste against practices of outgroups 
was mirrored in the appropriation of tastes by the ingroup, which provides further 
evidence to the argument that theorisation of conspicuous distaste as anti-choice is not 
always relevant and that the treatment of ingroup tastes as a mere opposite to the tastes 
of others may be underestimating the complexities of boundary making. 
 
Finally, the invisibility of the construct has led to arguments over its inconspicuous 
properties, since studies have demonstrated that anti-choice can also be used as a “play 
safe” strategy. That is, Banister and Hogg (2004) argue that consumers who use 
avoidance as a primary drive for their consumption may do so to remain inconspicuous 
and safe. This may be preferred to using taste as a way to signify an identity and thereby 
running the risk of “getting it wrong”. By contrast, the inconspicuousness of distaste is a 
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view that is completely dismissed in Douglas’s (1996) work, which, as discussed 
earlier, reads all artefacts for their evident meanings, solely.  This researcher posits that 
if the idea that anti-choice may indeed on occasion be a “play safe” strategy is to be 
accepted, then the literature lacks insights as to when the exhibiting of distaste is 
conspicuous, thus signifying non-compliance with the profile of the user that is 
normally associated to the object or practice in question, and when it is unassuming.  
 
 
4.2 Towards a Dynamic Conceptualisation of Distaste 
 
The problem with conceptualising distaste in relation to dissociative outgroups 
manifests itself in a two fold way. First, there is currently no framework of 
understanding as to who constitutes an avoidance group for a collective and 
consequently as to what provides the coordinates for what is rejected. Secondly, to say 
that distaste is refusal of the tastes of outgroups portrays the concept as oppositional 
without providing a rationale behind this opposition. Understanding underlying 
rejection behaviour, however, is crucial in explaining how distaste is formed and how it 
is subtly present in the performance of taste as “that which is out of place” (Douglas 
1966).  
 
Even though anti-choice (Hogg 1998) is an organised way to explore nets of distaste, 
the problem of volatile cultural frameworks calls for an analysis not only of objects or 
services that are rejected, but rather of the understanding underlying such decisions. In 
other words, since the meanings of consumption objects are unstable and depend on 
interpretations given by their appropriators (Elliott and Wattanasuwan 1998), what is 
necessary in the study of taste-making is a relativist approach that explains the logic 
behind disassociating with products, services and social groups, as well as the logic of 
the specific field.  
 
The importance of switching the focus from the object of rejection to the 
understanding underlying avoidance behaviour is imposed by another factor as well. 
That is, Banister and Hogg’s (2004) argument over the non-conspicuous aspects of non-
choice, is in direct opposition to Douglas’s (1996, 25) view that “any choosing ‘for’ is 
also choosing ‘against’”, for as it was established earlier, a choice for an object over 
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another may be related to a multiplicity of reasons: practicalities, availability, and habit 
to name a few. This raises an important question: under what circumstance is the non-
choice of products conspicuous? Contrasts and juxtapositions that actors use to justify 
their consumption choices are not necessarily triggered by the object itself, but by what 
the practice of using it represents. Despite actors expressing their dislikes towards “this” 
or “that” product or brand in their everyday narratives, it is the meanings associated 
with a particular practice that provoke disgust. While this argument states the obvious 
for any social constructionist, it has significant implications for this study of distaste in 
relation to our ability to distinguish between conspicuous and inconspicuous non-
choice. To give an example, in justifying their preference for complementary (as 
opposed to Western) medicine, Douglas’s (1996) respondents rather than providing 
evidence of how the former worked better for them, or indicating where the latter failed 
them, concentrated on stating the negative associations that they held for Western 
medicine – i.e. materiality, physicality and violence - as the reasons behind their 
rejection (25).  
 
From this standpoint, in understanding non-choice the ideology lurking behind 
rejection behaviour and potential “patterns” underlying an actor’s positive choices that 
could potentially be revealing are being sought. As such, Arsel and Bean’s (2013) 
approach to taste as a “regime” that directs practice revises the “rejection of the taste of 
others” conceptualisation implied in social identity theory and negative symbolic 
consumption, by placing the focus of the research on the pattern that consumers are 
trying to maintain when certain types of choices are consistently excluded from their 
consumption. In identifying such patterns, the dimensions used for comparisons and 
juxtapositions are key to understanding the underlying ideology behind disgust. 
 
To sum up, from the arguments expressed here so far, the construct of distaste has the 
potential to provide robust insights when it comes to taste-making and the drawing of 
symbolic boundaries. However, existing conceptualisations of it fall short in treating 
collective distaste as passive rejection, a mere binary opposite to the tastes of “them”. In 
addition to this, there is currently no framework of understanding as to when non-choice 
is conspicuous and when it is not. Ultimately, it is believed here that current models of 
rejection behaviour are static. Consequently, the approach of this study is to be 
different: instead of treating the concept as taken for granted, the aim is to elicit the 
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manner in which dislikes are constantly co-created amongst members of social groups 
as part of the taste-making process. Such negotiations concern not only which tastes of 
“them” should be rejected, but also how external practices can be appropriated in a 
ways that are in line with the group’s normative system. Ultimately, the question that 
remains to be answered is: How do members of collectives maintain the boundaries that 
distinguish them from dissimilar others? 
 
At this stage an important point arises. As exhibited throughout this chapter and as 
Douglas (1996) points out, it has been well established that cultures are inherently in 
conflict since they all represent a different way of thinking about the world. Perhaps the 
focus has so far been on such conflicts due to the clarity of the “us versus them” 
principle, which is easy to grasp and provides an instant snapshot of where groups stand 
in relation to one another in the social space. In this study, the juxtaposition of practices 
with “them” are considered to be of great significance in collective taste-making; 
however, it is believed that previous studies have underestimated the complexities of 
taste-making generated purely from engagement in group practices and interaction 
amongst members. From this standpoint, and taking into account the preoccupation of 
this work with the micro-social level of interaction, it is deemed that taste conflicts and 
disputes do not solely occur amongst cultures but also within them. To explore the issue 
further, the next chapter first takes a look at the importance of the collective as a unit of 
analysis in consumer research and subsequently probes how communities of practice, in 








5. Consumer Research and Community 
 
 
The term “community” has been a matter of debate, resulting in so many definitions 
that in the words of Halsey its meaning ends up being meaningless (Crow and Allen 
1994). In daily life, “community” can refer to anything from a group of individuals with 
unifying traits or interests, common characteristics and shared activities through to any 
interacting population. In consumer research, the tendency of analysing consumer 
culture by examining consumption collectives rather than individuals, has brought 
different types of communities to the forefront of studies. Such an inclination goes hand 
in hand with the idea that the development of self-identity is always dependent on the 
development of collective identity (Elliott 2004) and that the meaning of market 
offerings is socially constituted, being only significant when it exists as shared social 
knowledge within cultural groups (Berger and Luckmann 1967). From this standpoint, 
consumption communities have attracted the interest of researchers in terms of the 
capacity of their members to operate as active co-creators of the meanings of those 
products and services that are used to facilitate the existence of the collective and the 
sense of belongingness of its members (Pongsakornrungsilp and Schroeder 2011). 
Communities have been studied for their ability to develop practices through repetition, 
including the creation and sharing of myths and meanings (Pongsakornrungsilp and 
Schroeder 2011), the nurturing of value systems, codes and principles (Schroeder 2009), 
the development of rituals, traditions and shared consciousness (Muniz and O’Guinn 
2001) and the development of internal structures and ethos (Schouten and McAlexander 
1996). The role of members in these processes varies depending on their expertise and 
length of participation (Pongsakornrungsilp and Schroeder 2011), but the transformative 
powers of being part of the group affect all within.  
 
Particularly in relation to taste, Woodward and Emmison (2001) state that the 
“socialness” of taste judgements has not received the attention it deserves from scholars 
(296). Their findings demonstrate that people tend to use “notions of collective ideals 
and interpersonal norms” (305) in order to distinguish the tasteful from the distasteful. 
Yet, despite the academic community recognising that tastes operate in a communal 
way, as indicated in the previous chapters research has mainly focused on how 
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individuals define their tastes in relation to collectives, setting aside any discussions 
about how collective tastes are formed and sustained. This chapter discusses works on 
different types of communities which, while not explicitly about taste can be “read” for 
their reliance on the construct. It subsequently incorporates works on taste discussed in 
the previous chapters to further define the research gap. 
 
Communities have been encountered in multiple forms within consumer research 
literature, all indicating differences in the coherence and lifespan of the group as well as 
the degree of commitment of its members. Consumption collectives can be formed 
around admiration of a particular brand experience (i.e. Kozinets 2001; Schouten and 
McAlexander 1995; Muniz and O’Guinn 2001) or around common interests, in which 
case the use of particular brands facilitates bonding amongst members by creating 
“linking value” (Cova 1997; Cova and Cova 2002; Goulding et al. 2002). The chapter 
begins with a brief overview of four important, yet significantly different types of such 
collectives, namely subcultures, brand communities, neo-tribes and taste cultures, even 
though as Cova and Pace (2006, 1088) point out, “it is impossible to say whether any 
consensus exists regarding these proposed differentiations”. 
 
Subcultures constitute subdivisions of national culture (Gordon 1947) and their 
analysis has its roots in cultural studies. Typically, a subculture is seen as subordinate 
group with its own expressive forms and rituals (Hebdige [1979] 2002), usually 
encompassing some form of deviant behaviour, ranging from violence (Cohen 1955) to 
simply being an outsider, in other words, exhibiting behaviour that is outside of the 
mainstream (Becker [1963] 1997). The subculture is treated by its members as a new 
frame of reference and a new status system (Cohen 1955), within which members are 
given the chance to build a new identity. As such, subcultures are primarily 
countercultures, subverting dominant institutions, such as the family (i.e. Jefferson 
1993) or school (i.e. Willis 1977). From a consumer research point of view, subcultures 
can infuse brands with countercultural meanings central to the value and appeal of the 
brand in question (for example, the Harley Davidson image of the “outlaw biker” 
contributes to the myth of the Harley Davidson brand (Holt 2004)). Critics of 
subcultures, however, argue that the term fails to demonstrate the complexity and 
diversity of consumption collectives, which have “fragmented to the point where there 
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is no longer an identifiable subgroup sharing a common interest” (Cherrier and Murray 
2006, 81).  
 
Brand communities and neo-tribes refer to collectives that unlike subcultures do not 
exist as deviant or alternative to the mainstream (Muniz and O’Guinn 2001). Their 
emergence is attributed to a liberation from social bonds (Cova and Cova 2002) that 
occurred as a result of the liberatory postmodernist era (Firat and Venkatesh 1995) that 
privileges individual agency by allowing actors to be “whatever they wish to be”. More 
specifically, Muniz and O’Guinn (2001, 412), drawing upon cultural studies of fandom 
(fan communities), define brand communities as “a specialised, non-geographically 
bound community, based on a structured set of social relations among admirers of the 
brand”. In this case, the emergence of the collective is attributed to the symbolic value 
of the brand, which unites individuals with a shared consciousness and lifestyle 
differentiation. Brand communities can range from relatively autonomous consumer 
initiatives (e.g. Cova and Pace 2006) to co-constructed activities between the company 
and its fans (e.g. McAlexander and Schouten 1998). 
 
Tribes, on the other hand, constitute a more unstable, temporary and transient form of 
collective (Canniford 2011) in comparison to both subcultures and brand communities. 
They are “characterised by fluidity, occasional gathering and dispersal” (Maffesoli 
1996, 76) and are born out of shared emotions, passions or interests (Cova and Cova 
2002).  Their boundaries can be as vague as that of a “cool” tribe (Nancarrow and 
Nancarrow 2007) or as wide as that of British Royal Family fans (Otnes and Maclaran 
2007). From a consumer research point of view, Cova (1997) and Cova and Cova 
(2002) have argued that consumers value goods and services which allow and facilitate 
social interaction, enhance the bonds amongst tribe members and give individuals a 
stronger sense of identification through the “linking value” that they can generate. 
Complying with the principles of postmodernism however, these communities are 
volatile and constantly form, disappear and reform into different organisations. It is 
precisely their fragmented and elusive nature that has led to criticism that if everything 
can be considered a neo-tribe (Cherrier and Murray 2006), then perhaps the explanatory 




Finally, another considerably wide, vague and volatile type of collective is taste 
cultures. Similarly to neo-tribes, taste cultures are invisible and difficult to define and 
their nature is temporary. Gans (1999) defines them as unorganized aggregates of 
people sharing common aesthetic values and standards of taste. Distinguishing between 
“taste cultures” and “taste publics”, he argues that “taste cultures are not cohesive value 
systems, and taste publics are not organized groups; the former are aggregates of similar 
values and usually but not always similar content, and the latter are aggregates of people 
with usually but not always similar values making similar choices from the available 
offerings of culture. (…) at times people who make up a taste culture do act as a group” 
(94).  As such, when conditions are met, taste culture publics can strengthen their bond 
and organisation to constitute one of the more distinguishable types of communities 
discussed above. For example, in her work on dance cultures, Thornton (1995) 
demonstrates how members sharing common tastes in a particular practice (in this case 
music and dance), also exhibited preferences towards the same media as well as liking 
to spend their time with individuals who had similar tastes to themselves, while 
similarly, Goulding et al. (2002) discuss how rave taste cultures have come together in 
the context of dance clubs. 
 
 
5.1 From Inter to Intra Group Conflict 
 
 Reviewing the literature on marketplace cultures (Arnould and Thompson 2005) in 
order to explore how communities use the competitive “them” in their collective 
boundary-making, it can be observed that members of such collectives are active 
producers of meanings that are often juxtaposed to external practices in an attempt to 
enforce and maintain symbolic distinctions.  Schouten and McAlexander (1995) in their 
study of the bikers subculture state that “virtually every biker identifies strongly with 
the motorcycle as a symbol of freedom that contrasts starkly with the automobile 
("cage" or "coffin" in biker vernacular) as a symbol of confinement” (51). 
Juxtapositions with a stereotyped profile of car drivers were also used in multiple 
Harley Davidson adverts: a pair of hands in cuffs pictured on a car wheel, a Harley 
Davidson driving away while in the mirror of the motorcycle the audience can see a 
hectic family life being left behind, are two of many examples that aim to put forward 
and contrast the image of the free and rebellious motorcycle driver. The comparison 
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between group practices is also touched upon by Muniz and O’Guinn (2001), who 
emphasize the competitive spirit underlying the relationship between brand 
communities, while Kozinets (2002) demonstrates the conspicuous contrasts that 
Burning Man participants have been making between their festival and organisations 
like Disneyland and Woodstock. Finally, market imposed juxtapositions between the 
commercial and the sacred can be observed in Kozinets’s (2001) study of the Star Trek 
fandom. From this standpoint, while not necessarily dealing explicitly with taste-related 
issues, these studies can be “read” for their reliance on the “Us versus Them” principle. 
 
While this framing is indisputably valuable for the understanding of how collectives 
draw symbolic inter-group boundaries, an underlying principle that is deemed 
paradoxical in these studies is the treatment of collective tastes as homogenous units 
that stands in opposition to those of others. The persistent treatment of communities as 
unified wholes has not gone unnoticed by researchers. For instance, Chalmers et al. 
(2013, 1011) point out that “traditionally, research on community has been dominated 
by a perspective that privileges the homogeneity of groups”, while Martin (1992) also 
contends that research has so far focused on the unifying characteristics of collectives. 
Indeed, a closer observation in the literature reveals heterogeneous characteristics 
amongst members of groups that lead to different “readings” of texts, deviating 
attributions of meanings to practices and ultimately divergent views on collective taste-
making.  For example, going back to the Harley Davidson case, Schouten et al. (2007) 
state that while women members of the subculture claimed similar values to men, i.e. 
freedom and machismo, they defined and expressed these very differently. In fact, 
multiple authors acknowledge the existence of intra-group differences: Beverland et al. 
(2010) point out the diversity of identity goals sought from membership amongst 
members of the surfer, snowboarder and skater collectives, Fischer et al. (1996) bring 
attention to the utopian view of community as an expression of human solidarity, while 
DeValck (2007) argues that “real” communities have to deal with and resolve conflict, 
focusing her work on the tensions that occur within virtual communities. However, 
despite the recognition that intra-group tensions significantly affect the practices of 
consumption collectives, little is still known about how intra group dynamics impact 
upon the development of communities in general and taste-making practices, in 
particular. To help in understanding of how inter-group practice juxtapositions, as well 
as discrepancies of opinions as to what constitutes “good taste” internal to the group are 
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negotiated by members in the taste-making process, the next section introduces the 




5.2 What Are Communities of Practice? 
 
While communities of practice have been around for centuries, they only started 
attracting academic interest in the past three decades, primarily as a theory of learning 
(Lave and Wenger 1991) and subsequently as part of the field of knowledge 
management within organisation studies. Despite the fact that they have remained 
relatively underresearched within the field of consumer research, there is no denying 
that consumer groups organised around various domains (i.e. hobbies, travel, musical 
interests, fashions etc.) all constitute communities of practice. Communities of practice 
are everywhere and can be as diverse as the driver that gives rise to them (Wenger and 
Snyder 2000b). Wenger and Snyder (2000b), in particular, adopt a flexible definition 
and argue that they can be small or large, long or short lived, collocated or distributed, 
spontaneous or intentional, unrecognised or institutionalised, with an explicit or vague 
agenda, meeting regularly or rarely, and that such communities organise themselves 
informally by setting their own agendas and developing their own leadership. 
Definitions, however, vary significantly, with other scholars arguing that communities 
of practice can only refer to tightly knit groups that have been practising together for 
long enough to develop relations of mutuality and a cohesive identity (Lindkvist 2005, 
1189). As such, the term is to a great extent ambiguous and still evolving. 
 
For the purposes of this project, the widely accepted definition proposed by 
communities of practice veteran Etienne Wenger will be used. He argues that a 
community of practice is defined as a group of people pursuing common interests by 
using a shared repertoire of resources (Wenger 1998) and through mutual engagement 
with shared repertoires members negotiate a joint enterprise which brings coherence to 
the community and directs its practices. Negotiation of this common purpose is not just 
a stated goal, but more importantly, creates a sense of accountability amongst members 
that ultimately shapes the group, or as Elliott (2004) argues, is the practice of meaning 




Under this optic, communities of practice are not all that different from the types of 
collectives presented above. They too represent groups of people brought together by a 
shared passion; however, unlike brand communities and subcultures the emphasis is 
placed on the social relations amongst members rather than on the object of 
consumption (Goulding et al. 2013) and unlike neo-tribes, the communities of practice 
framework can also accommodate collectives of a more stable and organised nature. 
Given that communities of practice started off as a learning theory, the focus of the 
framework is on how interaction deepens members’ knowledge and expertise on a 
particular area (Wenger et al. 2002). In an attempt to take advantage of this “learning 
orientation” and taking into account that social distinctions, to a great extent, run on 
knowledge (i.e. cultural capital), the framework provides a lens for the studying of how 
socially significant knowledge is shared, managed and disseminated in the making of 
taste.  As such, similarly to Goulding et al. (2013), it is believed that to understand 
collective taste making it is necessary, first, to look at how participation in a group 
enables the learning and negotiation processes that underlie what is deemed to be 
“fitting” the community of practitioners and is thus acceptable, and what should be 
rejected. In fact, it is the value of “learning together” that brings members of such 
communities closer, thereby contributing in the development of a unique perspective on 
their interest and consequently common practices and approaches (Wenger et al. 2002), 
whivh distinguish the group from its dissimilar others in an “Us versus Them” fashion. 
 
Next, I take a closer look at the key interconnected elements that comprise a 
community of practice. 
 
 
5.2.1 Joint Enterprise/Doxa 
 
A community’s joint enterprise is one of the main sources of coherence that binds the 
group together, which does not merely refer to a stated goal but rather to a collective 
process of negotiation that mirrors the complexities of engaging in that collective 
(Wenger 1998). As such, in trying to identify a community’s common purpose it is 
important to remember that scholars should not be on the lookout for a static agreement 
but for a continuous process, for as Wenger (1998, 77) remarks, a joint enterprise is 
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defined “in the very process of pursuing it”. Defining a joint enterprise requires the 
combination of engagement (i.e. what are the opportunities to negotiate?), imagination 
(i.e. what vision do members have of the community?) and alignment (i.e. how widely 
do members subscribe to a shared purpose?) (Wenger et al. 2000a). 
 
 The formation of a commonly acceptable purpose becomes an important concern, 
since it is about determining, interpreting and negotiating the group’s position in a 
social space (who we are) and the ways it differentiates itself from dissociative others 
(what we do). However, defining “who we are” is neither a straightforward affair nor a 
definitive one as communities of practice are communities in process (Wenger 1998). In 
addition to this, as Handley et al. (2006, 642) argue “richness of context within which 
communities exist generates fluidity and heterogeneity which belies the idealization of 
communities as “cohesive, homogenous “social objects””. From this standpoint, 
members who come from different backgrounds, i.e. occupation, political stance, 
interests etc., tend to develop  their own unique patterns of “thought words”, underlying 
logics and narratives, which inevitably affect their participation stance, appreciation of 
other people’s roles and contributions as well as their perceptions as to what the 
common mission should be (Hong and O 2009). As such, a joint enterprise is “joint” not 
because it implies the unconditional agreement of members in any simple sense but 
because it is communally negotiated. 
 
From this perspective, a joint enterprise does bear a number of similarities to the 
concept of “consciousness of kind”, an implicit basis for community according to 
Gusfield (1975) and the most important element of brand communities, as recognised 
by Muniz and O’Guinn (2001).  Similarities are to be traced in that both terms imply a 
shared knowing of belonging. However, while common consciousness also assumes a 
common way of thinking about things, joint enterprise accounts instead for members’ 
varying “thought worlds” that make negotiations of the manner in which the group 
operates a constant and necessary process.  
 
A joint enterprise also necessarily entails a set of “rules of the game” that are shared as 
a common understanding amongst members and constitute the community’s doxa 
([1977] 2002) in Bourdieusian terms. Paraphrasing Bourdieu ([1977] 2002, 37), doxa is 
the universe of tacit presuppositions that organise action within the group. These 
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(informal) rules exercise a limiting influence on the potential courses of action for 
members, insofar as they agree that the community’s joint enterprises are worth 
pursuing. Bourdieu uses the term to denote what is taken for granted in a particular 
society, that which “goes without saying because it comes without saying” ([1977] 
2002, 167). From this standpoint, it is the community’s doxa that prevents members 
from particular choices or ways of doing things. This collective conscious (used here as 
specific to the community rather than in Durkheimian terms to the entire society) 
defines what is allowed and what is not: certain cultural artefacts and ways of doing 
things are recognized by the underpinning doxa as being inappropriate to a particular 
social position, hence helping to maintain symbolic boundaries, the "sense of the 
community’s place", and members’ sense of belonging, by excluding that which is “not 
for us”.  
 
Specific to this research, the term joint enterprise is used to refer to (a) the pursuit or 
object of practice of a community (i.e. what we do), (b) the normative system or 
ideology that underlies that practice (i.e. why we do it and according to what values and 
principles) and (c) the “doings” of members (i.e. how we do it). The commonly 





Participation refers both to action taken within the group and relationships and 
connections amongst members of the community and as Wenger (1998) argues it is not 
only personal but perhaps even more importantly social. As such, participation is 
characterised by the mutual ability of members to negotiate meanings amongst them 
and influence each other’s experiences of meaning, even though, as will be discussed, 
below this mutuality does not necessarily entail equality or similar levels of authority. 
By taking part, members develop a sense of belonging to the group, therefore 
participation does not merely refer to temporal engagement, but to active participation 
in the practices and construction of a common identity (Wenger 1998). “Through 
participation individuals engage with tools, language, role definitions and other artefacts 
as well as implicit relations, tacit conventions and underlying assumptions and values” 




Given the interest of this researcher in distaste and rejection, it is worth mentioning 
that participation in a particular community of practice is significant for the group’s 
identity, because it always signifies the non-participation of its members in other 
groups. In addressing the matter, Wenger (1998, 168-170) argues “each side is defined 
by opposition to the other and membership in one community implies marginalisation in 
another” and continues, “a significant amount of their (members) communal energy 
goes into making their time in the community a liveable realization of their marginality 
to the outside world. Non-participation (in external activities) becomes an active aspect 
of their practice (....) The subtle cultivation of non-participation is not something they 
talk much about but it’s in the air - a tacitly shared understanding (...) it manifests in 
remarks, conversations, in the way they behave etc” . Following the above and 
paraphrasing Wenger (1998), rejection of participation in outgroups can become reified 
in one’s own community and constitute an integral part of members’ practices. 
 
It comes as no surprise that communities of practice invite different levels of 
participation. To an extent this is due to the idea that different members participate in 
the community for different reasons and have different expectations of it. Wenger et al. 
(2002), in particular, contend that there are three main levels of participation: a small 
core group of very active members who inevitably take on leadership roles, an equally 
small group of marginal active participants who are regularly involved but lack the 
intensity of the core group and finally a larger group of peripheral members who keep to 
the sidelines. The reasons that members remain on the periphery can vary significantly, 
ranging from their inability to commit more time to the group through to their lack of 
authority. Participants may also choose to adopt a peripheral role to avoid personal 
identity conflicts or to adapt their practice in ways which retain a continued sense of 
existential integrity, whilst still notionally fitting in with the community norms 
(Handley et al. 2006). Periphery members, as Wenger at al. (2002) explain, are not any 
less valuable than the core and active groups, for they still participate and learn in their 
own ways and pace.  
 
Given the different levels of participation occurring in communities, as well as 
variations in the authority that members carry, there is a need to untangle the power 
differentials that enable dominant members to pursue their enterprises at the expense of 
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those occupying a marginal position, through the control and manipulation of 
community resources as well as rhetorical and interpersonal devices (Coopey 1995; 
Coopey and Burgoyne 2000). That is, when studying heterogeneity within communities, 
it is necessary to take into account how the more powerful individuals can dictate how 
and to what extent participants with inferior power are given access to contribute fully 
to the sociocultural practices performed by the community. New participants may also 
be denied power by full members, especially if the latter threaten to transform the 
knowledge and practices which are important to members who have invested in it 
(Carlile 2004). Particularly in taste-making, levels of participation and different 
members’ perception of “tastefulness” “are critical to the ways in which individuals: 
internalise, challenge, or reject existing practices of the community” (Handley et al. 
2006, 644) and consequently to the manner by which collective taste is negotiated. 
 
 
5.2.3 Learning and Knowledge  
 
The importance of learning on the path towards becoming a practitioner of a particular 
community was brought to the forefront of consumer research by Goulding et al. 
(2013). As was mentioned earlier, communities of practice were first introduced as a 
learning theory by Lave and Wenger (1991), with the aim of highlighting the 
importance of context when discussing learning processes, as well as the tacit nature of 
knowledge. According to this framework, a community of practice is the context in 
which individuals develop practices and identities appropriate to that community. The 
main argument behind this proposition is that knowledge is taking place in the place 
that it is applied and for this reason it is to a great extent embedded and tacit. In contrast 
to theories of socialization, which predict the smooth reproduction of communities over 
time, the so called “situated learning” approach calls for attention to the possibilities for 
variation and even intra-community conflict that need to be negotiated and reconciled, 
at least in part (Handley et al. 2006, 642).  
 
Knowledge that is tacit and embedded is still exchangeable and accessible through 
interaction amongst members, including conversations, storytelling and even 
observations of the core and active groups or apprenticeships with those most 
experienced (Wenger et al. 2002). Its character is primarily social, because members 
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need one another in order to develop, complement and even scrutinize their expertise in 
a particular domain. Most importantly, knowledge is dynamic and constantly in motion, 
which is not to say that a domain of knowledge does not have a stable core (a form of 
field doxa in other words). In fact, this core base is essential in securing the formation 
of a community of practice. However beyond that core, knowledge is constantly 
updated to follow evolutions in the domain and negotiate the relative position and status 
of the community in that field.  
 
Throughout the collective process of negotiation of this position, which is primarily 
mirrored in the group’s joint enterprise, learning takes place both as accumulation of 
skills and knowledge and as a process of becoming. Wenger (1998, 215), in particular, 
claims that skills and information developed and employed inside the community “are 
not abstract as ends in themselves, but in the service of an identity” and a process of 
“becoming a certain person or conversely, to avoid becoming a certain person”.  
 
Within the context of a community, learning particularly affects three dimensions of 
practice: discovering how to engage mutually (i.e. who is good at what, who is easy or 
hard to get along with), tuning the joint enterprise (including how to reconcile 
conflicting views of what the community’s purpose is) and developing repertoires, 
styles and discourses (i.e. telling stories, renegotiating the meanings of elements etc.) 
(Wenger 1998, 95). As such, it is not just knowledge that is exchanged through learning 
processes but the very process of engaging in a community and co-creating its practices. 
 
For the purposes of this project, learning within communities of practice is a useful 
process to study, because it emphases the sociocultural dynamics of being part of a 
collective. That is, learning how to become a “taster” involves mastering the field as 
well as understanding how to operate in accordance with collective norms. “To know is 
to be capable of participating with the requisite competence in the complex web of 
relationships among people and activities” (Gherardi, 1998, 274). As such, taste-making 
is not the result of a mere process of doing things together, but entails the exchange of 
knowledge amongst members of different participation status who collectively attempt 







Collective learning results in practices that reflect the pursuit of the community’s joint 
enterprise. As such, the concept of “practice” in itself is inevitably of great importance. 
As an analytic concept, it allows for the interpretation of how people achieve active 
being in the world (Gherardi 2009) or as Brown and Duguid (2001, 203) suggest “by 
practice we mean (…) undertaking or engaging fully in a task, job or profession”. 
Practice is always social practice (Wenger 1998) and is about doing in a historical and 
social context that gives structure and meaning to what we do. Reckwitz (2002, 242) 
defines practice as “a routinized type of behavior which consists of several elements, 
interconnected to one another forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activisms, 
“things” and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know 
how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge”. On a similar note, practice in this 
research does not stand for “action”, but rather, for a coordinated way of thinking about, 
doing and saying things. A practice is thus a way of understanding the world and acting 
within it. More specifically, at a mental (intangible) level, practices affect the mind (e.g. 
ways of understanding the world, knowing how to carry out an activity) and knowledge 
(not mere information but ways of understanding, wanting and feeling, which are not 
solely understood by the individual but are collective), while at a physical (tangible) 
level they include the body (e.g. bodily performances) and language (e.g. discursive 
practices, signs and communication). All elements of practices are interconnected and 
reproduced through routinisation and repertoires.  
 
What is often forgotten when discussing consumption collectives is the idea that while 
practices may get to some extent routinized, they never remain stable or static as 
practitioners are constantly appraising their performances and working practices in 
order to refine them. As Wenger et al. (2002, 39) argue, “an effective practice evolves 
with the community as a collective product”. A practice is only recognisable in relation 
to its intersubjectively created meanings and this is precisely why taste as a regime 
(Arsel and Bean 2013) endows meaning to “sayings” and “doings” as well as directing 
their appraisal. One can argue that practices are under constant appraisal and 
refinement, because they develop as a response to ever changing field conditions and 
field actors, even though in many cases they may not transcend the community 
boundaries or transform the environmental conditions in any dramatic fashion. From 
 68 
 
this standpoint, taste is performed as a collective, situated activity within practice, learnt 
and taught as part of becoming a practitioner and involves the continual negotiation of 






Referring to the sphere of influence of communities of practice, I have used 
interchangeably the terms “domain” and “field” in reviewing the literature. While the 
two have significant similarities – perhaps due to the fact that they are both rather ill-
defined - it should be noted that they have very dissimilar origins, thus having 
contributed to the development of theories unconnected to one another. Most 
importantly, the “intention” behind the two terms is different, as the first is meant to 
define the boundaries within which communities of practice operate and their “raison d’ 
être”, whereas the latter aims to establish the boundaries of field-specific knowledge 
and practice, in which actors compete for status. While it is not clear how one can 
identify the activities that give rise to a domain or field, what is true of both terms is that 
the meaning of practice, which may seem trivial to anyone outside, may be of grave 
significance to the practitioners within. 
 
More specifically, situated learning theory has used the term “domain” to refer to the 
setting of the scene and rules within which communities of practice operate, for 
“Without commitment to the domain, a community is just a group of friends” (Wenger 
et al. 2002, 30). The specificity of a domain can vary significantly from something 
mundane, like staying in good shape, to a professional practice with an established 
discourse. Knowing the boundaries of the domain enables members not only to decide 
what is worth pursuing and how to present ideas, but also creates a sense of 
accountability to a body of knowledge and following on from this the development of 
tastes and practices (Wenger et al. 2002). 
 
On the other hand, the term “field” has been linked to the works of Pierre Bourdieu, to 
indicate the various spheres within which actors compete for social distinction. In 
defining the term, Warde (2004:12), drawing upon Bourdieu (1992), contends that “a 
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field is a relatively autonomous structured domain or space, which has been socially 
instituted, thus having a definable but contingent history of development. One condition 
of emergence of a field is that agents recognize and refer to its history. Some fields have 
more autonomy than others and some parts more than other parts”.  As such, the field is 
a network, a space of structural positions to which communities bring their dispositions, 
experience and resources. For Bourdieu (1984, 1990), the field operates like a game 
where actors’ actions are strategic and competitive against those of other players in the 
field, in explicit or implicit ways, even though his views have been criticized for 
treating their actions as overtly strategic (Warde 2004). The boundaries of a field, as 
well as the boundaries of social groups within it, are fluid, constantly negotiated and 
often redefined by participants themselves in order to benefit their position.  
 
Social groups within each field are in command of field related capital, which they 
express though tastes, the legitimacy of which constitutes a matter of constant struggle. 
The dynamics of the field arise from the positions and position-taking of players who 
seek to establish their status in relation to dissociative others and the distinctive stylistic 
possibles within a domain allow practitioners to distinguish themselves through 
assertion of differences. From this standpoint and for the purposes of this project, it is 




5.3 The Negotiation of Taste 
 
In an attempt to put together the elements of communities of practice presented above, 
in this section it is proposed that in matters of taste, members of such communities 
share their experiences and knowledge in free flowing, creative ways that foster new 
ways of enforcing and reinforcing distinctions. Taste-making constitutes a situated 
activity within practice as it is learnt and taught as part of becoming a practitioner, 
whose loyalties lie with a particular community within the domain. As Gherardi (2009, 
563) argues “passionate attachment of a community of practitioners to the object of 
their practice is the basis of taste making, i.e. the collective achievement that allows 
practitioners to appraise the various performances of their working practices that, in 
being appraised and contested, are constantly refined”. That is, refining practices 
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involves using the group’s collective cultural capital to negotiate aesthetic categories 
through the appropriation of objects and production of narrative justifications. Most 
importantly, it involves the constant evolution of a joint enterprise that defines the 
position of the community in the field and deals with, at least in part, internal conflicts.  
 
Inevitably the refinement of group practices always “extends beyond the individual 
and subjective setting” (Edvardsson et al. 2011, 329), since communities not only 
negotiate their common purpose isolated in their micro settings, but - as previous works 
on distaste, negative symbolic consumption, social identity theory as well as previous 
approaches to marketplace cultures have established - engage in mental processes of 
opposition and juxtaposition with other actors in the field. The “Us versus Them” 
argument has its roots in the idea that within domains, different ways of relating to the 
object of practice may give rise to different identities and different tastes, because the 
attachment to the object of practice varies and is contested (Gherardi 2009). Following 
from this, when engaging with a community of practice, status may be drawn both from 
the complexity of the particular practice (taste) and from its prestige by comparing it to 
the variable prestige of other practices (distaste) (Warde 2005). In other words, the 
understandings underlying the negotiation of a common purpose and refinement of 
practice will be partly based on rejection of outgroups’ “way of attaching to the object 
of practice”, thus providing the basis for taste-making. 
 
Throughout the last chapter it has been made clear that collective taste making is 
closely bound to the community’s joint enterprise. The connection between the two, 
however, is nothing but linear. Tastes affect the negotiation of a joint enterprise by 
dictating “what is aesthetically fitting within a community of practitioners – a 
preference for the way we do things together” Gherardi (2009, 535). In its turn, a joint 
enterprise reinforces tastes by providing ill-defined, yet powerful, normative directions 
for members and their practices. Consequently, researchers should not only be looking 
for an abstract and symbolic “Us versus Them”, but also for tastes that are provisional, 
conciliated and socially constructed through participation.  
 
This thesis started off with a review of the literature aimed at probing how tastes are 
formed within a shared and communal context. It has been established that group 
practices constitute coordinated attempts to generate meaning in a way that is 
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detrimental to the tastes and practices of dissimilar others, as well as that their practices 
may be a constant negative point of reference, thereby providing an underlying 
mechanism for the negotiation of a common purpose and the refinement of practice. 
Previous works have emphasized the ease with which community members share 
idiosyncratic cultures and norms (see scholarship on marketplace cultures discussed 
earlier) and through extension similar tastes and distastes, expressed through individual 
and collective practices. However, it is still unclear how the group deals with conflicting 
worldviews and identities of members (Handley et al. 2007). Such unitary viewpoints of 
consumption communities neglect the broader social context and micro political factors 
of exhibiting collective taste, for groups face the critical challenge of resolving the 
social tensions caused by opinion conflicts and power differentials within their 
collectives (Hong and O 2009). Following from this, the question that this research aims 
to address is: “How is taste negotiated within a community of practitioners?”  
 
Taking into account the various approaches on taste presented in the previous 
chapters, it is necessary to develop a framework that integrates both the externally 
driven (Us versus Them) and internal dynamics (intra-group tensions) of taste, 
accounting at the same time for how resources (economic, social and especially cultural 
capital) and the constant refinement of community practices constitute parts of the taste-
making process (also see figure 1).  
 
As such, the main research question of the project is: 
  
What are the dynamics that underlie collective taste-making and how do they operate?.  
 
To answer this overarching question, the research explores a number of theoretical 
gaps as found in the literature presented in the preceding chapters, these being:  
 
 Through what processes of appropriation is (dis)taste employed to internalise 
meaning to practices?,  
 How do members of a community of practice maintain the boundaries that 
distinguish them from dissimilar others? and  







































Consumer research has been dominated by ideological perspectives that have their 
foundations in realism, determinism and positivism (Sanders 1987). Influenced by 
Durkheim (1938), the key advocate of a positivist approach who promoted the view that 
social scientists should study the social world employing the methodologies of physical 
scientists, scholars have complied with a logical empiricism that suggests human 
behaviour is the result of objective situations or psychological factors (Sanders 1987). 
However, traditional models and empirical procedures have often proven inadequate in 
providing an understanding of human behaviour (Sanders 1987). As a result, 
subjectivist approaches and interpretive methods have (re)asserted themselves within 
various social science disciplines and their legitimacy has now been well established in 
relation to more conventional approaches (Lincoln and Guba 2003).  
 
In line with this development, this study is based on a constructivist framework of 
inquiry, with the ontological and epistemological foundations being explained in more 
depth in this chapter. The methodological choice of ethnography as a suitable way to 
address the research questions presented in the previous chapter is also discussed. Along 
with the project’s aim of theorising taste-making in communities from a new angle, the 
chosen framework of inquiry and methodology allow for a better understanding of the 
examined phenomena, not in order to provide direct technical expertise from a 
marketing point of view, but to provide rich data on how social groups negotiate 
meanings. As Hackley (1998, 130) puts it “within marketing, a social constructionist 
research agenda would, in focussing on interpretations of the qualitative aspects of 
practitioner (and consumer) experience within marketing, move marketing theory away 
from a model of managerialism which presupposes the technical expertise of marketing 
practitioners and the political neutrality of marketing activity (and management) itself. 
(…)Rigorous and effective theory building in marketing must be founded on a reflexive 
understanding of how meaning is constructed in the social world in order to be 




Aside from outlining the philosophical foundations and justifying the methodological 
choices made, this chapter also provides an overview of the context of the research, an 
independent arts cooperative located in the United Kingdom. Regarding which, it 
provides arguments as to why the selected community is an appropriate match for the 
theoretical framework and research questions asked, as well as an extensive description 
of the context and the researcher’s experience within it. The lattermost serves the 
purposes of reflexivity and allows the researcher to “tell the truth” about the making of 
the account (Gergen and Gergen 2003). 
 
 
6.1 Framework of Inquiry 
 
The research is based on a constructivist framework of inquiry which holds that what 
we take to be objective knowledge and truth is the result of perspective (Schwandt 
1994). The choice of a constructivist approach is partly based on the need to study the 
meaning of the practices of a community from its members’ perspective and thus to 
acquire an emic point of view on the group. It is worth clarifying that social 
constructivism is closely related to social constructionism in the sense that people are 
working together to construct the meaning of artefacts. Most scholars do not distinguish 
between the two as they are easily confused and difficult to distinguish (Patton [1990] 
2002). A stated difference is that social constructionism focuses on the meanings that 
are created through the social interactions of a group, while social constructivism 
focuses on an individual's learning that takes place because of their interactions in a 
group. This researcher probes both of these processes and the two terms are used 
interchangeably.   
 
The ontological foundations of the study stem from the acceptance that what we take 
to be real is a construction in the mind of individuals (Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
Following social constructionism’s principles, people create a world in the process of 
social exchange which is a reality unique in its own kind (Schwandt 1994).  The 
ontology of constructivism is anti-foundational (Lincoln 1995; 1998) in the sense that it 
rejects any static or “foundational” standards by which truth can be universally known 
(Lincoln and Guba 2003, 273). From this standpoint, the bedrock of this philosophical 
approach is relativism, since “truth is only relative to one’s mode of engagement with 
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the world for which no independently existing evaluative criteria exist” (Johnson and 
Duberley 2000, 109-110).  
 
This relativist view contends that the world is the result of representational practices 
and that science “is a social and historical enterprise, and its knowledge products can be 
affected as much by sociological factors as by purely “cognitive” or empirical 
considerations” (Anderson 1986, 156). Following from this, the claims of relativism 
have a dual impact on this particular project. Firstly, in dealing with the research 
process itself, it is acknowledged that the researcher’s perceptions of the studied 
phenomena are dependent upon the sociocultural burden carried and as such may affect 
both the research process and the interpretation of the data collected. Secondly, the 
theoretical framework of the project highlights the importance of relativism since 
perceptions over what constitutes “appropriate practice” are entirely dependent on 
various actors’ worldviews and the interactions amongst them. Essentially this means 
that both the researcher and the respondents are bound to their sociohistoric 
environments. As such, the researcher cannot be completely detached from the observed 
and hence the findings will be themselves constructions of the research process (Lincoln 
and Guba 1985).  
 
Congruent with the attempt to conceptualise taste-making as a dynamic process of 
negotiation, the epistemological foundations of the research are subjectivist, while 
knowledge and meanings under this philosophical persuasion are an “active, 
cooperative enterprise of persons in relationship” (Gergen 1985, 267). The study’s 
theoretical framework was set out on the assumption that taste-making is the subject of 
meanings that are co-constructed by members of communities of practice. Such 
meaning-making activities are of central importance to constructivists because it is 
precisely this sense-making that shapes action (Lincoln and Guba 2003). Crotty (1998) 
defines constructionism as the view that “all knowledge and therefore all meaningful 
reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of 
interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted 
within an essentially social context” (42). From this standpoint, meaning is not “there” 
to be discovered but “arises from the relationship between members of some stake-
holding community” (Lincoln and Guba 2003, 273). Agreements as to what constitutes 
“the truth” are the subject of negotiations which are validated though a community 
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narrative that is subject to the conditions that give rise to the group (Lincoln and Guba 
2003, 273). By investigating the narrative of a particular community of practice the 
study investigates the manner in which contested practices are accepted as “truthfully” 
tasteful and thus accepted by the group, or “truthfully” inappropriate and consequently 
rejected.  
 
At this stage it is also worth clarifying that the philosophical backbone of the study is 
poststructuralism, rather than postmodernism. Poststructuralism, introduced by French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida in 1966, is compatible with the relativist and subjectivist 
underpinnings of social constructionism, because it asserts that there are multiple truths 
and realities, none of which is can be considered superior or more valid over the other 
(Johnson and Duberley 2000). Reality is viewed as historically, socially and culturally 
dependent but unlike postmodernist assumptions, the importance of the material and the 
symbolic is not overlooked (Elliott and Ritson 1998). In other words, poststructuralism 
sees truth as socially constituted and structured by members of society, accounting for 
the material conditions and experiences of subjects, but at the same time acknowledging 
the political social settings in which such experiences are located (Elliott and Ritson 
1998). The poststructuralist tradition constitutes a critique to its structuralism 
predecessor by asserting that people are not born into predetermined structures, but 
(socially) construct their own. “Narratively speaking, structuralism asks what is the 
story, whereas post-structuralism asks whose story is it anyway” (Shankar et al. 2001, 
436).   
 
An important dimension of poststructural analysis related to this project, is the concept 
of difference. Its philosophical underpinnings state that meaning is created through 
comparison and contrast (Scott 1988). Scott (1988), in particular, states that terms are 
only meaningful insofar as they are compared with others. Poststructuralists also believe 
that experiences are structured by binary distinctions that are socially constructed (e.g. 
mind/body, male /female, taste/distaste etc) rather than a reflection of reality 
(Thompson and Hirschman 1995). Taking as a starting point the idea that 
constructionists are concerned with the production and organisation of differences (Fuss 
1989, 3), the match of this particular framework of inquiry with the project is also 
justified given that one of the main objectives is to demonstrate how communities 
produce and maintain symbolic boundaries by juxtaposing their practices to those of 
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dissimilar others. It is worth clarifying here that comparisons and juxtapositions 
amongst social groups are not taken as sharply classified, as they would from a 
structuralist –and thus reductionist- perspective. As Elliott (1997) argues ““the 
juxtaposition of opposites and contradictions” (Foster 1983) is called for by postmodern 
theorists in the hope that it can develop our understanding(s) of the meaning(s) of these 
complex ideas. As a heuristic device, these bipolar oppositions should not be read as 
posited structures but merely as aids to coming to grips with the sometimes mind-
numbing interrelations between what are often incommensurable concepts”. Following 
from this, oppositional relationships will be treated as imperfect, temporary and relative 
to the mindset of respondents and the sociocultural context in which they are embedded. 
 
Finally, according to Scott (1992), poststructuralism is based on Saussure’s principle 
that signs have meanings “by virtue of their difference from other signs” and on 
Derrida’s argument that new meanings of signs are constructed upon prior significations 
of items. More specifically, “already-used words and images are reassembled, in an act 
and form that Derrida calls bricolage, and they come to mean in the way that they 
shimmer against each other and against their previous context” (Scott 1992, 597). This 
"play" among the previous and new signification of items is relevant to the study of how 
the meanings of particular items and practices are appropriated by different users or 
social groups. In other words, by altering the meaning of practices, consumers and 
consumer groups are able to assert distinctions through a subtle “bricolage” that is 
inaccessible to those not possessing the necessary code (field-related capital). 
 
 
6.2 Ethnographic Research 
 
Given the constructivist foundations of the project and the aim to study the practices 
and relative perceptions of a particular community that has its own distinctive culture, 
an ethnographic approach was considered to be an appropriate methodological match. 
As Goffman (1961, ix-x) puts it, any group of people “develop a life of their own that 
becomes meaningful, reasonable and normal once you get close to it” and so “a good 
way to learn about any of these worlds is to submit oneself in the company of the 
members”. In order to explicate meanings from the community of inquiry emic 
knowledge is required, which is best achieved through ethnographic investigation (Holt 
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1997). Ethnography is based on the naturalist principles that “appreciate subjects’ 
common sense as constitutive of social reality” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, 97) 
and is able to provide holistic and comprehensive accounts of communities (Stewart 
1998). Since “cultural capital is socially consequential only when converted into 
particularized field specific forms” (Holt 1997, 97), it was considered necessary to 
approach and become familiar with a distinct field. Subsequently, choosing specific 
natural micro-setting within that field would allow for studying not only how taste is co-
created by a particular group of people, but also how it is actualized through practices. 
 
Ethnographic researched was pioneered in the early 20
th
 century in the field of cultural 
anthropology (Harvey and Myers 1995), where an ethnography was a descriptive 
account of a community or tribe in a non-Western context (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1995). Under this lens, the researcher is observing from a quasi-inside perspective and 
subsequently explains his or her understanding of the native world, including its 
knowledge, beliefs, values, meanings and activities. More recently ethnography has 
helped the understanding of consumer society in relation to urban tribes, such as Harley 
Davidson bikers or Burning Man festival participants. The simplest definition of this 
methodology states that it is a set of methods for studying a group of people (McGivern 
[2003] 2006), used to answer “how” or “why” questions regarding decision making 
processes. The choice of ethnography is relevant to the aim of this study which is to 
understand the how of taste-making, rather than to develop solutions (e.g. action 
research), generate statistical measures (e.g. survey research) or explore broadly without 
a pre-set aim (e.g. grounded theory). The focus of ethnography is usually a single 
setting or group of people in order to facilitate depth (over breadth) of study. Consistent 
with this, this study is conducted in the context of a single community, more 
specifically an arts cooperative, detailed information on which is provided later in the 
chapter. The goal of the ethnographer is to gain a rich, textured and holistic 
understanding of behaviour in its socio-cultural context and to understand life as people 
live it, not as they report they do. As such, people’s actions are studied in their original, 
everyday context (as opposed to experimental setups), which is why ethnographic 





6.3 Choice of Settings 
 
At the initial stages of the quest for suitable settings to conduct the ethnographic study 
I was interested in questions surrounding how do social groups decide and distinguish 
what is legitimate taste from their relative point of view. As such, I was looking for 
settings where actors would place high significance in their cultural know-how. From an 
analytic standpoint, an arts related community seemed to be a suitable context. Multiple 
possibilities within the arts field were available, ranging from members of nationally 
famous art venues and communities within local art spaces to audiences of private 
spaces. I soon came across the Brik, an independent arts cooperative projecting films 
and hosting live music and performance events. The choice of an arts cooperative as a 
research context provides a good “fit” with the theoretical domain in which the project 
aims to make a contribution, namely taste-making, because of the particularities of the 
community, including dedication to carefully chosen art forms, a very distinctive space 
and an explicit anti-establishment ethic that enable the researcher to uncover the co-
creation and use of (dis)taste in the maintenance of symbolic boundaries.  
 
Using “extraordinary contexts to examine how constructs operate at extremes” 
(Arnould, Price and Moisio 2006, 110) is not uncommon amongst qualitative 
researchers. Such contexts allow for theoretically interesting factors to emerge more 
easily, making the phenomenon of interest salient for observation.  The aspects of the 
context that enable theoretical payoff (Arnould, Price and Moisio 2006) in this case are 
the oppositional identity of the Brik and its positioning as an alternative space for the 
enjoyment of the arts that “aims to make a difference” as stated on the website, which 
makes expressions of (dis)taste of central importance in the practices of the group. By 
isolating the community, the researcher is able to observe the negotiation and 
performance of taste in a group whose common purpose is to run an arts venue that 
makes a statement against mainstream dissociative others. In other words, this is a 
context where the avoidance of practices that “don’t fit” with the group’s idiosyncrasies 
is conspicuously manifested through programming choices, narratives, and the nature of 
the environment, thus making it a prominent site to study taste-making.  
 
Following this, the cooperative nature of the community opened up a new path for the 
project, namely, examining taste-making not only in relation to consumption but to the 
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increasingly important “productive consumption”. The concept of productive 
consumption is an inherent one in all cases where consumers are recognized as active 
co-creators of value. As Press and Arnould (2011) suggest, the underlying idea behind it 
is founded upon Stebbins’s (1982) concept of serious leisure (i.e. in a future where job 
opportunities will be reduced, individuals will be forced to try and take advantage of 
their capabilities during their leisure time), which includes: amateurism, pursuing 
hobbies and volunteering.  
 
Characteristics of productive consumption are apparent in brand communities, co- 
consuming groups as well as consumer-organisation contexts (which is the case with the 
Brik), where individuals use their resources to bring a project to life. The modernist 
phenomenological dichotomy of production/consumption, stemming out of a historical 
gendered dichotomy between man as the producer and woman as the consumer, as well 
as the division between the public and private sphere of an individual, corresponding to 
the dichotomy between work and play, is said to be eliminated in postmodernity (Firat 
and Venkatesh 1995). As Firat and Venkatesh (1995, 254) argue, there is no natural 
distinction between production and consumption, the two are the same and occur 
simultaneously. Evidence of this blurring of boundaries is to be found in multiple 
consumer culture studies. For example, Giesler (2006) describes the music file-sharing 
practices of a community whose members produce value by offering/uploading files for 
others to consume and devour value by downloading files generated by others. From 
this standpoint, the napster community is as much a consumption collective as it is a 
production one. Similar observations can be made in the co-created experience of Mardi 
Gras festival participants (Weinberger and Wallendorf 2012), while Schau et al. (2009) 
describe how coproductive activities in consumer collectives produce value, thereby 
challenging the idea that consumption is only destroying the value generated during 
production. 
 
Not unlike previous works within the Consumer Culture Theory realm, the chosen site 
allows for the observation of the coproductive activities of a collective that is both 
experience and oppositional identity based (Schau et al. 2009). Indeed, practices of the 
community within the Brik represent a good example of the blurring of boundaries 
between production and consumption as well as Stebbins’s (1982) “serious leisure”, 
with members using their (cultural) competences to produce experiences for their own 
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as well as the public’s consumption. The benefit of researching a coproductive 
community is that it allows for placing the focus not only on how modes of 
consumption influence taste-making (as Holt 1998; Hennion 2002; 2004; 2007, Arsel 
and Thompson 2010; Arsel and Bean 2013) have extensively demonstrated), but also 
how modes of production do. In other words, while the blurring of the boundaries 
between production and consumption is widely recognized within the study of 
consumer culture, in general, and studies on taste, in particular, the role of the manner 
of production in the taste making process has seldom been discussed.  
 
 
6.4 Data collection methods 
 
A number of ethnographic methods have been used to gather data: observations, 
unsolicited accounts and non-directive interviews. The research design of the study has 
been kept flexible (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; Arnould and Wallendorf 1994) to 
allow for grounded theorizing and to this end the researcher adopted a partial induction 
approach. That is, unlike fully inductive studies where researchers enter an investigation 
with no a priori framework, in this study many of the key constructs have already been 
well-defined and the research questions are guided by a well-established body of 
literature. However, the existence of a theoretical framework is not to say that 
observations and interviews were fully guided. On the contrary, the researcher allowed 
the phenomena of interest to drive and develop both the observations and the research 
questions. This approach allows for theoretical contributions by offering new insights to 
the examined phenomena and by reflecting on the potential limits and extensions of 
current approaches. Given the partial reliance on an existing framework, it also achieves 
a high level of continuity (Tsui 2004). 
 
Data collection methods are described in detail in the sections below and are 






Figure 2: Research Activity 
 




- Volunteer role acquired in 
community: participation in 
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6.4.1 Participant Observation 
 
Participant observation was conducted by volunteering in the community, a role which 
was maintained for one year (October 2011-Spetember 2012), with two evenings per 
week being spent at the venue that hosts the group. Apart from observing the physical 
activities of the group, valuable observations were also conducted by subscribing to the 
various mailing lists that the community uses as decision making forums. Particularly in 
relation to observations of the mailing lists, over 4000 emails were exchanged during 
my subscription, all of which were monitored for relevant data. A large number of 
emails were dismissed due to the content being of a purely informational/functional 
nature (e.g. calls for volunteers to help out during understaffed nights, administrative 
information in relation to booking bands/films etc). However, over 800 emails were 
deemed relevant and the respondent accounts they provided were scrutinised for 
themes/patterns. Email exchange turned out to be a particularly useful insight to the 
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community because similarly to observations taking place in the physical space of the 
group, it allowed me direct insights to how members interact and engage in debates on 
various topics. 
 
 I first spent time solely volunteering at the venue (October 2011-January 2012), 
familiarizing myself both with the members and their practices. Observation was the 
first step in order to gain a general understanding of the symbolic world to be studied 
(Elliott and Elliott 2003), become familiar with everyday operations, understand local 
rules, learn the language used and get to know possible respondents. Field notes, in the 
form of mental and jotted notes while at the venue, were kept at all times and these were 
subsequently turned into full text. Apart from serving the purpose of becoming 
familiarized with the micro-settings, observation is also important as a complementary 
method to oral accounts as it is argued that people are unable to describe and reflect 
fully on their complex behaviours (Arnould and Wallendorf 1994). Participant 
observation allows the researcher to observe directly the meaning system used by 
actors, it can help compare what people say they do (attitude) with what they do in an 
actual situations and consequently helps to make sure that data collected in other ways 
(interviews/unsolicited accounts) illustrate the full picture (Sanders 1987). 
 
The participant-as-observer role that I adopted through volunteering was considered 
superior to remaining a plain observer, which runs the danger of misunderstanding the 
orientations of the participants or experiencing situations where respondents feel that 
they need to hide their activities from outsiders (Arnould and Wallendorf 1994.) 
However, becoming over familiar with the settings and members due to the amount of 
time spent with the group is a potential pitfall in participant observation. This is because 
“going native” can make it difficult to recognize phenomena that are meaningful, thus 
resulting in their being overlooked as insignificant (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; 
Fielding [2001] 2008; Wirth 1964). Additionally, spending too much time with the 
native group is often found to lead to a celebration of their culture (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995), rather than culminating in robust balanced research outcomes. All in 
all, “one is participating in order to get detailed data, not to provide the group with a 
new member” (Fielding [2001] 2008, 271) and so following literature suggestions a 
marginal native role (Freilich 1970) (also referred as “professional stranger” role (Agar 
1996)) was adopted. From this standpoint, with the active membership role acquired I 
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became involved in the group’s activities without fully embracing its values and goals 
(Adler and Adler 1994). 
 
During the participant observations, Spradley’s (1980) descriptive question matrix 
(82-83) was used as an initial guide (see appendix), which contains nine dimensions for 
observations, under the assumption that observing and reporting these dimensions and 
their interrelations can describe any social situation. As immersion in the community 
grew stronger, my attention was focused on particular aspects of the matrix that seemed 
more important in addressing the research questions and/or that what factors were 
especially prominent for observation. Observations can be divided into the three stages 
identified by Spradley (1980): descriptive, focused and selective. Descriptive 
observations refer to my initial, basic comprehension of the community, familiarising 
myself with the environment, the people in it and the informal rules and procedures. 
While this stage is not necessarily particularly fruitful in addressing research questions 
it is nevertheless necessary to (a) confirm that the community chosen is a suitable 
context to study the phenomena of interest and (b) to examine possible dimensions that 
seem more promising for further observations. Consequently, the focused observations 
were centred on particular domains that were considered to be more revealing in 
relation the theoretical interest of the project and/ or because they were persistently 
highlighted by the informants. In the latter case and as Spradely (1980, 105) notes “if 
you listen to what people say, they often drop hints as to what they feel is important in 
their words”.  The two main domains of focus were actors (and particularly their 
interrelations with goals, activities, acts and events) and space (and particularly its 
interrelation with objects, actors, activities, acts and goals). The focus on actors was 
both dictated by the nature of the project and by the respondents themselves who were 
especially willing to discuss tensions amongst them, while space was an emerging 
dimension of focus, given the importance that the building itself seemed to play in taste-
making. This is not to say that the remaining dimensions of the matrix were ignored, but 
their role was observed primarily in relation to the two main domains of focus.  The 
third stage of selective observations refers to the looking for similarities/differences 
amongst previously identified cultural categories of interest. This last stage was largely 
conducted through analysing and thinking of previous observations as well as by 
conducting additional observations on site. (e.g. the different manners in which actors 
use space in their narratives to assert “us and them” tensions and how this potentially 
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differs amongst different events/actors). Of course, observational data on their own 
cannot shed light on the perceptions, values and beliefs of the respondents and so 
complementary methods were considered necessary (Arnould and Wallendorf 1994). 
 
 
6.4.2 Unsolicited Accounts 
 
Getting closer to members by adopting a volunteering role helps in extracting the 
value of pure sociability (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995), which pertains to 
developing trust and hence provoking small talk. A result of this is the gathering of 
unsolicited accounts occurring either amongst participants or amongst participants and 
the researcher (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; Agar 1996). Unsolicited accounts 
consequently became part of the strategy, whereby I posed questions to the respondents 
when the situation and context were deemed suitable in an attempt to get as 
“experience-near” as possible (Geertz 1973).  During the participant observation over 
80 unsolicited accounts were collected, which were kept in noteform as observations or 
in some cases recorded as “direct quotes”. 
 
 
6.4.3 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Interviews were conducted with 15 members with different backgrounds (e.g. age, 
occupation) and status in the community (core, marginal and peripheral members). 
These lasted from 60 to 75 minutes and took place in cafes that the respondents chose. 
The exact timing and purpose of the interviews is explained in the overview of my 
ethnographic experience later in the chapter.  
 
Even though the interviews had an exploratory aim, a semi-structured guide was used 
(available in the appendix), which was considered important in order to (a) preserve an 
order in the discussion of different matters for each respondent, (b) schedule a set of 
prompts, (c) provide direction and scope and (d) allow the interviewee to focus on the 
respondent (McCracken 1988). The interviews were organised around grand tour 
questions and prompts (McCracken 1988), which drew upon either my observations, 
stories and narratives provided by other respondents and/or the account of the particular 
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respondent that was being interviewed at the time. Interviewees were firstly asked to 
talk about their background and personal interest in the arts to help achieve a first 
impression on their cultural competences. Such opening grand tour questions (Spradley 
1979) give background and warm up respondents. Subsequently they were questioned 
on their involvement in the community and encouraged to give personal stories from 
experiences they had had. Community practices were discussed in relation to the 
members’ roles in the Brik, the nature and social aspects of the community, decision 
making processes, the values and ethos of the community and difficulties faced or ways 
in which the community is dysfunctional. Prompts were used to encourage respondents 
to elaborate on matters that got my attention from observations, previous accounts or 
instantly recognized as potentially useful. On many occasions I would ask respondents 
to reflect on particular situations that I had observed while volunteering in the 
community and these questions would be repeated to all of them in order to create an 
indirect “dialogue” amongst them. Moreover, verification questions were used to ensure 
that my understanding of the respondents’ stories was accurate, while contrast questions 
(Spradley 1979) were useful in identifying juxtapositions between the community and 
its dissimilar others. Overall an unobtrusive profile was kept and most questions were 
phrased in a general manner that gave a great extent of freedom to the interviewees. 
 
 
6.5 Description of Settings and History 
 
6.5.1 The Birth 
 
The Brik was formally incorporated in 2000. However, its origins lie further back, in 
an informal, experimental cinema exhibition group which ran for several years before 
the opportunity arose to take over the running of the building where it is currently 
located, which previously hosted an arts centre cinema. The business was a success and 
grew as the programme of events developed. The number of volunteer members also 






6.5.2 How the Brik Works 
 
Volunteers are carrying out work that falls into two broad categories: event staff and 
day staff. The space is open to the public during the evenings and any income generated 
from ticket and bar sales goes towards the costs of running the community. The group 
receives no other funding, in an attempt to keep its operations independent from the 
control and influence of any external organisations. Event staff are responsible for the 
daily events that take place in the Brik and include bartenders, projectionists, front of 
house staff, event managers and sound engineers. To take up one of these roles (on a 
night-to-night basis), members sign up on a rota clipboard which is to be found in the 
Brik office. Events are mostly in the afternoon and evening, but on rare occasions there 
might be happenings during the day. Day staff are responsible for looking after the 
administration, which includes programming films and performance events, publicity, 
accounting, production of the printed programme, management of the rota, repairs and 
cleaning.  
 
New volunteers start out doing evening shifts. The duties that need to be carried out in 
an evening role are straightforward and simplified in order to be accessible to anyone 
without specialised skills. Training for a role takes place while carrying it out, usually 
with the help of a more experienced member. Moving on to take up one of the more 
responsible roles, however (e.g. becoming a programmer or accountant), involves 
shadowing and more extensive training. 
 
 
6.5.3 Organisational Structure and Decision Making 
 
The Brik is a cooperative, which means that all volunteers have a stake in the business 
and a say in how it is run. The forum for this is mostly the weekly volunteers meetings, 
which allow staff to bring up and discuss questions and issues about the running of the 
community, both long term and day to day. In addition to these general meetings, there 
is a legal requirement for the directors to meet regularly. However, these meetings are 
held only for the purpose of ensuring legal compliance and do not have any more 
decision making powers than the weekly volunteers meetings. Regular smaller group 
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meetings are also in place, focusing on more specific domains of decision making, such 
as film programming, music and live events, IT and finance. 
 
Aside from physical meetings (which inevitably are never attended by all volunteers), 
another key aspect of the Brik’s decision making is the use of email lists. All volunteers 
are required to participate in the general “volunteers” list, which is used to share 
information about rota slots that need filling, discussion of relevant Brik matters and 
general conversations. Minutes from the weekly meetings are always distributed via this 
forum, to ensure that all members stay informed of any issues that have arisen and 
decisions that have been made. There are several other “thematic” mailing lists, (e.g. 
programming, music, IT and finance) to which members can request subscription. 
 
Because of the flat hierarchy of the Brik, all meetings try to reach consensuses with 
regards to any decision to be made. Voting is a rejected method because it is thought of 
as enforcing the opinion of the majority on all. Unlike many organisations, the Brik 
community is rather informal in that it does not have written rules, procedures or 
policies, but it is common practice, however, that any significant changes within the 
group must go through discussion at the meeting and through the mailing list.  
 
 
6.6 A Reflexive Account of my Time at the Brik 
 
6.6.1 The First Contact 
 
In this subsection I discuss in more detail methodological issues surrounding 
participant observation, detailing how I discovered and accessed the research site, how I 
established relationships with the research participants, how my role in the community 
developed and how the focus of my observations shifted from looking at how the group 
retains its off-the-mainstream image on the outside, to how members conciliate 
disagreements regarding the manner in which the community manifests tastes. By 
narrating the process of my entry and integration to the community I primarily aim to 
provide an introduction and overview of the research context to the reader that can be 
used as a foundation for the reading and understanding of the research findings, but also 
an opportunity to reflect critically on myself as a researcher. Detailing my Brik 
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experience is also necessary from a methodological point of view in relation to 
assessing the reliability of the findings and rigour of the data collection methods 
employed. Meardi (2000) in particular argues that describing the context of enquiry is 
especially critical for qualitative studies where the manner of data collection can bias 
findings. I should also note that some insights presented in this account will be used to 
form part of the general findings of the thesis. 
 
My quest for a research context was conducted within the field of the arts since the 
first days of enrolling on the doctoral programme for a variety of reasons. I have always 
had an interest in film and the visual arts, in the beginning purely as a hobby and a way 
to pass leisure time, and later on as a potential domain where I could develop a career, 
starting by pursuing a master’s degree in managing in the creative and cultural 
industries. My curiosity about  the arts field was further reinforced by a long-lasting 
informal contact with “art world” members (used here similarly to Becker [1982], to 
describe the loose network of people involved in the production and dissemination of 
art) of my hometown, Athens, through my best friend who is a fashion designer 
spending her time surrounded by a social milieu of: visual artists, curators, 
photographers and arts entrepreneurs. I have never been part of that tribe myself, but on 
multiple occasions observed the uses of taste of this entourage as an outsider. Finally, it 
is not without reason that previous works on taste have focused on the field of the arts. 
Multiplicity of offerings and passionate attachment of social groups to genres, 
movements and styles, has long generated taste wars that aim to legitimise choices and 
prove the superiority of one form over another (Becker 1982). 
 
   The city where the research was conducted is known for its vibrant cultural life: 
commercial spaces include multiplex chain cinemas Odeon and Showcase, highbrow 
venues comprise a 19
th
 century old theatre company and a nationally renowned 
symphony hall, there is a multiplicity of independent contemporary venues including 
innovative studio theatres and cross-artwork spaces and finally, a wide range of smaller, 
independently run communities that specialise in organising small scale art exhibitions, 
gigs and performances and capitalise on an “alternative” positioning. Aware of the 
complex arts map of the city, rather than attempting to negotiate access to a community 
I was already familiar with, I decided to research blogs and local forums and explore 




My expectations of what I would encounter at the Brik were set up before my first 
contact with its members and even before my first visit to the physical space where the 
community operates. Being an active arts goer, the very fact that I had never heard of it 
before had in itself an element of discovering one of the city’s best kept secrets – a 
representation that I later found out was to some extent promoted by members - a space 
concealed from the wider public. My assumptions about the kind of community I had 
stumbled across were further verified simply by browsing through the group’s website. 
Written in basic HTML, with a striking absence of visuals and a black-and-white logo, 
the site signified the opposite of “cinema for the masses”. This “bare” website serves 
two purposes: a functional one, which is to provide information with regards to the 
activities taking place in the Brik, and second, a “filtering” one, by putting off those 
audiences that would require a glossy interface to be seduced.  
 
Intrigued by the voluntary nature of the community and the anti-establishment feelings 
manifested on the website, I decided to explore the group further. The programme 
comprised an eclectic selection of movies and one-off live music events, with the vast 
majority of what was on offer being unfamiliar to me. At this point, I made the decision 
to make my first physical contact with the community, playing the role of a customer 
over that of a researcher. I asked a friend to come along with me and we chose a 
repertoire cinema evening, showcasing a well-known 50’s circus film, “Trapeze”. That 
same afternoon the website was updated with a message warning of the possibility of 
cancellation, which, to my surprise, was later confirmed just two hours before the 
scheduled showcase time. The movie was on for a second night, so the following 
evening my friend and I made our way down to the Brik for the very first time. 
 
Before arrival at the premises, I felt utterly in the dark about not only as to what I was 
about to encounter but primarily, being very self-conscious of my outsider status, as to 
how I was supposed to behave. Upon arrival, the first thing we came across was a metal 
door in a wall which was facing a small pedestrian road and was surrounded by graffiti, 
but with no actual indication that this was the entrance. A few minutes later and after 
talking to a couple of passers-by, we realised that this was only a side access for 
volunteers and that the audience should use the main entrance which was located just 
around the corner. Waiting outside the front entryway in what looked like an empty car 
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park, I got the chance to observe the building: the structural shape of three cubes 
attached to one another and the plain brown brick walls gave an industrial feel to the 
observer. Notably, there was a single window visible in the wall and the only thing in 
vivid colour was a red-blue neon sign on top of the terrace, reading “Brik”.  
 
As a frequent movie-goer, my expectations of the cinema experience were fairly 
challenged on that first visit to the Brik. The hegemonic cinema routine I would usually 
follow included arriving at the venue early on, queuing to buy tickets, purchasing drinks 
or food from the canteen and watching a good 15 minutes of trailers and adverts before 
the movie was finally shown. Therefore, I was puzzled by the fact that 15 minutes 
before the scheduled time that the movie was supposed to start the entrance was still 
shut. There were a couple more people waiting outside with us which at least reassured 
me that we were in the right place. 
 
At last, we were let in just a few minutes before the movie was scheduled to start. We 
quickly walked past a small patio area and entered the building, to find ourselves in 
what seemed like a reception hall that was overfilled with posters, magazines and flyers 
of past Brik events and other local happenings. The wall was painted blue but the colour 
and texture were significantly worn. We were unsure of which direction to take and 
speculatively walked towards the right to find ourselves in what seemed like a main 
area. Taking an investigating look around in the darkened room I saw a small bar, an 
“attached” waiting room to my right that got some natural light from the single window 
that I earlier had observed and after putting in some more effort I managed to trace a 
single cash till in the corner of the room, where I presumed we could buy tickets. I 
found myself feeling like a fish out of water, primarily because the space did not 
indicate to us where to go, what to do or who to interact with. Contrary to our 
expectations, it was also impossible to tell which of the people in the room actually 
worked there and which were customers.   
 
We reluctantly walked towards the till and asked the people who were chatting next to 
it whether we could buy tickets there. A scruffy looking girl in her late twenties asked 
us if we were members and informed us that buying a membership card (costing £1 and 
lasting for a lifetime) was compulsory. We agreed and spent £9 for two cinema tickets 
and two membership cards, in what seemed like the cheapest price I had paid in a 
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cinema in almost a decade. In return, we got an old style, stamp size cinema ticket and a 
loyalty card bearing the name of the Brik with a green psychedelic design. Stuck in our 
cinema habits and not knowing what else to do, we then headed to the bar, where the 
drinks on offer were written in chalk on a background blackboard. Below this, the faded 
blue wall was covered with banknotes from all over the world stuck on with blue-tack 
and further below the available spirits and bottled beers were on display on a dusty 
shelf. We asked for a cider and a cup of tea which was served to us in a casual mug and 
when asked whether we could take the drinks with us in the movie hall, the surprised 
volunteer answered that “of course we could”. My friend joked about how we were 
spared the questions we usually get asked in the multiplexes, “Would you like to 
upgrade for £1 to a large Coke? Do you know about our menu deal?”. The drinks were 
the cheapest I have ever bought in the city.  
 
A few people were standing in the middle of the room, drinking and chatting loudly 
but we opted for a couch located in the attached room, separated by two to three stairs 
from the main area, so I could observe at a distance. We sat down on the worn couch 
and I finally had some time to overcome my anxiety and look at the space I had found 
myself in. The main area had no windows at all and the artificial, very low light gave 
the room the “underground” feeling of an alternative bar rather than that of a cinema. 
There was a distinct smell of stale air filled with damp and the low ceiling created the 
illusion of being in a box. Wherever the eye fell, there was something new to discover: 
artwork hanging on the walls, event flyers on the coffee table, fairy lights decorating 
parts of the ceiling and little nooks and corners that seemed to serve no obvious purpose 
but to give a mystifying feeling. Everything around us was worn and old. Aside from a 
couple who seemed to be new to the space similarly to me and my friend, the rest of the 
people present, whether volunteers or customers, seemed to know each other quite well. 
There was a clear sense of community, manifested in the manner in which people 
interacted with each other and the comfort with which they circulated in the space. 
Their appearance - purposeful shabby clothing, styling, make-up and hair- further 
reinforced my outsider feeling. 
 
We entered the cinema hall with 20 minutes delay. The room had the air of an old 
cinema, evoked in the materials, colours and lighting: dark brown wooden floors and 
velvet red folding chairs arranged in an amphitheatre structure, facing towards an 
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elevated wooden stage on the back of which the screen rose. The smell of dump was 
even more overpowering in the hall. We took seats towards the back and there were no 
more than 10 people in the audience, despite the capacity being close to 100. The seats 
were very uncomfortable and creaked each time anyone made even the slightest move. 
Subsequently, the movie started immediately without any trailers or adverts. 
 
 
6.6.2 Gaining Access 
 
That first evening in the Brik, I left feeling content that I had found my research site. 
Gaining access was straightforward. The community was constantly on the lookout for 
help with work and so I enquired for a volunteer position, revealing in my email 
application that I was interested in studying the Brik community as part of my project. I 
purposefully avoided giving too much detail as to what exactly I was interested in.  
“Normalising social research”, in other words making it sound simple, appealing and 
accessible to respondents, is a strategy often proposed by ethnographers (Johnson 
1975). Given that there are no particular requirements as to who can join, I got invited 
to attend a volunteers’ induction a couple of months later. The person who responded to 
my initial request let me know that it was fine for me to do my research in the Brik, as 
long as I committed to helping out for a period of at least six months. At that time, I did 
not receive any additional questions with regards to the nature of what I wanted to study 
or the specificities of how I would carry the research out. 
 
I subsequently attended an induction along with a dozen more new volunteers. I was 
instructed by email to enter by the side door that I had traced on my first visit, rather 
than by the main entrance, which gave me a material confirmation that my role was to 
transform from that of a customer to that of a member. I paid attention to my outfit, 
taking care not necessarily to “fit in” but at least to not stand out. Personal appearance 
has been cited as an important consideration for ethnographers (Hammersley and 
Attkinson 1995), particularly in the early days of trying to gain trust. The Brik bore the 
same smell of damp as the last time I was there. I was led down a long corridor by one 
of the existing volunteers to what turned out to be a “backstage” office space, concealed 
behind the bar area that I had found myself in during the first visit, and accessible to 
volunteers only. There was a clear contrasting image between existing volunteers who 
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were lively, chatting to one another while carrying out various tasks and a very silent 
group of a dozen new volunteers, who, like myself, were sitting around a table, waiting 
for the induction to start. The office room was very spacious, but messy and full of 
clutter: boxes, recycling bins, computer screens, folders and documents, timetables and 
posters hanging from walls and to the side a small kitchen. People turned to me and 
briefly said hello. I found myself surprised that ages in the room varied significantly 
ranging from early the twenties to early sixties. I had associated the Brik with youth 
subculture movements, but instead what I later discovered was that it was made up of 
people whose cognitive age, in the words of Goulding and Shankar (2002), was out of 
synch with their chronological age.  Having said this, most of the new people in the 
induction group, however, on that day, fell within the 25 to 40 years age range .  
 
The induction was run by three existing members who welcomed us and gave some 
general information about the community and the way it is run. We were then asked to 
briefly introduce ourselves. The majority of the new members stated that they were new 
to the city and were looking for opportunities to socialize (“I recently moved here”). 
Some were recent graduates who were looking to fill in their time while job hunting, 
whilst others were interested in gaining working experience in an arts organization (“I 
recently graduated from a film course at the University and looking for some 
experience”). Others said that they simply had nothing better to do with their time 
(“Last year I did nothing with my evenings”). When asked to share with the group the 
reasons why I wanted to volunteer at the Brik I did not conceal the fact that I wanted to 
study the manner in which the community operated as part of my PhD, but I also 
stressed my interest in the arts. The reason I opted for overt research was that this 
approach would allow me to move in the settings more freely (Fielding [2001] 2008). 
The existing volunteers briefly explained to us the different roles that we could get 
involved with in the Brik, as well as how to take up one of these by signing up on a rota 
that was hanging on the wall in the office. Before leaving I signed up for my very first 







6.6.3 The Evolution of my Role 
 
As mentioned earlier, my role during data collection was that of a participant observer 
(Junker 1960; Gold 1958). The observer role would most of the time overshadow my 
participant role, primarily because the length of the ethnography (one year), in 
combination with my relatively low field-related capital, was not sufficient for me to 
assume a very senior/demanding role (or one that would have direct influence in the 
group’s taste-making for that matter). In communities of practice terminology, I 
remained a peripheral member (Wenger et al. 2002) throughout my participant 
observation, though inarguably towards the later phase of the ethnography my status 
was far better established when compared to the early days, primarily due to my 
elevated social capital and cultivated relations. This peripheral status has its advantages 
as it provides the researcher with sufficient emotional distance to conduct observations 
and avoids the danger of over-rapport (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995) that could lead 
to identifying with members views and losing the ability to be critical and analytical 
about the social situations observed. The peripheral-native role, however, has also been 
criticised for not allowing the researcher to appreciate the true character of the group’s 
life (Styles 1979), which has become known as the outsider-insider problematic 
(Merton 1972; Labaree 2002; Kusow 2003). In this project, the danger of failing to 
understand the orientations of the participants was overcome by using interviews that 
allowed members to “set the record straight” in case their behaviours had been 
misinterpreted.  
 
The first shifts that I worked at the Brik were exploratory. My focus was on learning 
how to carry out the duties of the role right and get to know members more closely, in 
other words, I adopted an “acceptable incompetent” role (Hammersley and Attkinson 
1995). I initially tried multiple roles, including selling membership, ushering, 
bartending and shadowing projectionists in order to take up a projectionist role, but after 
a month of experimenting I found that the role that offered me more access and better 
insights was that of working at the bar. The “social” role  of the bartender brought me in 
contact not only with the other members who would help out each time in the bar area, 
but also with a number of customers who, unlike in the snack counters of most cinemas, 
would be seeking to initiate conversations with myself and other volunteers that 
provided me with valuable insights. On very few occasions (most of them live music 
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events) the bar got so busy that all my efforts would be put into serving customers and I 
was unable to start conversations or undertake methodical observations. However, 
working shifts at the bar was the majority of times an easy task to carry out because of 
the simplified processes in the bar, the fact that on many occasions the Brik would not 
reach its capacity, as well as the voluntary and laid back nature of the community. As 
such, after getting used to the tasks involved, I was able to concentrate on my 
observations and collection of unsolicited accounts.  
 
During my time at the Brik, I found that one of the most valuable slots of being there 
was before the actual start of my shift. I would always arrive at least an hour before the 
venue was open to the public, so that I could observe the interactions amongst 
volunteers. Most evenings I would find between five and 20 members in the office 
room, either working or hanging out with one another. At the same time I would usually 
help out by stocking the bar, entering new members of the public to the databse or 
tidying up.  
 
Getting to know Brik members better has been a challenge throughout my time there 
for two reasons. First, the fact that the community operates with more than 250 
members means that there was a high number of “peripheral” members who only show 
up for a shift on a casual basis (i.e. once a month) and a core of very involved members 
did not normally work night shifts but focus on the more responsible tasks like 
programming or financing, which would not take place necessarily at the same times 
when I was present at the Brik. As such, my contact with peripheral and core volunteers 
was always less frequent and I found it significantly harder to cultivate relationships 
with them. The type of volunteers I got to know more were the marginal participants 
who were present in the venue very often (some of them on an everyday basis) and were 
involved in a mixture of shifts and more responsible duties. Second, because of the 
longstanding status of many members and the already well-established relations 
amongst them, I found it very hard to make myself accepted in the group and involved 
in the discussions taking place. This was a barrier that many new volunteers 
encountered and that the community was well aware of. New members would often not 
be given a warm enough welcome during their first shifts and as a result would 
eventually stop volunteering, which meant that their turnover was always very high, 




While spending time at the Brik, I would never stress the fact that I was a researcher 
observing the group’s interactions. In fact, on multiple occasions members that I 
worked with had no idea that I was a participant observer. However, when asked how I 
ended up volunteering, I would give an honest account of my presence there. Marginal 
members that I interacted a lot with and who knew about my role were fascinated by the 
fact that I wanted to study their group. Some would, on occasion, come to me to ask 
what I thought of them and what I was writing about. It is also worth mentioning that 
the legitimacy of the researcher may be challenged when particular attitudes prevail in 
the context. Hammersley and Attkinson (1995) refer to Brewer’s (1991) experience in 
the field, stating that “for many police officers the word “sociologist” sounds too much 
like “socialist””.  Diametrically opposed to this, in this case the connotations of being a 
marketing/management scholar were perceived to be in sharp contrast to the ethos of the 
studied community, despite marketing implications being outside the scope of the 
project. Consequently, during data collection I always highlighted the interdisciplinary 
and sociological aspects which characterise the research project, playing down the 
managerial aspects. 
 
Some discomfort in the field (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995) due to my peripheral 
role was definitely present in the form of a persistent insecurity, often inability to 
participate in conversations or a sense of “not knowing what to do” particularly in the 
first months, much like a child at its first day in school. While these difficulties were 
never fully outgrown, my sense of comfort in the group improved simply by acquiring a 
better network of contacts and/or by making myself useful in the community. With the 
passage of time, I got more competent in my duties and was able to help out more. I ran 
the bar as manager, rather than staff, I was responsible for controlling the stock for the 
night and got more acquainted with the internal computer system. Being able to offer 
more, gave me the sense that I could ask for more from members and the fact that I 
could give back to the community was very helpful in persuading individuals to do an 
interview. Especially when trying to attract participants from the members’ core, I felt 
that being an active volunteer significantly increased my chances of getting a positive 
response. The closest I ever felt to feeling as an included member of the group occurred, 
naturally, towards the last weeks of my participant observation, particularly during the 
very busy nights when keeping up with customers became somewhat of a challenge and 
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resulted in a contented feeling of “we made it collectively” at the end of the night and 
the sharing of stories and jokes amongst tired yet satisfied volunteers, including myself. 
Notably, one of the few occasions when my volunteer role overtook that of the 
researcher was when I was asked by one of the core members to take part in his art 
project, which included asking volunteers in front of a camera a number of questions, 
including “What is the Brik?”, “How did you get here?” and “Where are you going?”. 
The inversion of roles in this case (suddenly I was the interviewee and not the 
interviewer), brought out a reflexivity towards my volunteer role and prompted me to 
allow myself the enjoyment of being part of this group, not as a researcher but as a 
genuine member. However, the majority of my time at the Brik I felt that my role as a 
researcher took precedence over that of the volunteer and it is perhaps my unfamiliarity 
with communities of this sort and lack of relevant cultural capital that prevented me 
from “going native”. 
 
My observations of the community were not limited to socialising and working shifts. 
Another integral part of the research was participation in the volunteer meetings, which 
took place every Monday, and the volunteer mailing list, an opinion exchange and 
decision making forum in which participation was compulsory for all members. After 
six months of volunteering and once I had established a relationship with one of the 
members of the IT team, he agreed to put me on the programming and events mailing 
list so I would get an insight into how decisions are made in these areas as well. Finally, 
given the presence of multiple subgroups within the Brik, I would on occasion 
participate in the film-making group, which is dedicated to making amateur short 





I completed interviews with 15 individuals. The sample included a cross section of 
individuals in terms of age (ranging from 25 to 64), which was representative of the 
span of ages that I encountered in the community. The real names of the respondents, 
the community as well as of any other art venues mentioned in the participants’ 
accounts are not disclosed and have been altered for anonymity purposes. A detailed 
respondent table is presented in the appendix and will be removed from any subsequent 
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publication of the research in order to protect internal confidentiality, in other words to 
avoid the traits of individual/ communities/venues making them identifiable in the thesis 
(Sieber 1992).  Each interview was conducted in public coffee shops, lasted between 60 
and 110 minutes, and was electronically recorded. There were significant differences in 
terms of occupations of the participants. Five of them identified themselves as artists, 
two as high school teachers, three as administrative assistants as well as there being an 
engineer, a project manager, a carer, a retired accountant and a doctoral student.  
 
The recruitment of informants was based on a mixture of opportunistic, judgmental, 
and theoretical sampling (Elliott and Elliott 2003; Spiggle 1994) and can be broken 
down into three distinct stages. Initially I had difficulties building rapports with 
members so I focused on those who seemed willing to give me their time. On my third 
month of participant observation I conducted pilot interviews with three respondents, 
two of whom were marginal members with a relatively longstanding service and one of 
who was a new volunteer with no established status. I recruited all three of them by 
asking if they were willing to participate while working together on a night shift. At the 
time, I still felt like an outsider to the group and during the interviews my attention was 
entirely absorbed by looking into how volunteers use taste as a mechanism to establish 
their position in the complex cultural map of the city. The account of the new volunteer 
was very similar to mine, she viewed the Brik community as a unified whole that aims 
to do things differently, and shared with me her difficulties of penetrating the group. 
The two more experienced members, however, painted a less glorified picture of their 
ingroup and instead shifted the focus of my attention to an internal problematic: the 
common phenomenon of disputes and tensions amongst members, the existence of 
volunteers who “don’t get it” and the prevalence of members who they felt tried to 
control the group.  
 
As I got more integrated in the community these issues started becoming increasingly 
visible to me, particularly through the attendance of meetings and following of 
discussions on the volunteers list. I was able to identify specific individuals (almost 
always part of the marginal or core of the group) that were often involved in heated 
arguments and disputes with regards to the running of the Brik.  During the second 
stage of recruiting informants - six months into my participant observation - I focused 
 100 
 
almost entirely on marginal members that I had built relationships with by working 
evening shifts and participating in sub-groups. Most of these respondents were aware of 
my research role. I would normally prepare the ground by informing them early on that 
I would be interested in interviewing them and would usually follow up with an email 
invitation a few weeks later. Most of them were very eager to participate, either because 
the interview provided a forum for them to express any frustration they felt about the 
community or because they simply found it entertaining to spend an hour and a half 
reflecting on their participation and experiences. I was also able to recruit one core 
member who had a personal interest in observing the social relationships amongst the 
community’s volunteers and so was curious about my research and approach. 
 
The third and hardest phase of recruiting informants - 10 months into my participant 
observation role - involved reaching out to the core members. Even though I had 
already built a profile on many of them – through their intense participation on the 
mailing list, the stories of my existing respondents and by observing them in the Brik - a 
lot of them still had no idea who I was. Despite the Brik having a flat hierarchy, when 
attempting to recruit those members I often felt that I was seeking access to the group’s 
senior management. This was due to their longstanding status (over 8 years) and the 
assertiveness of most of them when it came to decision making and managing the 
community. Sampling for this particular group was theoretical (Dean et al. 1967), and 
on some occasions the rationale behind targeting specific members was to hear the 
“other side” of numerous stories that previous participants had shared with me. The 
strategy I followed was to email the members I was interested in, stressing the fact that I 
was a volunteer myself and pointing out that I had already interviewed multiple 
volunteers, in an attempt to legitimise my request and research role. At least in ten 
instances my emails were ignored but I got sufficient responses to start the third round 
of interviews. On some occasions I was given the impression that core members agreed 
to participate in order to give me “a clear” idea of what the community was all about 







6.7 Data Analysis 
 
Some preliminary data analysis was conducted while the researcher was still in the 
process of collecting data (see phases one and two above), with the aim being to direct 
the subsequent phases of observations and interviews. Once the full dataset was 
collected the researcher distanced herself from the field completely, because data 
analysis is best conducted when the ethnographer has left the field (Wallendorf and 
Brucks 1993). The entire dataset was transcribed by the researcher, which significantly 
improved familiarity with it (Braun and Clarke 2006). QRS NVivo was used to 
facilitate the organising of the transcripts, thematic categories and integration of the 
data.  
 
The data were processed  through a thematic analysis of the interviews, emails and 
field notes. Braun and Clarke (2006, 79) define this as “a method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data”, that is especially pertinent when 
analysing material of a qualitative nature. Because of the complexity of the process of 
analysing the data the exact manner in which the dataset was examined is difficult to 
explain in full detail. The procedure followed, however, bears significant similarities to 
the 5-stage process suggested by McCracken (1988). Accordingly, the first round of 
thematic analysis was descriptive, treating each theme in its own terms and allowing the 
examination of a wide range of ideas, a lot of which were subsequently either collapsed 
into bigger category themes (e.g. romanticism as part of complying with dominant 
bohemian norms) or in fewer cases entirely discarded (e.g. identifying with the 
organisation). The second stage (corresponding to McCracken’s second and third 
stages) was still fairly descriptive, developing themes with further observations from the 
field notes or additional data collected in the process as well as occasionally re-
labelling, merging or separating categories. During this phase, existing typologies (from 
the literature, e.g. cultural capital), indigenous typologies (from the respondents’ 
accounts, e.g. autonomy) and self-constructed typologies (by the researcher, e.g. exo-
cultural elements) were used (Patton [1990] 2002). That is, the analysis was semi-
inductive, relying both on existing categories but also allowing for new ones to emerge. 
During the third stage of the analysis, data was under scrutiny for patterns of 
consistency and contradiction. This led to their being divided into two major themes, 
externally-driven (inter-group) and internal (intra-group) dynamics of taste, that served 
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as organising categories for the writing of the findings and formed the basis of the 
conceptual model produced. Within these themes, axial coding (Corbin and Strauss 
2008) allowed for the identification of the commonalities that linked them together. At 
this stage the process of writing up the analysis was also initiated. Finally and while 
already into the process of writing, abstraction, comparison and integration (Spiggle 
1994), the data were put under further scrutiny by probing the themes through the 
interviews and field notes that made up the dataset one last time and verifying the 
identified relationships amongst them. 
 
 
6.8 Credibility and Transferability 
 
Given the constructionist foundations of the project, evaluation criteria used 
traditionally under positivist philosophy, including validity, reliability and 
generalizability are deemed inappropriate in assessing trustworthiness (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985) an instead, the study’s credibility and transferability are examined.  
 
Credibility was achieved by prolonged engagement of the researcher with the 
community of enquiry (Wallendorf and Belk 1989). This was naturally constrained by 
time limitations of the doctoral programme, but the focus of the engagement was 
quickly directed to particular social situations in the context (defining “us” in relation to 
“them” and intra-group tensions), which allowed for a thick description (Geertz 1973) 
of how the phenomena of interest were present in the group. Prolonged engagement also 
provided sufficient depth of understanding of the community to accurately direct the 
interviews and contextualise the narratives of the interviewees (for example when a 
particular situation was described by a respondent the researcher was able to ask for 
additional information/clarifications having personally observed the situation). 
Credibility was also achieved by triangulating data (Wallendorf and Belk 1989) 
pertaining to observations, interviews, emails exchanged in the mailing lists and 
unsolicited accounts. In particular unsolicited accounts operated as informal member 
checks, since the researcher had the opportunity to “test” interpretations derived from 




Specificity and extremity of context often evoke the critique of lack of generalizability 
in ethnographic research. However “the extremity of variables and values enables 
researchers to derive theoretical insights” (Arnould, Price and Moisio 2006). From this 
standpoint, rather than focusing on generalizability, it is more important to establish 
whether the results of the study are transferable to other social situations. This is 
achieved by abstracting and theorising context specific data so that they are applicable 
to alternative contexts. That is, constructions stemming from the research can be 
appraised “for their fit or the extent to which they “work”, that is, provide a credible 
level of understanding; and are relevant and modifiable” (Guba and Lincoln 1989, 179). 
Theory generated from this study was often appraised for its “fit” in other contexts (e.g. 
by considering the extent to which it could be applicable to religious groups and even 
academic ones, such as the consumer culture theory community of practice) and the 
ultimate aim is to provide a framework that could potentially increase understanding of 
taste-making in various types of communities of practice (e.g. neo-tribes, subcultures, 





The chosen methodology, as is the case with all methodologies, presents some 
limitations which are discussed below. 
 
First, the problem of criteria (Schwandt 1994) poses the question of whether accounts 
provided from the study are the accounts of the researcher, solely from her relative point 
of view. However, in all ethnographic accounts, veracity, or in other words conformity 
with the truth, cannot be absolute (Stewart 1998). The data which ethnographers use is 
argued to be a “product of their participation in the field rather than a reflection of the 
phenomenon studied, and/or is constructed in and through the process of analysis and 
the writing of ethnographic accounts” (Harnmersley 1992, 2). This manifests an 
underlying tension in ethnographic research between the “naturalism characteristic of 
ethnographers' methodological thinking and the constructivism and cultural relativism 
that shape their understanding of the perspectives and behaviour of the people they 
study” (Harnmersley and Atkinson 1995, 11). The argument is that ethnographers use 
rhetorical devices to construct an account of their research. However, whilst not 
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claiming objectivity, the variety of sources used (observations, interviews, unsolicited 
accounts and online communication) shows the reader that there was a level of 
consistency between the different sources of data. 
 
Second, textual representations in qualitative research have been criticised for leading 
to the belief that “the world is rather simpler than it is (…) in other words we are 
confronted with a crisis of authority which tells us the world is “this way” when perhaps 
it is some other way, or many other ways” (Lincoln and Guba 2003, 284). The way 
things are is really just “the sense we make of them” (Crotty 1998, 64) and any account 
of theory formation is partial, located and screened through the researcher’s eye/I 
(Kondo 1990). Under this optic, description and narration are not representative of 
reality but entail merely reporting how something is seen. This study constitutes a report 
of how taste is constructed within a given community and the researcher accepts that 
she has been involved in the construction of a particular interpretation of the events 
observed and subjectively directed the focus on specific aspects of the environment and 
people that were observed. 
 
Indeed, data in this report is presented in a way that does not faithfully represent 
“reality” and is “artificially” broken down into different categories of the dynamics of 
taste-making, that in real life situations work in parallel and complex ways. This, 
however, was a necessary step in order to present the data in a comprehensive manner. 
In an attempt to avoid an oversimplified representation of the community, the data 
analysis moves from the parts (findings chapters) to the whole (discussion chapter), 
offering insights into the different identified dynamics, but concluding with an 
integrative conceptual framework that aims to present the “big picture” of the data.  
 
Third, with regards to the data collection methods, what needs to be acknowledged is 
that working as a volunteer was a task that was time consuming and distracting from 
participant observation. This is an understandable limitation but a price worth paying in 
exchange for backstage access. In addition, the observed context proffered a vast 
number of phenomena and social situations being available for study, many of which 
were purposefully ignored in order to focus on the particular aims that the data 








During the first four months of volunteering at the Brik, my field notes were very 
much preoccupied with examining how an etic look on the group gives the impression 
of a unified whole characterised by a strong “anti-establishment” sentiment. It is clear to 
me that despite advocating the importance and research negligence of heterogeneity 
within consumption collectives throughout the previous chapters, the Brik community is 
certainly held together by some level of shared understanding amongst members as to 
“who we are”. The construction of this understanding is facilitated by the use of “them” 
as a focal point for comparisons, which as expected is on almost every occasion 
proclaiming the sovereignty of the ingroup. I should clarify upfront that the division of 
dynamics of taste into inter-group and intra-group that I have used to structure the 
findings chapters, is an artificial one. Dynamics of taste, whether externally influenced 
to constitute a response to “them”, or internally driven as a result of negotiations and 
reconciliation of conflicts, influence taste- making simultaneously and are closely 
interconnected. However, by distinguishing between the two, in the first two findings 
chapters (7 and 8) I am able to focus on the ambivalence of “us and them”, without the 
preoccupation of internal heterogeneity, following the example of previous studies on 
consumption collectives that have chosen to set aside the tensions within “us” in favour 
of studying other phenomena. In the third findings chapter (9) I focus on the influence 
of intra-group tensions on taste-making, accounting at the same time for the external 
influence of “them”. The discussion chapter reconciles the internal/external divide in a 
single conceptual framework. 
 
Taking into account the fact that the community studied is legally a worker 
cooperative, it comes as no surprise that the participants’ discourse incorporates all 
three elements of a social movement’s ideology: identity and self-representation, 
opposition towards an adversary and the indication of goals (Touraine 1981 cited by 
Kozinets and Handelman 2004). As anticipated, the findings reveal that members can 
operate in the community due to their shared understanding of what distinguishes them 
from a variety of dissociative groups, primarily various types of art venues that operate 
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in the city and their audiences, and in addition to this art subcultures and in some cases 
society as a whole. This is expressed in a series of “sayings” and “doings” 
juxtapositions, centred on the notions of autonomy, radicalism, romanticism, anti-
commerciality, nobility of joint enterprise and sovereignty of publics, that set identity 
boundaries for the group and provide the coordinates for taste-making.  
 
As it will be exhibited later, while the findings reveal that group practices are the 
result of a taste regime (Arsel and Bean 2013) that renders both who constitutes a 
dissociative actor, as well as the manner in which distinction from these actors is best 
reinforced, they also open up the possibility that scarcity of resources is an equally 
important force in determining the group’s position within the domain. I distinguish 
between the two processes by arguing that in the first case it is a particular normative 
system that drives practice, while in the second, practice is constrained by the 
availability of resources, significantly limiting the power of the normative system. In 
the latter case the taste regime acts as a “mediator” that legitimises “doing” by 
concealing resource-imposed limitations in the process of taste-making. In both cases, 
however, the end result - meaning symbolic demarcation from outsiders - is the same. In 
agreement with Wenger (1998), the findings also demonstrate the existence of not just 
one but multiple joint enterprises. Members alternate between different enterprises each 
time they attempt to express the ingroup’s distinction, while simultaneously 
interchanging the dissociative actors that constitute the focal point in juxtapositions. In 
other words, the participants constantly modify the field boundaries within which they 
compete for status. The chapter also demonstrates how the community uses its publics 
and their possessed cultural capital as “evidence” of the community’s status, as well as 
the publics of dissociative others and their assumed lack of cultural capital as a reservoir 
of resources to further enforce symbolic boundaries with “them”.  Finally, it is worth 
mentioning that the etic understanding of what constitutes “us” becomes reificated and 
visible to members and their publics through the conspicuous absence of known 
practices of the dissociative groups, the conspicuous presence of appropriated practices 
of others and the redefinition of aesthetic categories. The latter will be discussed in 





7.1 Complying with Dominant Bohemianism Norms 
 
It has become clear to the reader by now that the community of practice investigated 
in this project for its negotiation of (dis)taste bears resemblance, at least in part, to the 
19th century bohemian movement and subsequent bohemian-inspired movements that 
flourished after the second world war, including the Beat generation of the 1950’s, 
countercultures of the 1960’s (even though in contrast to subcultures, bohemia has been 
primarily conceptualised outside of class [Brake 1987]) and the hippies of the 1970’s. 
As Lloyd (2006) argues, the bohemian model is thematic rather than dogmatic, in a 
sense that there is no standard system of rules to be followed by a bohemian 
community, but rather transportable schemes that can be adapted in different periods or 
places. In any case “la vie bohème” supports the notion that “to produce art requires a 
commitment not only to the practical activity of creation but also to the artistic style of 
life” (52).  
 
Indeed, during my time at the Brik I became increasingly aware that it is not solely the 
choice of art to be displayed on walls, programming of quirky films and invitation of 
provocative performers that is distinguishing the community from other art venues, nor 
is it the tired building that stands in direct comparison with the neat and polished 
cinemas that one can find in the city. It is equally, and perhaps even more importantly, 
the community’s management style, including its organisational structure, decision 
making and informal policies that proclaim distinction. On this note, I revisit Silvia 
Gherardi’s (2009, 563) approach to collective taste (see section 5.3) that offers an all-
encompassing account of the construct by defining it as a “preference for the way 
members do things together” and a constant preoccupation as to what is the “correct” 
way of practising. Studies on taste have looked at how “good taste” is evoked in the 
material (Bourdieu 1984), its meaning and interpretation (Holt 1998), its actualisation 
and performance (Hennion 2001, 2004, 2007) and in the normative system underlying 
all of these (Arsel and Bean 2013). However, when looking at the micro social level of a 
collective, it can be seen that the role of the inevitably present management style 
adopted by the group and its relation to taste has been marginalised. Moreover, while it 
may seem somewhat odd to discuss how taste can be actualised through management 
styles, one should remember that beauty is ascribed to all the things we admire, the 
things we consider of good quality, “worthy” or even “ethical”. Woodward and 
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Emmison (2001) in particular have found that “judgements of taste are not only 
understood as a question of aesthetics but they are also matters of moral, ethical and 
communal sensibility” (296). In relation to this, and as Gherardi (2009) notes, a 
mathematician can consider his solution to an equation to be “beautiful”. From a similar 
standpoint, management science has in recent years shown some, yet embryonic, 
interest in the importance of aesthetics in the running of organisations (Strati 1992; 
1999; 2008; 2009, 2010), whereas the aesthetics of the running of consumption 
collectives have been rather neglected by marketing scholars. 
 
Similarly to bohemian artists, whose normative system not only directs individuals 
towards the production of meaningful art, but also towards leading the life of an artist, 
the findings reveal a compliance of (dis)tastes at the Brik to dominant bohemianism 
norms, that revolve not only around the material and its interpretation, but also the 
performative and normative aspects of what it means to be an avant-garde collective. In 
addition to this, an emerging dimension that is evident throughout the analysis is the 




7.1.1 Being Autonomous 
 
One of the key characteristics of the community is its rejection of any form of support 
from external organisations and especially its negation of any external funding. The 
autonomy created from this informal policy generates a shared feeling of pride amongst 
the participants. Pride, however, is not drawn from the financial independence enjoyed 
by the group and its ability to survive economically relying solely on the income that 
can be generated from selling tickets. Most importantly, pride is the result of what 
financial independence means for the decision making of the group and eventually for 
the chosen forms of art to be displayed. The fact that members can decide over what 
films to showcase, what bands to book and what kind of art to put on the walls without 
constraints or any form of supervision from external parties, authenticates the practices 
of the community by generating meanings of freedom, risk-taking, showcasing art “for 
art’s sake” and ultimately enhancing the perception of being amongst peers. Not 
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surprisingly, the role of other arts organisation as a focal point for juxtapositions in the 
way that the finances of the community are managed is evident in the accounts below: 
 
“Anyone who has ever been involved in trying to get funding, arts 
council funding, it tends to create an atmosphere where people are 
second guessing what will get funding so it subtly shapes the culture. If 
you know certain things are more likely to get funding even if not 
consciously, you start doing those things trying to get funding. And so it 
is really refreshing that this organisation says fuck that, we are not 
having anything to do with that, we will just do genuinely what we 
want. So you know I think the Brik with all its problems is still a 
genuinely autonomous arts institution which is really really rare. Very 
very rare.” (Patrick) 
 
Patrick condemns the funding culture prevailing in the arts because of the ability of 
funding bodies to “control”, in direct or indirect ways, the activities of arts 
organisations. As is the case with any type of funding, getting financial help for an arts 
institution means adapting to the likes and requirements of your sponsor. Having been 
employed by an arts institution before myself, I have experienced first-hand the 
compromises required when trying to attain external financial help. Similarly to what 
Patrick describes, funding applications often scrap the artistic endeavours of the 
organisation to accommodate the goals of the funding body instead. From this 
standpoint, any arts organisation receiving such help is, to an extent, reduced to 
“executing” someone else’s culture.  
 
Autonomy in programming is a key principle of the Brik community. The financial 
instability that is generated from this informal policy reproduces the myth of the 
“penniless yet artistically striving” bohemian artist who resists the marketization of his 
work by rejecting commissioned projects and only actualising what his or her artistic 
genius dictates. Negation of this “established practice” that is commonly encountered in 
the arts domain, enables participants to feel superior to outgroups, not only because of 
the rarity of the policy that they adopt, but also because of the connotations that the 
policy generates for the kind of art that the group chooses to showcase. Juxtapositions 
with outgroups in this case do not relate to the material (this film or this band versus 
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that film or that band) nor to its actualisation (e.g. watching a movie in 35mm film 
rather than digital), but to the decision making underlying the showcasing of art. It is the 
“how we decide about practice” that carries the positive connotations of freedom and 
free will, that in turn implies that “our offering is chosen out of passion and is not 
imposed to us” and as such is genuine and authentic. Following Beverland and 
Farrelly’s (2010) work on the relationship between goals and authenticating acts, it is 
the focus on the intent behind decision making that prescribes both the practice and its 
outcome with meaning. 
 
Another significant constraint imposed on arts organisations that attain external 
funding is the mandatory achievement of specific goals, particularly in terms of 
maintaining audience numbers and reaching out to new audiences. One way for funding 
bodies to evaluate the success of an arts organisation is by measuring admissions and 
while there is some merit in directing funding to those institutions that are doing better 
in pure “number” terms, this inevitably affects the programming of the institution. Brik 
participants explain to me that on many occasions the Sandbox
1
, will mostly showcase 
“marquee names” of independent cinema because this is safe ground for them. The 
Sandbox recently secured funding for three years (circa £750,000 per year) as part of 
the ACE’s (Arts Council England) new portfolio. While this may be good news in terms 
of financial stability, job opportunities and development of various sorts of artistic 
talent, the organisation will need to produce some sort of value in exchange, part of 
which will be measured by engaging more audiences and if its management knows that 
there is one there for marquee names, then that is what they are going to show. 
 
Consequently, members of the community feel that breaking free from attaining 
externally set goals makes their (programming) choices pure and agentic. In the words 
of one of the respondents: 
 
“That [no funding policy] comes from people wanting to do things their 
own way and not become accountable to like national, social or 
economic or cultural norms. And the less you are dependent on people 
                                                          
1
 Independent multiplex cinema and cultural venue located in the same city 
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from outside the more scope you have to do things your own way” 
(Billy) 
 
Operating independently becomes a project in progress that extends far outside 
attaining funding. The meanings that members attach to this conspicuous independence 
- idealism, creativity, rejection, purity - are elements common amongst bohemian-like 
cultures and project a narcissism often encountered in counter-cultures.  
 
“From getting the posters done for the Brik for a gig night to the whole 
computer system…We have own server, that is extremely unusual, and 
it is just quite interesting to see how.... the social group can function 
essentially doing it for ourselves with very little input from outside 
organizations. I think we do have a bit of fascination with how far you 
can take that and how well you can function without outside input”  
(Frances) 
 
The narcissistic empowerment attained from operating independently becomes a goal 
to be achieved and a point to be proven collectively. All elements of practice are 
scrutinised for alternative ways of performing them that keeps the group in line with the 
goal of complete independence. That is, members will challenge one another as to what 
is the most appropriate (tasteful) way of carrying out a practice and will weigh the 
different options available in each case. For example, when a smaller group of members 
decided to start a monthly podcast to discuss the forthcoming programme and news 
relevant to the Brik and the local community, the participants present at the kick-off 
meeting debated using SoundCloud as their web posting base for uploading the 
podcasts. Soon, disagreements from some members who rejected the proposal arose, 
with the argument behind those opposing the proposal being based on the idea that if the 
group has the technology and ability to do this in-house then there is no need to rely on 
propriety software. 
 
In this case, the manner in which the podcast is actualised increases its status. In other 
words, while the content of podcast recordings would be the same whether the group 
decided to use an external platform or rely on in-house technology, the different  
process of attaining the end result in the two cases infuses the outcome with meanings 
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that are of grave importance to its producers. In the same way, the point of juxtaposition 
with external actors not only concerns what the group produces and consumes, but 
places the weight in the how of the production and consumption process, thus verifying 
Hennion’s (2001) argument that the process of actualisation does in itself define taste. 
 
The lack of external constraints further increases the feeling of belonging of members, 
by allowing them to question not only the tastes exhibited by other organisations, but 
most importantly the goals driving those tastes. The formal organisational structure of 
arts institutions and concern for financial prosperity and reputation, become points of 
criticism for the ingroup, for while financial viability is still important for the Brik 
community, it is treated as a mere necessity that has to be dealt with in order to pursue 
more noble goals. As such, the decision making of the group, free from external 
constraints, can be based on a shared understanding of what is “good taste” prompted by 
collective mastery of similar cultural capital, that as Bourdieu thoroughly demonstrates 
in Distinction (1984) increases the feeling of belonging of members and their sense of 
what it means to be one of “us”. 
 
“Say the Burgundy2 or even somewhere like Land’s End3, obviously 
you got to persuade the administration of that organisation of what you 
think is a good idea and that administration is not your peer group, it's a 
hierarchy that has its own value system and own ideas about you 
know...and then they have different criteria for putting on things. They 
wouldn't put on things which wouldn’t reflect well on their institution. 
They have different criteria, value criteria, to the Brik where the people 
you have to persuade something is a good idea are basically your peers 
and are your equals” (Patrick)  
 
Members attempt to authenticate their performances in relation to the prevalence of 
bureaucratic structures in other arts organisations and the fact that the practices of 
dissociative others means they are held prisoners to a structure that restricts decision 
making and the actualisation of practice. This places an emphasis not only on the 
actualisation of practice, but also to the structure that gives birth to it. The fact that 
                                                          
2
 The Burgundy is a local art gallery/exhibition space of international reputation 
3
 Land’s End is a local contemporary arts venue of international reputation 
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programming choices in the community are made collectively by a group of people of 
the same idiosyncrasy, rather than being imposed by few senior members who attain to 
their own (or to externally set) goals, affects the perceived status of the exhibited 
choices. Tastes that are the result of a cooperative structure are perceived as agentic and 
genuine while those that are imposed by a team of a few are seen as instrumental and 
serving a sinister purpose. 
 
Moreover, while achieving externally-set goals is not a concern for the group, abiding 
by their own informally set rules faithfully becomes a matter of extreme significance. 
Authentication of acts fulfilled through the maintenance of the community’s autonomy, 
is only valuable when the normative system is followed religiously, for going astray 
from what the regime dictates, can jettison the authenticity of the practice, threatening 
to reduce the group to the level of dissociative others:  
 
 “We are quite unique in being a completely volunteer run organisation 
that as a matter of principle (emphasis) does not take funding, does not 
take government funding. I have been involved in a film cooperative 
before where three of the staff there were paid....they created three paid 
positions and from that the whole kind of...the cooperative nature of the 
organisation kind of collapsed. Because as soon as you have three 
people being paid suddenly it somehow kind of professionalises, 
marketises the whole ideology behind the organisation.” (Jake) 
 
 
7.1.2 Being Radical 
 
Similarly to what the bohemian tradition dictates, the community’s joint enterprise 
directs members towards programming choices that are there to serve a purpose, i.e. 
provoke thinking and reflection and operating collectively in a manner that stands out 
from the norm. This shared understanding of the common purpose is underlined by a 
hostility to and alienation from societal norms and is producing meanings of radicalism. 
Taste, in this case, is directed by a regime that calls for the cultivation of a “cultural 
revolution” that challenges the mainstream view of the purpose that the arts and 
entertainment should serve. This regime is explicitly stated in the community’s website: 
 114 
 
“We aim to offer alternatives and make a difference - in our programming and in the 
way we trade”.  Meanings of radicalism are realised through taking pride in being (one 
of) the first communities of its kind to operate in the area, thereby provoking the 
mainstream order through its way of operation and experimenting with programming 
choices. 
 
The Brik is located in a mainly residential area, which neighbours an artistically 
renowned bohemian district. The district is home to multiple activist groups and famous 
for its colourful, mural-painted streets and multiplicity of art galleries and art bars. The 
Brik is often mistakenly referred to as being part of that district’s scene (despite this not 
being true in strict geographic terms), both by its publics and by the press, much to the 
annoyance of volunteers, who have on occasions rushed to correct the mistake. The 
reason behind such a negative reaction is to be traced in the shared belief that the Brik 
“got there first”, and was able to operate radically, survive and develop, even at a time 
when the environment did not facilitate the existence of such groups. Neil explains to 
me that while a lot of Brik members hang out in the bohemian district and engage in a 
multiplicity of activities there, the group does not like to identify with the scene: 
 
“I think we are quite proud that we were here before all that… different 
views, the majority of people feel that it is restrictive”. (Neil) 
 
Neil not only highlights that the existence of the community precedes the development 
of the artistic quarter, proclaiming the superiority of the Brik in terms of originality and 
risk-taking, but also rejects the goals of the quarter as “too restrictive”. Indeed, while 
the descriptions of the Brik I have provided so far in this project point towards some 
forms of activism and a specific political orientation (manifested in the goals underlying 
the group’s joint enterprise, the physical building hosting the community, programming 
and associated groups, including Indymedia holding a monthly event in the Brik and the 
local Occupy movement being allowed to use the premises for free), on many occasions 
members reassured me that while political through their manner of operation and the 
cooperative nature of the community, the group has no specific political preferences and 
that heavy handed political ideas sit very uneasy with the majority.  
 
The reasons behind this rejection may partly be traced to the community’s effort to 
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distance itself from the openly left-wing orientation of the bohemian district’s scene, the 
symbols and practices of which, however, have in the past few years been increasingly 
co-opted by the market. The area is in itself an example of a neighbourhood undergoing 
gentrification. Development agencies, businessmen and affluent “outsider” consumers 
who are looking to buy into the lifestyle projected by it, threaten and damage the 
authenticity of its radicalism. By “othering” the community from the neighbourhood 
and its political orientation, members manage to retain an independence from a scene 
whose alternativeness is becoming more and more “fashionable”, much to the distaste 
of its early attendees. 
 
“The branding of the 'area' by some activist groups has been undertaken 
in earnest maybe, but more and more it looks like an empty and shallow 
emotional solipsism unable to regulate its use of the street as a canvas. 
The area is just filling with people trying to feather their own nests or 
jump on the cash booster bandwagon. Interestingly The Brik doesn’t 
feel it has been hugely effected by the influx, for better or worse” 
 
Distancing themselves from the “infected” area, allows members to maintain that their 
practices are genuinely radical and unaffected by the market and its commercial 
purposes.  
As Max states: 
 
 “The aim isn’t to have lots of people in the auditorium and lots of 
money coming in. It is great if that happens but that shouldn’t be the 
end. The end should be to do something extraordinary culturally and to 
provide something that isn’t provided elsewhere. The experimentation 
and the creativity have been fundamental and have been really 
passionately fought for. The whole thing is a kind of a provocation in a 
kind of macro sense. You are encouraged to go play with stuff, figure 
out how it works, unplug things, plug things back in. And I think that is 
quite good when it works, people are quite scared of it but yeah. It is not 
like going to the Sandbox or something. So it is a space that by its 





Max highlights that people locked in the wrong mindset are afraid of experimentation 
as well as that art venues, whose purpose, at least in part, should be to “push limits”, do 
not provide that sort of stimulation to their publics. From this standpoint, part of the 
Brik’s joint enterprise is to provide opportunities for its volunteers and publics to 
experiment and reflect. In particular, Max explains how in the Brik members perceive 
nothing as static, set or settled. Everything is up for alteration, testing, ruining and 
rebuilding, and it is this process of exploring in itself that embodies the “tasteful way” 
of doing things. As stated earlier, communities of practice are communities in progress 
(Wenger 1998); it is not only the end result that has to be evoking radicalism but also 
the way of attaining it. Challenging the status quo by experimenting is not aiming to 
reduce the status of outsiders to mundane or boring but has underlying political 
meanings, criticising the apathy of the crowds and the preference of other organisations 
and their publics to stay in their comfort zone. Apart from directing a general attitude 
however, radicalism is also reflected in programming choices: 
 
“We also do film festivals sometimes, quite rarely these days but we 
might take a theme and then programme loads of films around those. 
But we try to pick films that we like and that are good films at the same 
time. We try to pick films that are a little bit…you are not necessarily 
going to see any day of the week on TV or in another cinema. So now 
we are trying to programme a weekend of music documentaries at the 
end of August and it would be very easy to programme a lot of music 
documentaries that everyone has seen but it is not really interesting so 
we are currently scouting for interesting films out there.” (Neil) 
 
Members take pride in the effort that the group puts into programming by explaining 
that the “easy way” of showcasing the popular documentaries is not an option. The 
shifts I worked as a volunteer at the Brik involved events that similarly to what 
described by Neil were not accessible elsewhere and provoked thinking with regards to 
social phenomena -consumerism, inequality, acceptance of differenc e- amongst many 





7.1.3 Being Romantic 
 
The romantic movement “borders” bohemianism in that both were born as a reaction 
against the intellectual trends of the 18
th
 century, including enlightenment’s obsession 
with reason and logic as well as against the straight laced codes of society at the time. 
Romanticism is first and foremost reproduced at the Brik community through its 
attempt to create an egalitarian utopia. Aside from this aspect, which is to be discussed 
in more detail in chapter 9, the community’s nostalgia for “old cinemas” and how movie 
venues used to be, is exhibited in the nature of the building as well as their practices and  
hence makes an implicit comment on the development and nature of contemporary 
venues of the same domain.  From the neon “Brik Cinema” sign that decorates the 
terrace and the old, stamp-like tickets that buyers receive in exchange for their custom, 
to the wooden, red velvet seats in the auditorium and the choice of snacks at the bar 
(limited to sesame snaps and bars of ethically traded chocolate), the Brik stands in direct 
comparison to all other cinemas in the city. With overstated signs (in the case of the 
multiplexes more than triple the size to that of the Brik), carpeted floors and choice of 
“inoffensive” colours, comfortable, oversized seating and multiplicity of offerings at the 
bar, ranging from the classic popcorn to full menu choices, the modern cinema bears no 
resemblance to its older days and the extended product is on many occasions overtaking 
the product itself.  
 
The community is exhibiting a longing for the past and artefacts and activities 
associated with another time, putting forward the nostalgic “feel” that is a common 
trope in Romanticism. This becomes apparent in the fascination of the group with 
35mm film over digital. While working at the Brik I often observed that volunteers 
would persistently try to get hold of the 35mm version of movies over the digital one 
and when this was achieved the group would always perceive the film as a “special 
treat”, promoting it as such. Surprisingly, this practice was avidly pursued, despite the 
fact that while many members are trained to project digital films, very few are trained to 
deal with the complexities of projecting 35mm films. Inevitably, lack of trained staff 
means more strain for those few that are up to the task and leads to many cancellations 
on nights that no 35mm projectionists can be available. When asked why the group is so 




“If you shot on film and you have a piece of film you can just cut it up, 
splice it together you know, you can do stuff like that with it, whereas if 
you got a DCP unit and it’s a closed, locked box basically, it is like a 
hard drive that comes from the distributor, you bang it into the player 
and it is all encoded. You cannot get into it, you cannot do anything 
with it, it is completely propriety and it is just really restrictive. There is 
something a bit sinister about it I think, and also practically it costs a lot 
of money to get a digital set up and also the format changes constantly, 
whereas you can have a 35mm projector that you can keep for 80 years 
as long as you keep it maintained. But I think aesthetically film looks 
nicer, looks more natural, I mean it is more natural, it is exposed film. I 
don’t know there is just something about film, I guess something about 
looking back to the past” (Neil) 
 
Neil emphases the tactility of 35mm film over the restricted nature of digital. Similarly 
to what was discussed earlier, the ability to “experiment” and properties that make an 
item or practice “playful” are favoured by the group. In our discussion Neil was also 
highly critical of the multiplexes that rely solely on automatic digital projections and 
noted that to him, the absence of “a living soul” from the projection room creates a 
feeling of being in a post-apocalyptic, soulless world. Similarly to previous accounts, 
the authenticity of the romantic practice is always assigned as “in comparison” to what 
dissociative others do.  
 
 
7.2 De-Fetishizing the Domain 
 
In this section I examine how community members construct a sense of “us” by 
drawing upon an anti-commercialist regime that directs their practice. Consumers often 
“choose to define themselves in opposition to the dominant consumer culture” (Dobscha 
1998, 91). Bourdieu (1984, 220), in particular, refers to “ostentatious poverty” to 
describe the symbolic subversions of rituals that aim to challenge dominant lifestyles. 
Embracing a similar approach, the findings demonstrate the group’s rejection of any 
“respect for forms” that exhibit an unashamed relationship to luxury or comfort, 
prioritising function (as opposed to form) and de-fetishising in the process the 
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entertainment field. In many ways the Brik bears similarities to a counter-culture. 
Members consider the community and its prosumption properties a reaction and 
response to “packaged” entertainment and the society of the spectacle. The fact that they 
can walk in the community, make a film, show it, make their own theatre, blurring the 
boundaries between the traditional “money-making” producer and the paying consumer, 
is key to their sense of identity. 
 
  As described extensively in section 6.6.1, the building that hosts the Brik is 
significantly dilapidated. Upon arrival, you enter a site that with the exception of the 
neon sign placed on the terrace could well be a warehouse or small industrial building. 
You have learned about the Brik from three possible sources: word of mouth, a search 
for particular movies/events on the internet or you have come across a programme 
leaflet distributed by Brik members in selected cafes, galleries, record stores and bars in 
the city. Upon arrival, you can never expect that a film or event will start at the time 
advertised on the website. At times, you might even arrive at the venue only to realise 
that there was a last minute cancellation (usually due to understaffing, untimely receipt 
of a movie from the distributor, technical problems or no available projectionist to 
volunteer on the night). On most of these occasions, however, you won’t be turned 
away. You might be invited in to watch an alternate movie for free or if this is not 
possible, you will be offered a free cup of tea and a friendly chat for making your way 
down to the venue. This is not a marketing ploy to avoid “disappointing the customer”, 
but a warm welcome to the community and an indication that the space is not just an 
entertainment venue but a place to socialise. 
 
If the planned event goes ahead as normal, sitting in the cinema hall for two or more 
hours is a small adventure in its own right. The creaking seats are a striking contrast to 
what you usually get in the local multiplexes and performance venues. The floor, in all 
likelihood, has not been swept for days and the air smells of damp. During the winter, 
the radiators do not suffice to warm up the hall, but you won’t be left freezing as 
volunteers will provide you with a blanket and a free cup of tea. You look around to see 
the most bizarre image: an auditorium filled with an audience covered in blankets. If 
you are down for a movie night, it may be that upon start-up there are problems with the 
visuals and projection may stop and restart few times. The audience may clap to 
encourage the projectionist who eventually comes out of the projection room to explain 
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what seems to be the problem and more often than not the problem gets resolved in the 
end. But there is something odd about this whole sequence of events taking place in the 
auditorium. The blankets, tea mugs, friendly chats with the usher and other volunteers 
and the projectionist trying to manage the issues that he or she encountered, make you 
feel that you are at a friend’s pad for a night-in,  rather than in an arts venue. In fact, you 
are well aware that any of these “mishappenings” would never occur in the majority of 
the entertainment venues you usually go, and if they did, they would be dealt with as 
“major deficiencies”, but not at the Brik.  
 
I tried to uncover the reasons why at least some of these issues are not dealt with and 
most importantly to understand the success of the Brik despite the mishaps. Robbie, 
who is a newbie, confirms what I already suspected, that the community operates under 
these conditions by choice and for what the group considers to be good reasons: 
 
“There is a feeling that this is how it should be kept. They (the other 
volunteers) don’t want to make it look too nice or clean because that is 
not really the feel or the atmosphere of the Brik. I think its messiness 
attracts people. It is like a worn in feeling, it's comfortable. It's not in 
any way pretentious, it is what it is…” (Robbie) 
 
It becomes clear to me that the messiness and clutter of the space are valued not 
necessarily because members enjoy operating under these particular conditions, but 
because of a subtle comparison that they provoke to the environment of other venues, 
characterised in Robbie’s account as “pretentious”. Such juxtapositions come to the 
surface in other participants’ accounts: 
 
“As far as the Sandbox experience is concerned, you phone up in the 
Sandbox and you get somebody who always asks you exactly the same 
stuff on the phone and it is like 'I want to see such and such'.. They 
don’t really chat with you on the phone, they are just somebody doing 
their job and then they will say 'right ok... so which showing you want 
to come to? Can you get your card out, give me your card number 
details? blah blah blah... I hope you enjoy the film'. You know, that is 
basically what you get there. And then you go along, there may be 
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somebody ushering but you are not going to chat to them, they are just 
doing their job again. And you do get that feeling that everything is 
overtly organised within there. And I know they have a cafe but the cafe 
is not that inviting to chat, especially with strangers… Whereas at the 
Brik it is like: you phone up, you might get somebody at the office, you 
might not (laughs), they might not know what the films is or they might 
be able to chat to you for hours about it. You have to go down and pay 
by the door, you get that funny ticket and then if you are a smoker you 
go outside to the garden and meet other smokers and people hanging out 
there, drinking or whatever, and possibly chat to somebody there. And 
then you go in to see a film and maybe there is a delay before it is 
shown or there is a breakdown half through the film (laughs)...you 
know... as I say it might not even be open so you have all these things 
that are...well they are not ideal in terms of ... in a strange sort of way it 
gives you a good feeling. It is a friendly feeling.” (Jake) 
 
The picture painted of the community in the account is that of a clumsy-yet-likeable 
character. Jake prioritises function over form by recognising that the “malfunctions” of 
the community do not represent optimum conditions, they do, however, serve a more 
important purpose: they build up a friendly atmosphere for the community. He describes 
the experience in the local independent multiplex as “packaged” and mundane by 
focusing on the overtly organised processes, impersonal manner of staff and uninviting 
environment. Jake also highlights the commercial side of other organisations by 
referring to the paid staff members of the Sandbox, implying that Brik participants give 
their time voluntarily to engage in the exact same duties out of their passion and not for 
monetary rewards. The comparison between the two venues is based on the well-known 
rhetoric of the over-fetishisation of products and services that facilitates the group to 
differentiate themselves from “others” by de-fetishising the movie experience. Applying 
Binkley’s (2008) argument on “fetished de-fetishization” of commodities, one could 
also argue that Brik members share “a taste for”  unmasking the artificiality of 
commodified entertainment, with the aim of “uncovering its intrinsic humanity and 
naturalistic sociability” (602). Unlike in commoditized venues where the visitor 
experience is the same every time, a night out in the Brik is never the same because it is 
dependent on the personalities of the people that happen to be working shifts on any 
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given night, as well as on the unpredictable factors that will affect the evening, bringing 
the human element to the forefront of the visit.  This general disorganisation may be 
perceived as a weakness by some, but members will argue that it is primarily a strength 
that demarcates the community from the distasteful, bureaucratic practices of 
commercial spaces. 
 
While members of the community interpret the chaotic nature of the space and 
services as a response to the over-commerciality of other venues, I could not help but 
wonder how the audience reacts to this offering. Neil explains: 
 
“The audience understands that we have problems. You know, we got a 
fairly old building with moths in it and we got a broken wall in the bar. 
Sometimes the projector breaks. And a lot of the audience recognise 
that. I think they quite like it. The number of times that we haven’t been 
able to get a film started and the audience just laughs. They kind of give 
you a round of applause and a cheer and you come out and apologise. 
And I think people like that because it’s the human touch which we 
don’t get in the multiplexes or anywhere else. People are quite 
forgiving.” (Neil) 
 
Members believe that the audience is not only patient and understanding when it 
comes to services not functioning properly, but is even appreciative of the incidents 
because the “human touch” of the Brik is juxtaposed to the robotic practices of the 
multiplexes. While the overtly organised procedures of other venues usually mean that 
no mistakes are made, for Brik volunteers, making mistakes is part of human nature, 
something that the audience understands and can empathise with, and so operating in an 
amateur mode does not put people off but is on the contrary a major point of 
differentiation, contributing to brand-building against local actors.  These views are 
verified in a user comment under an online article discussing the Brik: 
 
“Went here for a screening once - they hadn't had the reels delivered or 
something - so they put on a free screening of the latest foreign Oscar 
winner (some Argentinian film if I remember correctly), with free mugs 




Many participants criticise the picture-perfect image put forward by the multiplexes: 
 
“It is like... you go in...They are the worst (the multiplexes) to be honest, 
everything is really stuck together you know. And it is all brand new 
and glistening and gleaming. And you get big nice seats I suppose but is 
that why you are in the cinema? And so, it is just utterly soulless to my 
mind. Utterly lacking soul.” (Jake) 
 
“It is really weird because the Brik is held together with blue-tack and 
Sellotape and yet when I go to the multiplexes, everything is clean and 
well-polished and yet I get the feeling that it isn’t… I almost get the 
opposite feeling that there is no care there. There is like a surface but no 
real care.” (Lisa) 
 
Jake and Lisa dismiss the comforts of the multiplexes as less important to the main 
offering of art venues: the art in itself. Exhibiting contemptuousness against the “new 
and gleaming” décor of these spaces, Jake prompts me to think of the function, what 
people really go to the cinema for, dismissing the extended product offered by the 
multiplexes: big lights, bright colours, fake plants, identically replicated seating areas 
and shiny floors. The “inoffensive” ambience of those venues is characterised as lacking 
any human qualities and care while the fetishisation of the experience neglects what 
should be the essence of the cinema.  
 
 At this stage it should be noted that it is not surprising that this particular discourse on 
lifestyle and authenticity mediates the group’s sociability and collective orientation. 
Binkley (2008), in his work on Liquid Consumption explores how oppositional groups 
develop collective orientations by using consumption as “the object of a social 
movement aimed at any of several objectives” (600). In support to this argument, the 
findings show that social bonds facilitated by anti-commercialist discourse constitute a 
“Prêt-à-Porter ” sociability for consumers permanently on the move (602) and may be a 
useful base for the community given its quick turnover of members. It becomes an 
instant point of contact for anyone who joins and a clear cut signal to the outside world 
as to who we “are” and what tastes are deemed to be acceptable. As Adorno and 
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Rabinbach (1975, 14) have argued, “the technique of the culture industry is, from the 
beginning, one of distribution and mechanical reproduction, and therefore always 
remains external to its object”. In this case, members reclaim the connection between 
the object of art and its reproduction by creating an experience which is skilfully 
rejecting the industry’s way as distasteful. 
 
 
7.3 Taste Regimes and Resource Limitations 
 
Applying Arsel and Bean’s (2013) theorisation of taste as regime to the analysis 
above, one could argue that members of the community use an anti-commercialist 
discourse as the normative system that orchestrates their practices. I now, however, 
want to address another side of this argument. Multiple practices that members engage 
in that I have described earlier - from the creative compensation offered to the public 
when the programme cannot go ahead as scheduled and the amendments made when the 
weather is too cold, to the messiness of the space and interface of the website - and 
which inarguably form part of the tastes that the Brik community represents and of the 
public’s etic understanding of it, are, to one extent or another, influenced by a distinct 
lack of physical and economic resources that characterises many voluntary collectives. 
In other words, at some point during my analysis the question I asked myself was: to 
what extent do participants embrace anti-commercialist tastes because they are guided 
by this particular normative system and to what extent are these tastes enforced by lack 
of resources? 
 
 For a moment let’s assume that it is not the anti-commercialist ideology nor the 
bohemian influences that drive these practices, but it is lack of adequate resources (i.e. 
no budget to refurbish the seating or to maintain/add radiators). If anything, this is a safe 
assumption to make, not only because of the limited financial capital of the group, but 
also because of the voluntary nature of the collective. The latter means that members are 
not in any way obliged to help out during an understaffed event (which can lead to 
closures or in the case of non-availability of 35mm projectionists it may mean that an 
alternative, non-scheduled film is put on) and members are solely trained on the very 
basics of providing service to customers, which combined with the absence of a formal 
code of conduct, means lack of consistency of the experience, which then becomes 
 125 
 
dependent on the personality of the volunteers working on the night (bringing to the 
forefront the praised “human” character of the Brik). To continue, the strictly no 
external funding policy means that the only financial resources available are those 
coming in from the public attending events, which are usually just sufficient to cover 
the basic expenses of running the community: fixed costs including rent, bills, recycling 
services, alcohol license fees, council tax etc and variable costs including the payment 
of performers, movie distributors and last but not least any essential maintenance that 
cannot be carried out by volunteers themselves. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to 
explore the possibility that lack of human and financial capital may, at least in part, be 
driving taste-making. 
 
In this scenario, where does the anti-commercialist normative system come into play? 
Inarguably, members’ narratives on art for art’s sake, freedom, romanticism and 
radicalism, are in place to legitimise the practices of the group and elevate their status in 
relation to that of outgroups. From their standpoint, calling the Brik to find out about the 
programme and running the risk of getting no proper response, waiting into a cold 
auditorium covered in a blanket,for the projectionist to deal with any technical problems 
that have unexpectedly arose and sitting on a creaking seat, are not perceived in a 
negative way, but are all experiences that give a positive “human touch” to the 
community. Stepping on an existing discourse on fetishisation of products and the 
commodification of entertainment, in particular, members achieve the social 
externalisation of “them” by either rejecting their robotic ways (when it comes to 
commercial arts organisations) or on a more sophisticated level, by criticising those 
outgroups for whom independence is a co-opted symbol and part of a marketing ploy. 
 
However, going back to the theorisation of taste as “regime that drives practice”, and 
while in this case the anti-commercialist ideology, indeed, seems to provide a 
foundation for the group’s collective orientation, the manner in which it is used 
somewhat differs to what Arsel and Bean (2013) describe, if we take the resource 
limitation scenario to be at least partly true. In apartment therapy (2013), members 
“problematized” as to how they could align their practices with the regime’s core 
meanings, whilst at the Brik members “problematize” as to how they can legitimise 
their engagement in specific practices which are imposed by lack of resources. The 
solution to this problem is the parallel use of a normative system that allows them to 
 126 
 
juxtapose those practices to those of dissimilar others. From this standpoint, 
problematisation in the first case is to do with the symbolic appropriateness of the 
practice, whereas in the latter this is partly pragmatic (i.e. dealing with lack of 
resources) and partly symbolic, involving the legitimisation of ingroup tastes and 
disapproval of the tastes of “them”, thus allowing for demarcation in the domain. An 
implications of this, in line with what was noted in section 4.2 with regards to the lack 
of a framework of understanding as to when rejection is conspicuous and when it is not, 
the distinction between anti-choice (conspicuous rejection due to avoidance, 
abandonment, aversion) and non-choice (inconspicuous rejection due to affordability, 
accessibility, availability) (Hogg 1998), is far more blurred than previously thought. 
 
 
7.4 Constructing Joint Enterprise(s) by Extending Field Boundaries 
 
I have mentioned on multiple occasions by now that the Brik community lacks a 
formal mission (at least in the form and function that missions are usually manifested on 
various organisations’ websites), yet I have repeatedly referred to the group’s joint 
enterprise and efforts to achieve a “common purpose”, without at any point explaining 
just what that enterprise might entail.   Despite the fact that when speaking to 
participants I always got the impression that decisions in the community are made in 
order to achieve an unwritten, yet noble goal, none of the members was ever able to 
clearly articulate just what that purpose is.  In the words of one of my respondents 
“everything (happening within the community) has to be endured within the Brik 
philosophy”, but when I subsequently asked what that philosophy is, responses are 
reduced to mere mumbling. For quite some time this is a matter that troubled me. I tried 
to extract an answer from all of my interviewees as well as from multiple members that 
I interacted with while working at the group, but never received a specific answer.  
 
My subsequent interpretation of this is that the community does not serve a single joint 
enterprise but multiple ones, which means that perhaps it is not the respondents that 
were not able to give a proper answer but the interviewee asking the wrong kind of 
question. As stated earlier on - and quoting Etienne Wenger- communities of practice 
are communities in progress and evolution. As such, it may be unreasonable to expect 
collectives to follow a clearly spelled out, static common purpose and by static here, I 
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do not only imply that the enterprise changes as time passes by (which indeed it does), 
but that it changes according to the intent that members wish to serve for any particular 
situation and the point they wish to get across. Interestingly, it is not only the joint 
enterprise that changes according to which aim members wish to focus on, but also the 
external actors that constitute focal points for juxtaposition each time. The accounts and 
examples below demonstrate how the group’s common purpose changes from 
“provoking a critical response”, to “operating autonomously and collectively against all 
odds” and “to providing a platform for members and the public to make a difference”, 
putting forward different aspects of the normative system followed and the values that it 
rejects each time. Concurrently, these accounts alternate between dissociative others 
that are used as focal points and that comprise of arts organisations, worker cooperatives 
and society as a whole, extending in the process the field boundaries within which the 
community competes for status. From this standpoint, tastes are dynamic because the 
group’s joint enterprise is also so. 
 
Naturally, and as it has been demonstrated so far on this chapter, other arts 
organisations constitute a major competing actor in the war of legitimisation of tastes. 
In this case, and going back to the group’s compliance with the “being radical” 
bohemianism norm, the joint enterprise of the Brik is to “open up people’s minds”, 
which refers both to members’ personal development and the community’s publics, and 
to provoke a questioning response with regards to a multiplicity of contemporary social 
issues. This mission is widely evident in the majority of programming choices. As a 
volunteer, I watched numerous films and performances which were chosen for their 
ability to challenge perceptions, amongst these were: “Le Havre”, a comedy drama 
about a shoe shiner who tries to save the life of an immigrant child in the French port 
city of the same name,  “The Black Power Mixtape”, a Swedish documentary about the 
Black Power movement in the US, “No Fun City”, a documentary exploring 
Vancouver’s underground scene and its struggle to stay alive in a city that tries to 
supress it, “The Third Policeman”, a postmodern play toying with the boundaries 
between reality and fiction, and last but not least “Qu-Junctions”, a recurrent music 
production event that focuses on musicians that do not conveniently fall in with a 
recognised music pathway. Aside from programming, the set up and offering of the 
venue as describe earlier, are also in line with the mission of “challenging people’s 




Volunteers believe that for other cinemas, bound to the profit making goal, showing 
“big bugs Hollywood movies” that are more likely to attract an audience and generate a 
higher turnover, makes the mission of “provoking critical thinking” irrelevant to them. 
They criticise their programming, citing the rarity of independent American and 
European movies and the almost complete absence of anything from the third world. I 
ask what is it that is considered so negative about Hollywood movies? Some explain to 
me that Hollywood ran out of steam by the end of the 70’s, producing nothing that is 
worth while watching after that. Others point me to “over the top special effects”, “same 
lame storylines” and “celebrity fixations that accompany the industry”. The greatest 
criticism against other art organisations is ultimately lack of experimentation. While 
discussing the matter, one of the participants tells me laughing: “If Orson Welles 
showed up in Hollywood today he wouldn’t even get a job as a clapper boy, you know 
what I mean?”. When it comes to blockbusters, Brik members, in the words of a 
participant, “would not ever dare to even suggest” them for possible inclusion in the 
programme. This conspicuous absence of such movies is in the members’ opinion 
consistent with what the joint enterprise dictates. In this case, focus on what purpose the 
artistic offering should fulfil, adjusts the joint enterprise to be that of provoking debate 
and critical thinking and directs juxtapositions towards the artistic merit and intellectual 
rigour, or lack thereof, of the offering of dissociative others. 
 
During my time at the Brik I observed on more than one occasion that profit was 
somewhat of a “dirty word” and talks about money were only acceptable when 
discussing the financial viability of the community. The fact that the Brik cinema is “the 
cheapest in town” as manifested on the website, and that the drinks that one can 
purchase there are inarguably surprisingly cheap, is in itself a conspicuous statement, 
professing the group’s rejection of the idea that entertainment should cost a lot, but most 
importantly telling us what the its joint enterprise is not:  
 
“As consumer of big corporations myself, I don’t feel that there is any 
care given to my experience. They just want my money. Which is the 
total opposite of what we are about. Yes, we need your money to keep 
going, but that is not why we are there, that is not our primary purpose. I 
think that is the Brik difference. And then so many coops will dilute the 
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ideology behind the movement by starting to pay two members or three 
who are supposedly doing the “hard work”, but by doing that you are 
essentially changing what this is all about.” (Neil) 
 
Neil demarcates the mission of the Brik from that of “big corporations”, implying that 
it is a much nobler cause that the community serves. In this case, the purpose of “them” 
is informed by the capitalist order and focuses on money-making. Antithetically, the 
Brik uses money purely in an instrumental way, while profit-making conversations 
constitute a “red flag”. Neil refers to “the Brik difference” with pride, implying 
contemptuousness against the enterprise of other actors, proclaiming in the process the 
community’s sovereignty, based on what its joint enterprise is not. That is, the primary 
focal point for the juxtaposition of the nobility of the community’s mission is big 
organisations that the participant has experienced first-hand. There is, however, a 
secondary comparing actor, namely cooperative movements. In this case, the 
comparison with communities of a similar structure and ideological descent and the 
reduction of the latter to the level of big commercial organisations when they do not 
religiously comply to what the normative system directs, allows the group to juxtapose 
its enterprise and rejection of the profit making goal, not only to big corporations, which 
the group clearly disassociates with, but also to communities of a similar ilk. On a 
similar note, it is not only juxtapositions that extend outside the field of the arts but also 
positive comparisons: 
 
“The organization that I think we are most like is the Women’s 
Institute. Because they do ... they have this cake and jam thing where 
they do a stall at the farmer’s market every two weeks and they are all 
volunteers. They get their income from... they buy the ingredients in 
bulk, distribute it to their members to bake cakes and they are like 
machines every week. The carrot cake is exactly the same, and they 
are more organized than the Brik.  They bring it all to the market and 
sell it. All that money is used for their activities which is social 
activities and politics. They, like, lobby against big super markets and 
stuff. It is extraordinary!! And I think they are more like the Brik than 




In this account, Frances perceives a cooperative of a similar structure and 
organisational culture to be closer in social space to the community than the 
independent multiplex. From this standpoint, the joint enterprise of the organisation is 
not anymore about the showcasing of radical art: 
 
“I see the Brik as primarily a ground of how to operate collectively, that 
is its purpose for me, but all of the cinema and stuff that is just a kind of 
a pretext. So the real work is how to operate politically and socially 
together. ” (Daniel)  
 
 The structure and operations of the Brik community, the conspicuous indifference 
against profit and members’ willingness to give their time voluntarily (carrying out 
duties that anywhere else would be financially rewarded), provide them with a feeling 
of superiority, fuelled by the survival and success of the community “against all odds”. 
The comparison quickly extends outside the boundaries of both arts organisations and 
the cooperative movement and members use as a focal point in their juxtapositions 
dominant societal ideologies and economic systems:  
 
“Well you know the sort of...what people are pleased to call capitalists 
or western social democracy or whatever it is called...it is a very 
heartless system that works. A combination of capitalist greed and 
impersonal bureaucracy. And these things coexist and these are the 
things which people are told to buy into. Strict hierarchies and all the 
rest of it and if you are not making a profit then you are not doing 
anything, you are not even a human being (laughs) you know what I 
mean? And these are the values which the whole society is indoctrinated 
in and you get bombarded with the papers and the television, in your 
daily life and your work experiences is the values which they... are 
bombarded with. We are paralyzed from institutions and corporations, 
bureaucracies. So for somewhere like the Brik to work and try and make 
a difference is a big deal ...under all that, is great” (Jake) 
 
Similarly to what the account indicates, the collective’s enterprise to try and “make it 
against all odds”, survive by rejecting what is perceived to be the dominant normative 
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system with which society is indoctrinated, is perceived by some members to be a noble 
mission. The shortcomings of other organisations, whether or not in the arts domain, are 
attributed to blind following of the “wrong” regime, which is quickly inducted to a 
regime ruling society as whole. Shifting the boundaries within which the community 
competes for distinction significantly strengthens the importance of its enterprise by 
setting aside art taste wars and bringing to the forefront a much wider ideology that is 




7.5 Using Associative Others as “Evidence” of Distinction 
 
It has been clear to the reader by now that by referring to “Brik members” or the “Brik 
community” I distinctly mean those individuals who participate both in the production 
and consumption of its programme and that are responsible for all the aspects that the 
running of the venue entails. Audience members, whether occasional or patrons, have 
been excluded from my definition of “community of practice”. While some of these 
individuals have been described to me by volunteers as “friends of the Brik” 
(particularly those who are often physically present at the venue and/or take an interest 
in news and developments), I took the decision to exclude them from my use of 
“community of practice” (and subsequently data collection for that matter) on the basis 
that they do not influence the decision making of the group in a direct or formal manner. 
Indirectly, however, I found that these associative groups contribute in their own way in 
the social externalisation of “them” by constituting a form of “human capital” that the 
community incorporates in its “us versus them” discourses.  
 
First, the audiences of other art venues are often a point of criticism in the accounts of 
my respondents. From this standpoint, members proclaim the sovereignty of their own 
publics by occasionally “degrading” the audience of other arts institutions primarily on 
the basis of their choice to consume inferior kinds of entertainment, but also by looking 





“Generally you would find that the people who go to the Brik are people 
who are thinking for themselves. The vast majority of people who go to 
the multiplexes are just...they are not really thinking about what they are 
watching, they haven't really thought about why they are watching it. It 
is just like a big sensation you know... so you get much more 
conventional people if you know what I mean. People who don’t have 
very opened up minds generally. Not always, but that would be the 
predominant. Or you know, families and things like that. They are just 
going because they are working flat hours and then they will go to the 
cinema in the weekend and take the kids, and they are just going for 
pure escapism. They aren’t going  someplace to engage their minds 
cause their main job is probably so shit (laughs) and boring anyway, and 
this is just a way of escaping this and that for five minutes and then back 
to the boring job. So for that kind of person,   locked into that mindset 
then the Brik is not going to have an appeal to them” (Jake) 
 
Jake laughs and imitates people greedily galloping pop-corn while he narrates. His 
opinion is one widely shared in the group and assumes that the content offered by the 
mainstream institutions only serves the purpose of escapism and is unworthy of any 
critical attention. The group draws from an existing rhetoric of the postmodern era: 
alienated individuals aspiring for lifestyles that they will never be able to realise, left 
unable to “think for themselves” and looking for ways to escape their day-to-day lives. 
“Big bucks movies” offer to these audiences a break from their reality. In contrast, the 
Brik with its messy décor, amateur attitude and rejection of Hollywood fixation is 
serving a double purpose for its community. First, it is an unattractive choice for this 
kind of “mindless” audience. Second, it appeals to a different kind of punter, one that is 
able to “see through” the superficiality and offering of other venues and allows the 
community to serve the goal of further cultivating their audiences’ intellectual 
engagement. From this standpoint, the associative groups of the community are not only 
perceived as superior to those of outgroups in terms of cultural capital, but they also are 





On a similar note, discussing the audiences of the Burgundy, the theme of 
“superficiality” is one that often came up. A large number of art-goers are criticised by 
the community as “too concerned about how others see them” and “what is the correct 
way of behaving in any given circumstance”. Some participants mock them as “status 
obsessed people” who hang out in art galleries in order to be seen at posh arts, trendy 
arts institutions and that big contemporary organisations are inevitably “suffering” from 
this kind of shallow audience, which however is rarely to be encountered at the Brik. I 
tried to uncover the reasons why the community believes it manages to evade this 
perceived problem. Consistently in my participants accounts there seems to be an idea 
that the Brik with the state of its building, its environment and practices, provides a 
natural “filter” for audiences: 
 
“So you are coming to an environment which is ambiguous and ill-
defined and you can’t cope with that if you feel like you have to behave 
in the correct way. So you would be self-regulated out because it would 
be too challenging an environment” (Max) 
 
Indeed, the Brik is visited by a high number of first-timers who never return to it. To 
explain this in more detail I will attempt to take a closer look at the segments that 
comprise its audience. First I have to make clear that in my eyes the audience of the 
Brik seems to be fairly homogeneous, a view that I maintained throughout my 
participant observation and that is most likely due to the fact that I never collected in-
depth accounts from this group to be able to trace its refined differences. As such, my 
understanding of it is purely an etic one. Visually, apart from the fact that ages range 
significantly (from students in their early twenties to people in their late 60’s), 
similarities in the fashion sense and styling or at least in showcasing an eccentric, 
bohemian and/or intellectual “look”, would make crystal clear to any observer, if not 
who exactly is the “Brik type” then at least who is not . I was often surprised to hear 
from my participants that in fact there is no “Brik type” and that the audience is very 
wide and bears no particular characteristics. Most of them also denied that the 
programming is targeting particular audience profiles or that it is done having specific 
audiences in mind. When asked if there is a kind of audience that one would never 
encounter at the Brik, responses become a little more specific. Drawing on political and 
media consuming profiles, I was told that I would most likely never encounter “Tory 
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voters” or “Daily-mail readers”, but other than that anything else would go. In this case, 
and similarly to what Sirgy et al. (1997) describe, user-imagery stereotypes are used to 
provide the group with immediate and obvious ways in which to compare and convey 
their perceived sovereignty.  
 
Having casually chatted to numerous audience members while working my bar shifts, 
I think it is safe to distinguish between those who “go to the Brik” and those who just 
“go to the cinema”. As is the case with any other entertainment space, a (surprisingly 
large) percentage of the audience will go to the Brik in order to watch a particular film 
or see a specific band that happens to be playing there. To a smaller percentage of those, 
the nature of the venue is irrelevant. They want to watch “Moonrise Kingdom” or 
“Pan’s Labyrinth” and perhaps they have missed the chance to do so at one of the other 
cinemas in the city. This kind of audience is the least forgiving about any 
dysfunctionalities that may arise on the night and the least likely to return. To others, 
the nature of the venue is unknown (while working there I often had to explain to 
customers that the Brik is entirely volunteer run and how this works), but once they 
realise that they are taking part in such an unconventional community they would 
respond with admiration and fascination. Then there are those to whom the alternative 
identity of the Brik is of the utmost importance, perhaps even overshadowing the appeal 
of the event that is on on a particular night. For them, it is the “going to the Brik” aspect 
that matters over the enjoyment of a particular band or movie, and those are the publics 
that will return multiple times to the venue. Most of them also know a lot of the 
volunteers on a first name basis, forming in theoretical terms the next “layer” after 
peripheral members. In describing this kind of audience one of the respondents stated:  
 
“Usually people are OK with it because the place is quite charming, 
because it is a mess and it can be a little bit amateurish at times, but I 
don’t mean that in a bad way, I mean it in a good way. So even if things 
go a little bit wrong, I think the fact that they are mixing with volunteers 
who are enthusiastic about putting a night on, I think it gives an extra 
something for some people. Not everyone. Some people get upset 
anyway, but we do hear a lot of people speak well of the experience of 





Members often describe how individuals, including volunteers themselves, identify 
with everyone else in the audience and feel that the audience has its own identity. This 
feeling of “belonging” is juxtaposed to that experienced in other venues where 
individuals often feel they have no connection to the larger crowd. The fact that the Brik 
only has one hall, which can only host one movie or one performance at a time, 
contributes to this feeling. Every night, the people who attend are there to see the same 
show, and inevitably share similar tastes, which to them means “being amongst equals”. 
This sense of being part of a “wider community” becomes more obvious in the smooth 
mingling amongst strangers that takes place in the bar area prior to the main shows, as 
well as the usual clapping at the end of not only live performances but also movies, or 
the occasional loud sharing of jokes or comments during the showcasing of a movie in 
the auditorium.  
 
Interestingly enough, on occasion the worn building of the Brik, its atmosphere and 
occasional “malfunctions” have led first timers to form a negative impression of the 
community, ranging from expressing disappointment to fleeing the venue. Cold 
conditions, slow service or the state of the toilets are amongst the reasons that customers 
have expressed complaints. On a busy film night that I was selling membership cards 
alongside the volunteer who was selling tickets, the queue became so long that it 
extended to the parking space outside the Brik. The next day one of my respondents 
who was also there on the night commented:  
 
“Someone said to me yesterday "why is the queue so long? Why are we 
waiting?" So I kind of said "oh we only got one till and… we are the 
Brik!" as if that was an excuse in itself. Hopefully she got in!” (Johnny) 
 
But inevitably the nature of the Brik does not provide a good enough counter-benefit 
to everyone. One such memorable occasion involves two BBC employees: 
 
 “The film hadn’t started on time and nobody cared that these two 
women were arguing, like they were shouting... and they preceded very 
viciously to express their opinion and then our opinion was quite 
viciously expressed back. Then they left, they actually came out of the 
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film, they said “you are shambolic, this is disgusting ...I am from the 
BBC...” there was a bit of laugh to that actually, and then somebody 
said that “We don’t care if you are from the BBC that doesn’t mean 
anything to us, we are volunteer run and we do what we want, it doesn’t 
mean that we run smoothly” and she was very, very disgusted that we 
weren’t valuing her opinion, cause it wasn’t valued at all and it was 
laughed at. We didn’t respond well at all to the criticism, we didn’t try 
to say sorry - nobody apologized about the way that the Brik runs. We 
were just glad that she was gone.” (Lisa) 
 
In Lisa’s story, one can observe the complementary relations of inclusion and 
exclusion based on (dis)taste, as identified by Wilk (1997):  
 
 














From this standpoint, the audience, which exchanges its economic capital for cultural 
by attending the venue, is used by community members as “evidence” of their 
sovereignty. Moreover, it is not only the community’s publics that are used in this 
inclusion/exclusion process (Brik punters that “get it” and those that don’t), but despite 
their ignorance, punters of other venues that may have never even heard about the Brik 
                 Inclusion Exclusion 
Taste “We like things run in a laid 
back manner.” 
“They like the overtly 
organised approach and 
mundane offering of 
organisations like the BBC.” 
Distaste “We hate the bureaucratic 
and unchallenging ways of 
organisations like the BBC.” 
“They think we are 




community, are used in the ingroup’s narratives to proclaim distinction. The “us and 
them” battle, becomes more sophisticated as taste wars are not only expressed through 
objects of preference or the appropriation of practice, but are opening up to include a 


























8. Inter-Group Dynamics of Taste: Resignification 
 
 
This chapter examines the manner in which “us and them” tensions are actualised in 
more subtle ways when compared to those presented in the previous chapter, involving 
skilful meaning subversions that resignify practices and their attached tastes. 
Resignification refers to the insertion of new sign elements (previously exo-cultural), 
which are lifted from their original contexts and inserted in other sequences, not 
necessarily in the position that they occupied in their prior incarnation (Barthes 1957). 
The process is not uncommon amongst avant-garde movements, which are known to 
employ a number of techniques to make a point including “unusual fashions, the 
blurring of boundaries between art and everyday life, juxtapositions of seemingly 
disparate objects and behaviours, intentional provocation of audience, reorganisation of 
accepted performative styles and procedures” (Henry 1984, 322). In the case of the 
Brik, the findings demonstrate that resignification takes place through three distinct 
processes: recontextualising exo-cultural elements, appropriating practice through 
conspicuous absence and recontextualising prevailing aesthetics. The significance of 
resignification is to be traced in the community’s challenge towards the orthodoxy of 
the set-up of other art spaces and its ability to exclude those not possessing the “right” 
cultural capital. At the same time, it praises the ability of insiders, including members 
and the community’s publics, to “decode” the process and its underlying meanings.  
 
 
8.1 Recontextualising Exo-Cultural Items 
 
Taking a closer look at the Brik’s programme, the casual observer will notice with 
surprise the inclusion of films that at first glance seem like an alien choice for the 
community, seemingly being classified as “mainstream”. The astonishment from this 
observation is further enforced by the fact that on most occasions, the same films are 
likely to be on at the independent multiplex, Sandbox, or even worse at one of the chain 
multiplexes. The practice of showcasing such films displays some common 
characteristics each time. First, the group is “forced” to have the film on for at least 
three or four consecutive nights, which is due to distributor-imposed terms, who want to 
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make sure that the film generates enough profit to be worth lending it to this particular 
cinema. This constitutes a compromise for members, not only because putting on the 
same offering for few nights in a row is a practice that bears too close a resemblance to 
“them”, but because it also restricts the eclectic image of the venue, which is partly 
made up from having a different offering every day. The second characteristic is that 
such films usually turn out to be sold-out nights for the Brik, resulting in long queues of 
customers (and on occasion the turning away of some of them) and naturally a very high 
turnover. In fact, these kind of events constitute “cash cows” for the community and 
there is a shared understanding amongst members that while not necessarily complying 
with the joint enterprise of experimentation or the common goal of “opening up 
people’s minds”, they are making up for the financial loss of other events (some of 
which are inarguably poorly attended) that are chosen for their intellectual rigour and 
the stimulation they provide. 
 
As one might predict, the selection of more mainstream films is not done on a random 
basis where “everything goes”, for inclusion of such films needs to have a rationale, 
however abstract, as to why it is acceptable for these commodities to be present in this 
context. For example, the decision to put on the popular movie “Pan’s Labyrinth” a few 
years back was justified on the basis of it being a foreign (non-Hollywood) production 
and being a “Brik kind of film” due to its “arty, weird and quirky character”. The film 
was on twice a day for a week, with the audience queuing outside on each occasion, 
thus generating an enormous profit for a cinema of the Brik’s range. However, 
justifying the choice of blockbuster movies that have clear cut associations with the 
practices of outgroups (e.g. showcasing of Hollywood movies) requires more than just 
an abstract connection of the content of the film to the Brik’s identity. In such cases, 
members are complying with the argument that “practice is defined by its intention” 
(Barthes 1970) and the rationale for inclusion focuses on the goals served by the 
showcasing of the film. Max explains: 
 
“You can show something that is incredibly commercial but there needs 
to be a good reason that backs it up. And that reason maybe a sort of 
take on it that transforms what it is into something else. So it essentially 
isn’t the thing that it was. And for me... King's Speech has never been 
showed at the Brik. Well I didn’t even know they have been showing 
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that - that seems inappropriate to me unless there is a swing on it or a 
reason. It is something that you can see elsewhere, a big commercial 
film that is available elsewhere and if you are just showing it as a film, 
that is a waste and damaging I would say. Unless you adapt it in some 
way.” (Max) 
 
Max expresses his frustration with the choice to put on a popular film with a royalty-
friendly theme that was widely available in cinemas throughout the country and 
highlights his ignorance that the film would be put on. His opposition is here justified 
by the idea that the audience can go pretty much anywhere to watch this kind of movie, 
a reason widely stated to me by members in their attempts to justify why particular 
movies would be a “no-go” for the group and in line with the goal of “making a 
difference”. However, there seem to be more reasons behind such disapprovals, as on 
multiple occasions the Brik does show films that are available elsewhere, if the 
ideological underpinnings of the film are at least partly in line with the community’s 
common purpose. This is proven in the recent showing of “Sightseers”, a quirky British 
black comedy that was also on at the Sandbox for consecutive nights. Despite this, there 
was consensus amongst members that this was a suitable match. From this standpoint, 
programming choices are not simply a matter of showcasing what is not available 
elsewhere but a matter of fitting, at least in part, with the normative system followed. 
 
What is of interest in Max’s account is that commercial films are not an instant turn 
down for the group, but can be incorporated in programming if they are given “an 
angle” that essentially transforms the meaning of the movie. A recurring event of this 
sort is the monthly comedy combo night. Born out of some volunteers’ passion for 
repertory cinema and classic Hollywood movies from the industry’s golden era, the 
“Hollywood” label was still a negative association for the Brik. Despite the fact that 
these sorts of films are renowned for their romantic feeling and nostalgia they generate 
about an era that has passed (and perhaps that could be enough of a justification for 
inclusion in programming, given the community’s associations with romanticism as 
discussed in the previous chapter), the genre was opposed for lacking experimentation 
and criticality. More specifically, some members suggested that repertory cinema was 
“available elsewhere”, predictable and boring and not in line with what the space offers. 
Eventually, and with the insistence of those in favour of this form of cinema, the 
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showcasing of the genre was combined with an open invitation for standup comedians 
to create the comedy combo events: one hour of open mic and a classic comedy film. 
The altering of the event from a “repertory cinema night” to a “comedy event” and the 
incorporation of the film in a night dedicated to performance, gained the acceptance of 
the community by changing the essence of what it would represent, i.e. not a predictable 
“oldie” but something to be generated and participated in, as well as consumed. 
Similarly, contemporary mainstream movies are on occasion showcased as part of an 
event. In contrast to independent productions that are significant enough to be presented 
as movie-only nights, mainstream films are never a sole offering for the evening, but 
part of a wider theme that alters the angle from which the movie is looked at. In the 
words of Jack:  
 
“We have shown Batman, not the one now but the previous together 
with a comic book event. And it is by Nolan who is a really good 
director and things like these. It is a piece of cinema not a piece of 
popcorn toss.” (Jack) 
 
The social reproduction of such films, the lifting of mainstream movies from their 
original context, a commercial multiplex, and insertion into an avant-garde space as a 
supporting artefact to a main event, redefines the film in itself. The adoption of the 
external practice here is not an isolated cultural reproduction, for when jointed with 
space and the goal of the event (e.g. to produce comedy, to educated about comic book 
culture) the film serves as a comment on the nature of its previous context in relation to 
its new (Holden 2001). That is, if Batman is treated as a piece of “popcorn toss” in the 
multiplex, it is respected as a form of art in the Brik. In this case, it is not the intrinsic 
properties of the film that are rejected, but the way it is embraced by dissociative others 
and by changing the metaphysical context in which the movie is displayed, the film 
acquires a new meaning, one that is considered worthy enough for inclusion in the 
community’s programme. From this standpoint, “them” is unable to provide the 
coordinates for what should be avoided (as Simmel 1955; Hogg 1998; Hogg, Banister 
and Stephenson 2009 suggest), but the manner in which the item is embraced by 
dissociative others underlies ingroup negotiations as to whether the exo-cultural taste 
can be successfully appropriated and exhibited by the ingroup, on the condition that it is 




I have so far demonstrated that mainstream movies within the new context that is 
created for them by members, form part of a second order semiological system, because 
they are constructed from a semiological chain that existed before, that of associating 
them with commercial theatres, and an audience in need of escapism. However, there is 
an additional second order semiological system that takes place in parallel and which is 
brought to the fore in Alex’s account: 
 
“I kind of like that.  I like that fact that that (showing mainstream 
movies) happens here precisely because it is something that kind of goes 
against the grain of what the Brik is and in that aspect, I think it is quite 
radical even though some people would criticize it for the fact that it is 
not radical. But in the context of programming in the Brik that can be 
completely radical because it is just challenging the idea of what the 
Brik is and what should be programmed” (Alex) 
 
By placing the exo-cultural element (in this case the blockbuster) in the new context 
(of an avant-garde cinema), not only does the movie acquire a new metaphysical 
meaning but the context in itself is affected by the insertion of the alien form and hence 
transformed during the process.  From this standpoint, the risk of trying to 
recontextualise successfully a taste complies with the community’s enterprise of 
experimentation and alters in the process the nature of the community itself. 
 
However, not all “physical” forms can be successfully recontextualised. That is, some 
tastes have connotations that are so badly contaminated that no form of resignification 
allows for the group to embrace them. In an unsolicited account one of the members 
states: 
 
“We wouldn’t show Transformers because the people that come here 
wouldn’t watch it and the people who watch Transformers wouldn’t 
come here”  
 
Mainstream movies showcased in the Brik are usually justifiable not only in terms of 
the much necessary income that they generate or the resignification that they have 
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undergone, but also on grounds of critical acclaim of one sort or another. Pan’s 
Labyrinth is a foreign production with the right atmosphere and Batman is a classic with 
an acclaimed director. Moreover, Moonrise Kingdom may feature Bruce Willis but the 
director is renowned for his cinematography and the film has a Brik-like quirkiness. As 
such, mainstream films resemble contaminated patients. Some of them can be “saved”, 
appropriated, given a new life in the form of a meaningful commodity that complements 
an important event. Others, however, are beyond “treatment”, whereby their 
incorporation in the programme would be threatening to the group’s status and would 
jeopardise the superiority of other exhibited tastes.  
 
 
8.2 Appropriating Practice through Conspicuous Absence 
 
Rather than moving signs away from their original contexts and inserting them in new 
sequences, on some occasions the distinct absence of a sign that one would normally be 
expecting to encounter in the context of a cinema is sufficient to drive the 
resignification process and drawing of boundaries from “them”. This is mirrored in the 
absence of multiple items that movie-goers are used to have at their disposal while 
enjoying the cinema experience and which I have addressed in the previous chapter: 
from the absence of signs as to where the Brik is located or where one can buy tickets 
once inside the venue, to the exemption of Coca Cola from the bar offerings and the 
missing of big, comfortable seating that one would normally find at other venues. 
Members attempt to create a cultural space (in this case physical) from which 
overwhelming, excessive consumerism has been filtered out (Rumbo 2002), not only in 
straightforward ways (for example, by not allowing the showcase of adverts before film 
screenings), but also by excluding objects and ways of working that carry subtle 
connections to the practices of “them”. For the purposes of explaining just why these 
distinct absences are conspicuous, not only because they de-fetishise the experience, but 
also because of the manner in which they induce symbolic value to other items that are 
available in the space, I will focus on the example of popcorn.  
 
“We don’t have popcorn. That came up again recently. I remember 
thinking that was weird. Because it’s a cinema, a cinema should have 
popcorn. But then you have it because the biggest cinemas define that as 
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what cinemas do. And by not doing it you are kind of redefining what 
that space offers people”. (Billy) 
 
By removing the sign, the group attempts to restate what the space’s purpose is. For 
the absence of such signs to become conspicuous, however, the practice or artefact that 
is removed needs to be one that has powerful associations with its original context. Only 
in this case does the nonappearance become noticeable and meaningful. In the popcorn 
example, the focus of the rejection is not the physical commodity in itself – the 
existence of a popcorn machine would not in any obvious way trivialise the identity of 
the venue - but in a metaphysical sense, popcorn has established its status as a necessary 
companion to the consumption of mainstream movies of low intellectual rigour. The 
practice that is rejected is that of gobbling handfuls of overpriced, oversized bags of 
popcorn while passively engaging in movies that serve escapist purposes. Discussions 
over the suggestion of getting a popcorn machine in the mailing list reveal the thoughts 
of volunteers on the matter. 
One member’s ironic response reads: 
 
“I fully support this proposal, providing that popcorn purchasers are 
required to stay behind and clear up the mess, and that those of us who 
can’t abide the smell are provided with surgical breathing masks. Oh yes 
and we’d also need a special noise filter built into the sound system to 
drown out that infernal crunching while the audience is watching, say, 
Tarkovsky’s Stalker” 
 
While another members jokes that “Popcorn and a Bergman would not go together 
well”. The inconsistency between the seemingly innocent grain and watching the artistic 
productions of renowned film makers, whose works are famous for the complexity of 
their underlying themes - religious doubt, sexual frustration, obsession amongst the 
many - is of course not related to any intrinsic properties of the snack. Popcorn’s 
function, in this case, is representing the numbness and mindlessness of the audience of 
“them”, their lack of cultural capital and the inevitable consequences of this: 
inaccessibility to the subtlety of complex works, a constant seeking for escapism and 
last but not least an inability to show the appropriate respect towards films that require 
the full intellectual engagement of their viewer. Moreover, by rejecting the physically 
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innocent grain, the unwanted connotations of its metaphysical form are also avoided, 
reinstating the space as a cinema for thinkers and intellectuals.  
 
By joining the signification of the absence of popcorn with other practices of a similar 
ilk observed in the space (i.e. the distressed walls, the programming etc) the ontology 
from which the distinctly absent sign originates comes into focus (Holden 2001). But 
what does this absence signify to its observers about the society from which it 
originates? Without having to openly express contemptuousness against the mainstream 
cinemas and their audiences, the community trivialises the values that are at the heart of 
dissociative others. From this standpoint, the conspicuous absence of popcorn, Coca-
Cola, blockbusters or big lights, is appropriated because it represents an indirect critique 
towards the culture of “them”.  
 
 
8.3 Resignifying Prevailing Aesthetics 
 
The idea that art should have a shock effect is an established part of avant-garde 
aesthetics (Laing 1985). Redefining what counts as an aesthetic category in order to 
provoke outsiders and exclude those not possessing the necessary knowledge to 
“decode” the subversion, has been a tactic used by artists of many movements in the 
past. During the ethnography I often observed volunteers resignifying the prevailing 
aesthetic of commodities and other artefacts of a primarily utilitarian nature, by treating 
them like objects of art and as part of the artistic productions that members engage in 
and offer to their publics. Of these, two prominent mundane categories whose prevalent 
aesthetic is altered, are the bar practices and the information systems that are in place.  
 
Within the bar area a practice with clear anti-commercialist connotations is the distinct 
absence of the “original” Coca-Cola and its replacement by a cola drink named “Brik 
Cola”. As a new volunteer I was trained on how to produce Brik Cola, by mixing a 
measurement of a homemade cola syrup with common carbonated water. The 
concentrated syrup is produced following an openly sourced recipe and is always 
stocked in the fridge, ready to be mixed with the soda for a brand new bottle of Brik 
Cola. The drink is served to audience members for £1. It is inarguably far from a perfect 
replicate of the original (overtly sweet and with less powerful carbon dioxide gas), 
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however, while working in the bar I observed that not only Brik Cola was popular, but 
also that the majority of customers asked for it using its full name: “can I have a Brik 
Cola please?” On fewer occasions customers may request a “coke” (expecting a Coca-
Cola) in which case members have to explain that the group does not serve the original, 
but produces instead a homemade cola drink. Most of the times this generates a 
response of admiration and customers ask for more information as to how it is produced 
or when did the community start experimenting with it. The drink is clearly popular 
amongst the audience: 
 
“It has become one of the things that the Brik is proud of. To me that 
has been a perfect Brik project.  It has been in the media, it is like 
something the Brik is known for. People understand that it is 
homemade, anyone who understands the open source, probably not so 
many people, but people who get the open source connection, not the 
idea that it is open source. I don’t work at the bar anymore but I love the 
idea that it has got its own life and I guess the volunteers like it and then 
they talk to customers about it and people like coming to the Brik and 
knowing that it has got its own special stuff. 
 
Interviewer: What was the motivation behind Brik Cola?  
 
It was to extend the programme int theo bar, I see the bar just as much as 
part of the programme as what goes on on stage.” (Frances) 
 
“Us and them” tension in this case, relates to the subversion of the mundane to the 
sacred. But what is of interest in this instance is not the idea that even mundane product 
categories (refreshments in this case) can be used to draw distinctions (after all think of 
the Coca-Cola and Pepsi wars (Muniz and O’Hamer 2001) and even the marketing of 
Dr. Pepper as a “unique” drink with a cult status), nor the meanings drawn from the 
open source origin of the drink - which is inherently appropriative- and its anti-capitalist 
connotations. It is instead the conception of the refreshment as being part of the 
programme and the artistic offerings of the space. That is, the respondent in the passage 
above sees Brik Cola as yet another performance taking place in the venue: an artistic 




In a similar case, Cova and White (2010) describe how consumers rejecting the 
Warhammer brand reside in producing their own DIY, cheaper alternatives, eventually 
creating a counter-brand. As is the case with Brik Cola, the people that buy the counter-
brand are not preoccupied with the quality or taste of the product in relation to the 
original. On the contrary, consuming the counter-brand contributes to the symbolic 
demarcation of the community (and in extension its publics) from dissociative others, 
by implying a common understanding as to why the original brand is rejected. As 
Thompson et al. (2006) would argue, Brik Cola is a doppelgänger brand that mocks not 
only an exploitative company abusing its economic power, but also the 
actors/distributors of the product and its consumers. The identity value of avoiding the 
original brand and exhibiting a preference for the alternative is underlined by an 
artisan/owner motif (Thompson et al. 2006) that subtly criticises the original brand as 
“distasteful” and inappropriate.  
 
Brik Cola is not the only commodity that members treat as an artistic project.  The IT 
technology that facilitates the community’s operations, and primarily the in-house 
server that supports it, are perceived to be in the words of one of the volunteers “the 
beating heart of the community”. Unlike most organisations that choose to outsource 
their server management and web hosting, the Brik has chosen to keep its IT operations 
in-house.  
 
The choice of most organisations to use external servers is not an unjustified one as 
outsourcing is praised for being less costly and more reliable. In fact, keeping the server 
in-house has caused multiple technical problems to the group owing to the server’s low 
power and frequent disruptions in connection. In practical terms, this means that the 
Brik email and website can be unavailable at times, affecting both the operations of the 
group and the convenience for members of the public. It also means that the community 
is unable to host any heavy duty media because the links are not good enough. In the 




“Sometimes it is like we are cutting our own nose to spite our face, but 
there is this idea that by not having the server in the building we are 
somehow jettisoning a kind of core Brik principle”. (Johnny) 
 
Eventually the old server was to be replaced by a new one and members had a 
visionary impulse to place the new acquisition in public view. The rationale behind this 
decision was that the server is public infrastructure (usage is free). Discussions relating 
to how the showcase of the new server would take place were not very different to those 
of planning an artistic event. One of the members of the IT team, writing in the mailing 
list to finalise the location where the server would be placed, states:  
 
“We could have a monitor permanently displaying the access log which would make 
it the coolest toilet block in town, possibly the UK. I like the idea of it being like a 
cabinet of curiosity type artefact”. 
 
In the same manner as a cabinet of curiosity objects had undefinable categorical 
boundaries, the server serves a functional, a symbolic and an aesthetic purpose by 
providing a service to the community, carrying an underlying political message against 
propriety systems and being exhibited as a work of art.  
  
Negating mainstream negation of what counts as aesthetic and what counts as 
mundane has been a common strategy to draw distinctions primarily amongst artists and 
intellectuals (Dada and Kitsch being amongst the two examples of movements 
incorporating mundane objects in works of art and mass producing art using cultural 
icons, respectively). Following Bourdieu (1984,) the easiest way for countercultures to 
“shock” is through symbolic transgressions, in other words by managing to give 
aesthetic status to objects (or ways of representing them) “that are excluded by the 
dominant aesthetic of the time”. From this standpoint, a symbolic transgression 
(considering a refreshment in the case of Brik Cola, and a server to be projects of art) 
constitutes a challenge to the empty values of outsiders. In simpler terms, the group can 
transform (or recuperate) and purify mundane objects that have a different appeal to 




What is of interest in these symbolic transgressions, is that the practices of the group 
are not driven by instrumental attempts to improve the IT technology that supports the 
group (given the drawbacks that arise from keeping a server in-house), nor by seeking 
for a good tasting cola. Volunteers (and while this was not investigated as part of this 
project, to a great extent, audience members) derive pleasure in the awareness that those 
unable to understand the reasons behind the rejection of the original drink and its 
replacement by a home-made one or the rejection of an outsourced server that would 
make daily practices easier and more manageable, are left discomforted and ultimately 
excluded. Such transgressions are only valued by their creators when they successfully 
provoke those for whom they feel disgust. 
 
 
8.4 The Significance of Resignification 
 
An ultimate linking goal behind the different types of appropriation encountered in the 
Brik, is the attempt by the group to appropriate and ultimately transform the field of the 
arts and the purposes that it serves. In one account, Frances compares the Brik’s looser 
interface to that of other spaces. She criticises the “being treated like a customer” 
feeling that she and other Brik customers get when they attend other venues and 
explains how the prosuming nature of the community empowers the group to generate 
within itself a type of entertainment that the industry is unable to offer. 
 
 “The Brik platform is to be a model of how leisure doesn’t need to be a 
category and entertainment can be something that you generate and 
participate in, as well as consuming” (Frances) 
 
France’s praise for the prosumption opportunities generated in the community relate to 
critiques with regards to the alienation of individuals from the production of 
entertainment. Eco (1975), in particular, argues that the consumption of a pop music 
concert is a display of both physical and soul energy, but there is an inherent 
contradiction in the artists provoking the audience which, however is expected, solely to 
observe passively while the artists consume their energy on stage. Eco perceives this as 
an unfair and unequal form of division of labour which alienates the audience by forcing 
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it into a largely passive role. In a prosumption context, however, individuals are able to 
direct their energy via the production of the offering as well as its consumption. 
 
Even more importantly than the resignification process itself, is what it communicates 
about the audience and its intellectual capability (Holden 2001). Placement of alien 
artefacts in a new context and even alteration of the context’s meaning because of the 
insertion of exo-cultural elements, underscores a presumption about the group and 
audience’s competence to decode the process. If the latter is unable to grasp the 
mockery and trivialisation of dissociative others’ values that is in the heart of the 
appropriation process there is a danger that the adoption of external tastes will have an 
opposite effect: putting off audiences or worse, diluting the Brik’s identity by bringing 
the commercial element into the picture. The ability of individuals to “see through”, to 
trace the obviousness of the motivation behind the absence of popcorn, the offering of 
Brik-Cola and the showcasing of Batman, simultaneously “praises” the ability of the de-
coders to understand what the space is all about, thus turning them into a “worthy” 
public for the Brik (that stands in direct opposition to the “mindless” audience of 
dissociative others as discussed earlier) and excludes those unable to decode. In this 
process of exclusion, however, the tastes of dissociative others do not necessarily 
constitute distaste for the ingroup and its publics, but rather, can, on condition, be 
embraced by members. The latter perspective questions the bipolar relationship between 
the constructs as suggested by social identity theory and provides evidence that the 






9. Intra-Community Dynamics: Negotiating Heterogeneous Tastes 
 
 
9.1 Doxa and Struggle in the Collective 
 
As I have mentioned on multiple occasions before, my initial purpose when I 
approached the Brik community was to research how members negotiate collective 
tastes in an “us versus them” fashion. My etic perception of the group was one of a 
concrete, homogenous unit that stands in opposition to the mainstream offering of 
commercial art venues and the overtly organised, structure-bound practices of dissimilar 
others. As established in the previous chapters, the Brik community, indeed, defines 
itself by marking its differences to “them”, players located in diverse, semi-autonomous 
and specialised spheres of action, including the field of the arts, the workers cooperative 
movement and in some cases even economic systems that dominate the whole of 
society. In demonstrating these externally (intra-group) driven dynamics of taste-
making, however, I have purposefully omitted any account indicating the clashing of 
views amongst members of the group. The picture of the community that I have painted 
is a rather rosy one, where solidarity, experimentation and ultimately provocation 
against the dominant model of entertainment come to the forefront. In fact, even though 
I witnessed differences of opinions – mostly to do with programming choices - amongst 
members since the start of my participant observation, it was not until a couple of 
months after I started my volunteer role that I noticed that this divergence of opinions 
had deep ideological roots and often developed into intense debates that lasted for 
months, years in some cases. The primary forum in which these debates are expressed is 
the mailing lists. Within the exchanged dialogues negotiating “what is appropriate” and 
what “our ethos does/does not allow us to do” make their appearance all too often, 
indicating that the discussions concern what is “fitting” amongst this community of 
practitioners. Such debates may be of a wide breadth, involving a wide range of core 
and marginal members (Wenger et al. 2002), while on other occasions they may be 
centring on two or three individuals.  
 
At this point I should mention that neither the fact that the community is 
heterogeneous nor the existence of tensions amongst members should come as a 
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surprise. First, even though as I have pointed out in Chapter 5, studies on consumption 
collectives have in their majority set aside intra-group tensions in favour of studying 
other phenomena, literature on communities of practice widely recognises the 
heterogenous nature of its object of study (Wenger et al. 2002; Handley et a. 2006; 
Swan et al. 2002). Second, not unlike other cultures, and despite the community’s 
formally flat structure, the Brik constitutes a space of domination, where informal 
hierarchies are created and maintained. The group’s culture, the symbolic systems in 
place that determine the group’s “alternative” identity, understanding of their reality and 
ensuring communication and interaction, necessarily embody power relations amongst 
the core, marginal and peripheral members (Navarro 2006). Metaphorically speaking, 
this symbolic system entails a set of “rules of the game” that are shared as a common 
understanding amongst members and constitute the community’s doxa ([1977] 2002) in 
Bourdieusian terms. From this standpoint, it is the group’s doxa that prevents members 
from putting certain kinds of blockbusters on the programming discussion table, to 
promote the Brik in mainstream publications or to raise the prices of tickets in order to 
make more profit. This collective conscious (used here as specific to the community 
rather than in Durkheimian terms to the entire society) defines what is allowed and what 
is not: certain cultural artefacts are recognized by doxa as being inappropriate to a 
particular social position, hence it helps to maintain symbolic boundaries, the "sense of 
the community’s place", and members’ sense of belonging, which is closely connected 
to all the examples presented in the previous chapters that the group considers to “not to 
be for us”.  
 
In the case of the Brik, not all members agree on the doxa or rules of the game, which 
results in “members occupying positions aimed at either conserving or transforming the 
structure of relations or forces in the group” (paraphrased from Bourdieu 1995, 39). 
Those taking the position aimed at transforming the power relations, try to transform the 
rules of the game to fit their own views and tastes, whilst those attempting to maintain 
the status quo do not agree with this and hence a clash ensues. In this struggle players 
make use of their power, constituted of social and cultural capital as well as length of 
volunteering and intensity of participation, to impose the tastes that appeal to them the 
most. In this chapter I first demonstrate the nature of the struggle in the Brik 
community. I subsequently trace the sources of heterogeneity of members and explore 
the expression of such discrepancies in the form of practice debates that involve 
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“sayings” as much as “doings”. Finally, I unfold the strategies employed by members 
with different power positions in their attempt to challenge and alter collective taste. In 
the process, a number of questions arise with regards to the explanatory power of the 
core/marginal/peripheral classification of members as proposed by Wenger et al. (2002). 
 
 
9.2. Tracing the Sources of Heterogeneity 
 
9.2.1 Evolution of the Collective 
 
During my time at the Brik I became aware that the community started out as a much 
smaller group, made up entirely of artists and operating with far less structure than it 
does today. Reflecting on the sources of its heterogeneous nature prompted me to look 
into how different it was back in its conception days: its growth from a group of four 
artists to a community of over 250 volunteers, its development from a partnership with 
an illegal bar to a registered workers cooperative, the evolution of its offering from 
limited tech-scene acts to a wide range of events that may even include the occasional 
blockbuster movie, and most importantly the historicity of the evolving joint 
enterprises. The reasons why it is important to flashback to those early years, is that the 
genesis of the community coincides with the formation of its doxa, the formal and, 
perhaps even more importantly informal, rules that got established by volunteers 
through trial and error, routine and repetition, refinement of practice and ultimately 
learning. It is also necessary in order to understand the different perceptions of the joint 
enterprise by longstanding members, those who have been around to experience the 
early days of the Brik, and newer participants, who, having joined at a later (or much 
later) time, have had to familiarise themselves with the existing informal rules, 
conforming with some and challenging others, thus resulting in increasing heterodoxy 
within the group. 
 
One of the participants reminisces: 
 
“The previous project was a thing called Club Triangle, and that was an 
event that was held in a different area of the city, in a big warehouse 
space (…) it wasn’t licensed, it did not have permission, so it was an 
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illegal event basically, an illegal bar, much DIY and a big space where 
we just showed films and invite people. We went to the cash and curry 
and grabbed some beer, sold it, we made no profit or anything, we sold 
it cost price. We sold people tickets to get in, two or three quid and that 
was just to pay for the hire of the films. All the films were always 16mm 
and they were all...came out of catalogues or collections in London, 
London filmmakers, co-op collections, and BFI avant-garde sort of 
films. (…)  
 
When the arts centre (the business operating in the building that hosts 
the Brik now) shut down we thought whether we could take on a cinema 
as a business, as a project, and use it to kind of fund, back our own 
ideas, our production ideas. That is how it came about. So we looked 
into it. Basically it was a real thing...the rent is this much, we need this 
equipment… starting a cinema… cinemas were closing down, it was 
difficult to get help. All the experience we had in cinema groups 
involved these tiny operations in squats and things like that. But this 
was a proper cinema! We gotta get a projector, a sound system, a 
programme… how are we going to book films? We got that book and 
start with A, then B, then C. We had to fax 20th Century Fox to say 
“hey we got over this cinema”! It helped that it was a cinema before 
cause we were taking over this site and run it and call it the Brik. That 
was its genesis. And we knew because of Club Triangle, we had a hunch 
that we could make it work. We thought there were enough people in 
the city, enough alternative, interesting people. And it is 100 seats. Is 
there 100 people who might be interested? And thought probably just 
about, if we do a good event, 100 people may come.(…) 
 
It was 4 of us who started it. A cinema is a much easier thing to run than 
the thing that the Brik is now. A cinema if you just show films, you 
don’t need that many people, you need one to project, they can also 
usher, one person to sell tickets… So you need two people. Maybe one 
person to run the bar. There was no bar at the beginning. There was only 
an illegal bar where the office is now. People who did films, watched 
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films they would all leave. Me and J would run down after the film and 
everyone had gone, we got a bar but noone was staying and we wanted 
to socialise. So we had to be careful with the illegal bar and quietly say 
to people “psst if you want to stay we got a bar”. And then we got a 
licence. But we quickly had an energy about it, because we knew other 
people doing similar stuff, like two writers/curators who were based in 
Bristol then who run a magazine were doing similar kinds of events, 
much more alternative, left wing events and they had done events at the 
Sandbox and stuff, so they liked what we were doing and they kind of 
got involved. It was four of us but plenty of people who wanted to get 
involved, usher, paint, everyone who was around really… So it was 
more like five to six people in the very early months.” (Daniel) 
 
The image of the newly born Brik stands in sharp contrast to what I experienced as a 
volunteer. First, there is the matter of the size of the group. From a club of four co-
founders and their friends to a community of 250, the scope of both ideologies present 
and operations taking place is crucial in explaining heterodoxy in the collective. The 
“group of five to six people” described in Daniel’s account refers to not only a group of 
artists with a common vision, but also to a tight knit group of friends, a gang, who in the 
words of another volunteer were “constantly in each other’s lives”, knew each other 
very well and spent time in the building all together during the same hours of the day. 
Currently, the pool of volunteers of the Brik is so large that inevitably there are 
members, particularly from the peripheral space, who passing each other on the street 
would remain ignorant of the fact that they belong to the same group. Commenting on 
the matter, in her account, Frances, who is also a longstanding member but joined a few 
years after the conception of the Brik, describes the early group as an exclusive “boys 
club”:  
 
“It was a lot smaller; there was a lot less structure, the roles tended to 
fill up on the day. There was a rota - but no one liked putting their name 
down. So it was all the same group of about 15 - 20 people scrambled 
on the night. It was a lot, lot more like trying to break into a small social 
group than it is now because everyone was there, there weren’t so many 
casual people, and everyone had assigned roles. So if you were new, 
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you really felt new because it was only about 20 people around. My 
understanding of it was much more of a boy’s club. There was a whole 
era between 1998 and 2001, and I think that was a huge separate section 
of time, when it was much more of a boys club run by this group of the 
co-founders and then their mates and that structure was starting to break 
down later on. So over the time the structure has been democratized in 
various stages.” (Frances) 
 
Similarities in the artistic background of the “club” members and a commonly shared 
vision with regards to the Brik’s possibilities, made the early group a much harder unit 
to penetrate and firmly excluding to individuals of a different background, particularly 
anyone outside of the sphere of the arts. Part of the democratization that Frances 
describes in her account has occurred in the form of the slow but steady growth of the 
community, with its increasing popularity eventually attracting individuals of a very 
diverse background, people who did not encompass identical views, preferences, tastes 
or ideals with those that were to the forefront of the Brik during its early days. This 
wider community of volunteers along with the repetition and inevitable establishment of 
some practices, which became essential for the management of this much larger group, 
changed the face of the community, including its: offering, structure, operations and 
ultimately identity. 
 
 “During the first phase of the Brik, the first 18 months to be precise, 
there was almost no conflict at all between people in terms of personal 
clashes of ideology or clashes of personality or whatever. Your “key” 
is quite a big key in a smaller group, you have got to understand more, 
like where your position is. Whereas in a bigger group your key 
becomes smaller and smaller. Till all it takes is to say “I like the Brik 
and I am going to volunteer”, which does not mean anything. And then 
you can participate. If someone came to the smaller group and said “I 
like the Brik” it would be like…  
“What else? What else have you got?”  
“I like films”.  
“OK, what films? What skills have you got?” 
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You know what I mean? So you need a quite big profile in a way. And 
that defines the level you can participate. The later phase is about 
openness. If something is open then the connections between people 
are no longer important, you lose your social connection. (…) What 
has happened is that it has gone from a few people doing a lot, to lot of 
people doing a little. Though you still have people who have taken on 
a lot of responsibility and end up doing a lot.”  (Daniel) 
 
In his account, Daniel highlights that one of the main differences of the Brik’s first 
phase to the later years is the degree of affinity of preferences and skills that newcomers 
have needed to exhibit in order to join in. From this standpoint, a smaller group of 
relatively homogenous members with established positions and extended 
responsibilities constitutes in itself a powerful “filtering mechanism” with regards to the 
profile of potential new participants. This filtering mechanism is to be traced in the fact 
that this smaller group, mostly known via word of mouth and social capital, is likely to 
attract a rather narrow audience originating from an akin ideological space. In addition 
to this, the homodoxy of the “boys club” puts off anyone who does not share similar 
dispositions or is unable to understand the underlying ethos. In contrast, in the latter 
years, the natural growth of the community (perhaps complemented by the co-opted 
popularity of “alternative” spaces) has attracted a wider range of publics which became 
interested in participation. Increasing diversity within the group significantly weakened 
the natural filtering mechanism for two reasons. First, heterodoxy softened the informal 
criteria that were in place for participant recruitment, in the sense that ideological 
affinity ceased being a subtle requirement. Second, extensive division of labour in this 
context means that members do not need to possess any particular skills or knowledge 
and can choose to carry minimum responsibility (what is referred to as a “small key” in 
Daniel’s account), which means that the decision of an individual to join can be made 
light heartedly and without much consideration, making the participant’s role a lot more 







9.2.2 Participants’ Reasons for Volunteering 
 
Similarly to Chalmers et al. (2013), the data reveals that heterogeneity amongst 
members is partly due to differences in the stated reasons why members decided to join 
the community in the first place and, following this, their different orientation towards 
its object of practice. Longstanding members’ accounts reveal their artistic visions and 
their perception of the Brik as a platform that could assist the actualisation of those 
visions. Such accounts also demonstrate an interest in the production (over the 
consumption) of art and an appreciation of the group’s ability to operate autonomously 
and collectively. Commonly, the vast majority of the older members found themselves 
in the Brik via word of mouth and social capital and through friends who were existing 
participants. 
 
“I was interested in ideas of dissolving authorship of things and sayings. 
Doing things together and the cinema taking all the authorship. Not 
being protective over ideas. And if you work that way you can create 
good things.” (Daniel) 
 
 “Well I was around at the beginning, not involved as a volunteer at the 
very beginning, but the people who set it up used to run another 
cinema club and I was in another art group and we sort of knew about 
each other. And then I started getting involved by performing. We did 
a set of re-schools of Frankenstein of 1931 which doesn’t have any 
music, it is just dialogue and they had three nights with different 
musical acts rescoring. More than anything I DJ really.” (Max) 
 
In contrast to this, the accounts of newer members reveal less artistically envisioned or 
ideologically charged explanations for their decision to volunteer. Those participants all 
state in common their passion for film or other forms of art, focusing, however, on the 
pleasures of consuming rather than producing. In their minds, love for art is a pre-
requisite for joining the group and a necessary criterion that rationalises the choice to 
volunteer. However, in comparison to the accounts of those present in the early days, 
newer members’ stories place less focus on the ethos of the Brik and more on personal 
benefits that can be extracted from participation. From this standpoint, their 
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participation and self-authentication is, in comparison to longstanding members, more 
individual oriented than communal (Arnould and Price 2000). 
 




“I don’t go to the Brik to make huge artistic statements. I just go to have 
some fun you know.” (Jack) 
 
“I had done some volunteer work, I do that sorts of stuff but... It would 
be something that I would do because I felt that it was helping people, 
like working in a care home, but it wasn’t something that was 
particularly fun. You know it is not a very fun thing to do it, so I was 
looking for something that was a bit more fun. I do really like the arts, I 
have always been into music, film particularly, so when I found out they 




 “It was just chance that I got here because I emailed quite a few other 
organisations saying that I would be happy to volunteer and the Brik 
was the first place that got back to me, so I decided just to stick with 
the Brik instead of waiting for another organisation (…) I just view it 
as socialising.” (Robbie) 
 
Work experience in the arts and escapism from one’s main job: 
 
“I did really want to get a job in something film related or music 
related. It just did not really happen. So I quickly learnt that spending 
the time somewhere like the Brik is quite a good way to fill that gap if 




The diversity of the reasons why people choose to participate in the group and the shift 
from politically or artistically charged motivations to more hedonistic/individual 
oriented incentives does not go unnoticed by longstanding members and is best 
summarised in the account below:   
 
“I guess it (the community) has gotten less political in the last five or six 
years. More people are coming in just to enjoy films or something rather 
than…of course they kind of get on board with the Brik ideals. But it is 
becoming difficult because those ideas of what it originally was started 
to wear off and come back again depending on who is volunteering at 
the time. And so you have got people who are quite rigid and they see 
what the Brik’s ethos is and think it has got to go that way and then 
there are people that are a little less interested in that, they are mostly 
interested in getting their event on and so it is kind of difficult.”  (Mark)  
 
Max refers to the community’s doxa by recognising that all members to one extent or 
another comply with the Brik’s ideals, a matter which I will discuss in more length later 
on. Most importantly, however, he recognises a division between those attempting to 
protect what is thought to be the communal ethos and those attending to more personal 
satisfaction. Taking a closer look at my respondents life histories, this division is not 
random but seems to have its roots, at least in part, in the participants’ backgrounds and 
especially those who identify themselves first and foremost as “artists”, whose main 
income is generated from an arts related job, and those whose main occupation is 
outside this sphere. The first group, within which the majority of individuals tend to 
have a longstanding relationship with the Brik, has a far more politically charged view 
of what the community’s purpose is, while the latter, tends to focus on the leisure and 
social aspects of being part of the collective.  
 
 
9.2.3 Evolution of Doxa 
 
Having presented an account of the community’s evolution from a homogenous group 
of a few to a diverse community of many, I now demonstrate the current state of the 
doxa, which not only keeps the group together, but most importantly contributes to the 
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etic perception of it as a unified whole. In other words, despite conflicts amongst 
members, the existence of commonly accepted norms is sufficient to provide the group 
with a specific and concrete identity within the field, which, as exhibited in the previous 
chapters, contributes in the maintenance of boundaries from dissimilar others.  
 
Going back to the increasing division of labour that occurred in the later years, partly 
due to routine and repetition and partly imposed by the need to manage the large 
number of volunteers, this constitutes a significant development from the  “lighter 
framework where people knew what everyone had to do” that one of the respondents 
describes. In contrast, nowadays, administrative and financial practices are carried out 
in specific ways, defined by the commerce of the community and the need to make sure 
that that the venue runs as smoothly as possible, if not for volunteers then at least for its 
publics. Practices have been structured in a significantly more organised manner, for 
example, rather than having one big shared programming team, there are now 
specialised teams that meet following a fixed timetable. Similarly, finances are carried 
out with identical procedures each week, the management of the booking and delivery 
of films is somewhat standardised, there are operations in place to do with the ordering 
of supplies and the stocking of the bar as well as the collection of recycling and the rota-
system, which in the past tended to be filled on the day of the event, but is now 
managed by assigned members who try to avoid understaffing problems.  
 
As Bourdieu would argue ([1977] 2002), structures exercised in such practices have 
been more and more confirmed and reinforced with the passage of time, extending the 
field of doxa. Of these, some remain undisputed and their importance, despite the 
experimental identity of the group, is recognised by most members, primarily because 
of the need to coordinate an increasing number of volunteers (who compared to the 
early days spend less time at the Brik and engage in fewer duties) as well as the need to 
introduce newcomers to an, at least partly, structured way of operating. Others, 
however, constitute points of negotiation within the group. Given the increased 
heterogeneity amongst members, including different personalities, cultural capital, 
background and reasons for volunteering, the number of practices that get questioned 
has increased in the later years. In the early days, despite the fact that the absence of any 
sort of formal structure or established practices left more space for disputes and debate, 
these were avoided because of the orthodoxy of group members. Today, “rules of the 
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game” are significantly more established, diminishing the space of the undisputed (see 
figure 4 below), yet the heterodoxy of its members generates constant tensions within 
the group. The evolution of doxa in the community is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
 



















In relation to taste-making, what the evolution of doxa indicates is that within the 
context of a community whose operations have been well established with the passage 
of time, heterogeneity of members lifeworlds will still impose taste conflicts with 
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Figures adapted from Swartz (1997) 




9.3 Heterodoxy as a Failure of the Community’s Filtering Mechanism  
 
At this point it is worth examining where this heterodoxy is attributed to by members 
themselves. On the one hand, those carrying politically charged views, consider the 
existence of the rest a result of the failure of the community to filter naturally its 
participants. In other words, while there aren’t (and never have been) any formal 
requirements as to who can join in, it is considered that the nature of the space, 
including the worn building, manner of operation and environment in which the 
community functions, should “filter” out those not in line with the prevailing normative 
system by making them feel uncomfortable or unable to operate under the given 
conditions. More specifically, many members believe that joining should have as a 
prerequisite a certain familiarity and kinship with the space, which however is not the 
case for all new volunteers: 
 
“People initially would be coming because they came to see something 
that interests them. So that is already a kind of introduction... it is 
already a sort of kinship that is happening and then they come a few 
more times, getting to talk to people and then decide to join - that seems 
to me a much healthier way. People can do their research and look into 
what it is or people come once and say “oh I love this space!”” (Daniel) 
 
From this standpoint, new volunteers who have joined without being aware of the 
history and ethos of the group should then be naturally self-regulated out of the 
community. Those with a politically charged view of the Brik explain the 
incompatibility of certain people with the nature of the community, expressing 
negativity and rejection towards those unable to understand the importance of 
complying with what a particular normative system dictates. The Brik’s free form 
structure is not going to appeal to everyone, allowing some to thrive on it, while leading 
others, who cannot handle that way of working, to exit the group thinking that “this is 
not for me”. Exclusion is a necessary process in protecting the community: 
 
“I would guess or think in that self-regulating way, that someone who 
is... what I understand by superficiality, they are concerned about 
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surface and how others see them and what is the correct way of 
behaving in any given circumstance. So they are worried about being 
seen doing the one thing. So you are coming to an environment which is 
ambiguous and ill-defined and you can’t cope with that if you feel like 
you have to behave in the correct way. So you would be naturally self-
regulated out because it would be too challenging an environment.” 
(Max) 
 
For others, these “self-regulating” aspects of the community are somewhat more 
troubling and less welcome. Rather than subtly praising the merits of natural filtering, 
these members focus on understanding why people may not feel comfortable in the 
space, expressing an interest in evangelising participants and preventing their exit from 
the group: 
 
“We don’t know why people leave; we sometimes talk about getting in 
contact with people and asking them. Kind of like an exit interview. 
Maybe if you are not in that mindset, maybe you just don’t understand 
what the place is about. Or maybe you wouldn’t be in a place to kind of 
articulate why it did not meet with you. I don’t know. But then maybe if 
it doesn’t match maybe you wouldn’t come in the first place. So what is 
it that drives them away?” (Johnny) 
 
The view that many of the new members are unable to cope within the community is 
supported by the high turnover of volunteers, for of the dozen people that I attended an 
induction with, only one was still present at the Brik at the time when I completed my 
research. Of the rest, the majority I never saw again after that first day, or I only 
encountered working on night shifts on a few occasions, disappearing soon after. 
Throughout my time at the Brik I also came across a number of volunteers who I would 
only see once in the venue, never to re-appear again, and who seemed to be excluded 
from interactions amongst the senior members, much like a child on its first day of 
school. Similarly to what I experienced, existing members who were set in their ways 
would rarely, if ever, go out of their way to include and accommodate a new volunteer, 
making the process of “going native” a daunting task for newcomers. In the end, many 
of the individuals who managed to “survive” their first shifts and kept coming back 
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were (a) either those with personal connections to existing volunteers or some other 
form of relationship with the community preceding their attempt to volunteer (for 
example they had been at the Brik as performers) and for whom “fitting in” the group 
was a far smoother process due to increased social capital, or (b) those whose main 
occupation was arts related and as such, experience and cultural capital would allow 
them to contribute to the group without having undergone much training and without 
taking as much time to familiarise themselves with processes. 
 
The survival of members who are little or not at all familiar with the Brik’s history 
before joining and who are coming from a different ideological space than the majority 
of the older members, is interpreted by some as a failure of the filtering mechanism. Of 
these newcomers, some manage eventually to integrate with the group and get on board 
with the existing ethos by learning through intense participation and by forming what 
Bourdieu refers to as a “straightened opinion” (Bourdieu [1977] 2002, 169). 
 
“In the past there was this kind idea that it was "the way of the Brik" 
which was not written down and you could not define it or write it down 
but it was in the air. That was the sort of spirit we did things and 
approached culture and did art and events. So some new people really 
get that. Or sometimes they don’t get it at all. Sometimes even old 
people don’t get it.” (Daniel)  
 
Others, however, maintain a different view of the venue as an alternative, yet 
entertainment space, interpreting the disagreement of the rest as “resistance to change”, 
exhibited primarily by longstanding members:  
 
“I think that on the flip side there is kind of an “old Brik” view. There 
are some people who have been there a very long time and seem very 
much against change as a default position. I don’t know what their 
motivations are and they seem to be different in each case. But there are 
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9.4 Structure, Power and Hierarchy  
 
As it will become obvious in the remainder of this chapter, members of the 
community, despite being part of an organisation with a seemingly flat hierarchy, do not 
all have the same power in influencing dominant tastes and their actualisation. At this 
point, it is worth examining the factors that contribute to some members’ higher 
influential power, the role of the community’s structure in this unequal power 
distribution and how these conditions potentially transform the relevance of members’ 
classification into core, marginal and peripheral (Wenger et al. 2002). 
 
Despite the organisational structure being dictated by the ethos of the cooperative 
movement, in casual conversations as well as interviews I never came across a volunteer 
who did not admit the existence of an unequal power structure in the group and the 
formation of an informal hierarchy. Some would accept this as the “natural order of 
things”, stating their disbelief that a seemingly flat structure would be more beneficial 
for the group or would even be achievable: 
 
“In a way it is a contradiction. I mean like I say everyone in the Brik is 
equal but sometimes in the words of George Orwell, some people are 
more equal than others. Whether that delivers or not...  I think 
unfortunately it is inevitable. In the most idealistic of communities there 
is always going to be some.... even if it is not explicit, it is always going 
to be some kind of struggle going on. It just seems to be a natural, 
unfortunately, part of how humans operate.” (Mark)  
 
Members attribute this inevitable formation of an informal hierarchy to inequalities in 
social and cultural capital, as well as to an underlying meritocratic system operating in 
the group: 
 
“Technically it is a workers coop but in actual practice we struggle with 
that idea. Some of the ideas are from the ideology of the cooperative 
movement, like workers ownership and equal say sort of thing. They 
apply but at the same time you have to have hierarchies in a way, even if 
they are creative hierarchies or personality hierarchies. If it would just 
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be a coop and we did everything by the book, we would not be here.” 
(Daniel) 
 
Daniel states “creativity” as one of the main factors that inevitably lead to unequal 
power structures. Indeed, those with higher and more relevant (sub)cultural capital have 
been able to establish themselves quickly as “influential” members, whose tastes are 
respected by the group and whose knowledge intimidates those lacking the relevant 
experience. As I stated earlier, the distinction between high and low cultural capital 
members is primarily to be traced to individuals’ background (not unlike what Bourdieu 
(1984) suggests), primarily education and main occupation, with those considering their 
main job to be within the domain of the arts significantly overpowering those with more 
conventional occupations. This is not only due to those members’ ability to engage in 
debates that require specialty knowledge to be participated in or their ability to assume 
quickly a lot of responsibility in “key” positions (e.g. programmer), but also to the 
recognition of this cultural capital superiority by others: 
 
“It takes a while to get confidence. You lack education about the way 
the community works but also understanding about music, film and art 
in the same way as others do. I think a lot of the new volunteers don’t 
feel they have it and therefore don’t feel that they should express an 
opinion.” (Neal) 
 
A second factor driving the unequal power distribution, and one that is based on the 
principles of a meritocratic system, is participation. Membership in the group, despite 
the “equal say” principle that is “key” in the cooperative movement and that is also 
assumed by the community, in practice means nothing. It is participation in itself that 
gives credibility and power to a member, accompanied by a moving dynamic based on 
personality, with some people voicing their opinions a little louder than others. 
 
As such, inevitably, those with a more longstanding service find themselves to have 
significantly more credibility, power and ultimately influence, given their track record 
of having “proven” themselves through participation. Similarly to what the literature 
describes, subcultural members who have more experience, expertise and higher levels 
of responsibility are attributed greater status (Celsi, Rose, and Leigh 1993; Leigh, Peters 
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and Shelton 2006; Widdicombe and Wooffitt 1990). In the Brik community, everyone 
has got responsibility. Even during my first days, when working on a particular role 
during events, I always felt the responsibility of carrying that role out appropriately and 
in the same manner as I would if I was earning a living from this job. But naturally a 
newer member’s responsibilities are not the same as someone who understands and 
manages aspects of the building (e.g. the keyholder responsible for opening or closing 
on each night) and similarly a key holder does not have the same responsibility as a 
director, who while not “technically” in charge has serious legal responsibility. 
 
Longstanding members, constituted of those people who have been involved in every 
sort of role and on every level, have proven themselves and have “earned” the right to 
what is perceived to be a stronger veto, a louder “no” in negotiations of any kind, 
including what is perceived to be an “appropriate” way of running the venue, what is 
aesthetically fitting with the Brik and what is the best programming mix. Given these 
conditions, these members are able to deny power to newer participants who may 
threaten to transform practices which are important to those who have invested in them 
(Carlisle 2004). As Coopey (1995) and Coopey and Burgoyne (2000) argue, dominant 
members able to control better and manipulate community resources as well as 
rhetorical and interpersonal devices, pursue their enterprises and promote their 
perceptions of tastefulness at the expense of those in more marginal positions.  
 
 “Proving” oneself, however, is not a principle that is in accordance with all members, 
especially given that part of the Brik’s ethos and part of what disassociates the group 
from outsiders is its seemingly flat structure and “equal say” principle. Consequently, 
those with less power, i.e. lower cultural capital, less longstanding service, are left 
frustrated with the barriers they encounter in actualising their tastes. 
 
“I guess that some people like being in control over the programme... If 
not distrust, there is a wariness of people with new ideas… Which I 
guess backs up with the thing that people don’t like change. And people 
can make claims to be somewhere really dynamic and different but 




Neal interprets intra-group struggles as “resistance to change” on behalf of some of the 
longstanding members. His realisation concerning the existence of “unspoken rules” 
and an informal hierarchy partly dilutes his perception of the community’s purpose as 
aiming to “make a difference” comparing to dissociative outsiders:  
 
“People take suggestions to the programming meeting and if you like, if 
they are approved by the “old guard” then they will get into the 
programming. If it does not fit their ideas, it won't.” (Penny) 
 
Tensions amongst members are further enforced when the extreme influence of 
practices by those with more power is clearly at odds with the group’s supposedly flat 
structure: 
 
“We are supposed to be a workers cooperative, we are supposed to all 
have the same vote and yet there are people there who can shoot an idea 
down straight away just by voicing a negative opinion and that is 
because they do kind of wheel a bit more power, despite the fact that 
they should not.” (Neal) 
 
Unequal power distribution becomes a source of frustration also in cases when those 
with more influence are numerically less than those in favour of a particular proposal. 
From this standpoint, and as it will be explained later in more detail, the “consensus” 
principle favours those whose expressions of distaste and rejection are stronger than that 
of the majority. 
 
Finally, a question that arises is why does the community put forward the image of a 
seemingly flat structure, when all of the members that I interacted with are well aware 
that informal hierarchies are in place? In fact members display a clear negation of this, 
at least in public, with regards to the matter: 
 
“I don’t think flat structures exist... it is a fantasy. Most people would be 




Maintaining the perception of the group as a flat organisation certainly sustains the 
identity of the community from an etic point of view. It complies with the goal of 
“making a difference” by demarcating it from conventional structures and freeing 
members from the bonds of a system where the goals of those at the top (usually profit 
related and as such distasteful for the ingroup) define the practices of the community as 
a whole. Accordingly, admittance of the existence of hierarchy is denied due to its 
potentially damaging effect on the actualisation of “us and them” tensions.  
 
Going back to struggles about doxa, Bourdieu (1972) suggests that those who occupy 
dominant positions and those who are in subservient positions share a silent acceptance 
of the field, their role in it and the rules of engagement. In the case of the Brik, doxa is 
challenged by newer, yet very active, members and is not accepted as self-evident (as it 
is by peripheral ones). As explained earlier, this is further enforced by the “flat 
hierarchy” of the cooperative, which dictates an equal say to all volunteers in the 
decision making and running of the community, as well as by the fact that on multiple 
occasions the “dominated” outnumber the “dominant”. Paraphrasing Bourdieu ([1977] 
2002, 169) “the dominated have an interest in pushing back the limits of doxa and 
exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted (especially since there are no fixed 
principles in place); while the dominant have an interest in defending the integrity of 
doxa and its realisation or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily 
imperfect substitute – orthodoxy”.  
 
From this standpoint, the division of members into core/marginal/peripheral 
(suggested by Wegner et al. 2002) is inadequate in classifying participants in this 
context. Peripheral members - newer participants who only casually get involved in the 
Brik - indeed fit this classification. However the distinction between core and marginal 
is somewhat different to what the authors describe. According to Wegner et al (2002), 
the core is a small group of very active members who inevitably take on leadership 
roles, while marginal members are active participants who are regularly involved but 
lack the intensity of the core group. In the case of the Brik community, both the 
dominant (which logically coincides with the core) and dominated (marginal/peripheral) 
members are intensively participating in the community. The difference is to be found 
in the amount of power possessed by each group, with dominant members having a 
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rather longstanding service and high cultural capital and the dominated a less lengthy 
service informed by less field related capital.  
 
In addition to this, the division between longstanding and newer members, while 
largely accurate, can still be negated by “falsifying” cases. More specifically, my 
observations have traced occasions when the views and goals of a member with more 
longstanding service coincide with those of newer members (for example by prioritising 
pleasure or the social aspect of the group over more political causes), while the odd 
vice-versa case may be true of a newer member, in other words a newly joined 
participant may be on board with views usually associated with longstanding members. 
 
Accordingly, the best explanatory power in the classification of participants is to be 
found in their amount of field related cultural capital. As such, a more relevant division 
is that between “devotees” (those with high subcultural capital and who are faithfully 
dedicated to the mission of experimentation and radicalism as explained in chapter 7), 
“appropriators” (those with less cultural capital, who while on board with the 
collective’s regime, seek to appropriate the normative system in order to satisfy  their 
less politically-driven goals) and “marginals” (those who only casually participate and 
are indifferent to the normative system). While this classification is made according to 
the degree of adherence to the regime that drives practice, taking into account the 
relevance of cultural capital for all layers of volunteers, this is simultaneously a power 
classification, with those in the middle possessing the highest influence in matters of 
taste and with power diminishing towards the outer layers. The classification is used in 
the remaining of this chapter. 
 
 
9.5 Struggles of Ideology 
 
Heterodoxy of tastes within the group is primarily to be traced in the diversity of 
volunteers’ “readings” of the community.  Devotees view the Brik as an artists’ space 
with a political orientation, that provides individuals with a platform to experiment and 
explore and that ultimately aims to “open up people’s minds”. In contrast, appropriators 
perceive it as an entertainment venue which should provide pleasure and alternative 
opportunities for socialising for members as well as for its publics. In this section, I take 
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a closer look at the struggles of ideology within the group that aim to shape its dominant 
culture and in extension the tastes through which that culture will be actualised. 
 
As described extensively in chapter 7, working collectively and autonomously is a 
practice of grave significance for community members, especially when juxtaposing the 
group with dissociative others in the field of the arts. Surprisingly, while this is 
interpreted as a political statement by some, the political connotation of the group’s way 
of operating is overlooked by others. I asked one of the participants to explain why this 
is the case: 
 
 “If you mean kind of party political then no. If you mean in terms of 
civic life and having a civic identity and therefore kind of political then I 
do yes. It is a hard thing to define you know. If you say political, a lot of 
people at the Brik now will say it is not political at all, and they hate that 
debate, because their understanding of political means social workers 
party or communism or these established discourses…  They think 
political means taking some position in terms of Politics with a capital 
P. Which isn’t what we mean at all so it is a difficult one to flesh out 
because most people don't have an understanding of it that way, even 
though they are participating in it so they are working there, 
volunteering or freely giving their time and their labour. And sometime 
you just wonder why are they doing that? What are they gaining from 
it? They might see a film or listen to some music…” (Daniel) 
 
Daniel points out the inability of some members to understand the political statement 
made by the group through its way of operation as an autonomous cooperative. From 
this point of view, the Brik community is a political entity whose core identity is not 
only defined by its positioning against other entertainment venues in the city, but also 
by the equality and shared rights of its members, the consensus based decision making 
processes in place and the rejection of structural hierarchies (at least formal ones) that 
direct the course of action of the participants. While he may recognise the merits of the 
artistic, social and hedonistic sides of the group, Daniel’s account prioritises the 
importance of civic identity by expressing confusion as to why some members engage 
in what he perceives to be civic action when they do not identify with the group’s civic 
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identity. For devotees, identification with that civic identity seems to be a necessary pre-
requisite for everyone participating, generating a questioning response against members 
who do not. 
 
Confirming Daniel’s view that some participants misinterpret any discussion about the 
political side of the group as necessarily taking a political stance, one of the respondents 
states: 
 
 “Politics is not even discussed very much because obviously it does not 
have to. Like I said pretty much most of us are the guardian-reading sort 
of types. So the political side of it doesn’t really even, doesn’t come into 
it I think.” (Jack)  
 
In Jack’s account it becomes obvious that diversity of opinions is not to do with 
members disidentifying with the group’s civic identity but negating its existence, 
interpreting it not as a way of governance but as taking sides with political parties. That 
is, Jack sees members as homogenous in terms of their political views, which he 
justifies by citing their media preference for a newspaper renowned for its middle class, 
mainstream-left audience. By generalising the political profile of the Brik participants, 
Jack dismisses the need to even discuss politics in what he perceives to be a relatively 
homogenous group. 
 
The sharply contrasting accounts of the two members are illustrative of a divide that 
concerns both members’ perceptions of the “community’s place” and the debates 
regarding the manner in which the group operates as well as which practices are 
tastefully fitting or deemed to be inappropriate. For some, the political “reading” of the 
community constitutes the main indicator of its social standing: 
 
“I see the Brik as primarily a ground of how to operate collectively, that 
is its purpose for me. All of the cinema stuff, that is just a kind of a 
pretext. Training on how to operate collectively, that to me is goal of the 
Brik. Decommodifying entertainment, that is also really important to 





France’s perception of the community is politically charged due to the importance that 
the respondent places in the de-fetishisation of the cinema experience (and thus the 
“unmasking” of the artifice of commodified entertainment and the “true” socioeconomic 
purpose that it serves) and the prosumption opportunities cultivated by the group (rather 
than engaging solely in alienated consumption of one’s leisure time, members are 
encouraged to participate fully by both consuming and producing). Her insistence on the 
importance of the function of the group over that of its artistic offering, further justifies 
the juxtaposition of the Brik community with actors located in fields outside the art 
world. In other words, for those members for whom the civic identity of the group 
overtakes its artistic, social or hedonistic sides, it is not surprising that focal points for 
comparison, rather than involving other arts organisations, concern workers 
cooperatives (collectives perceived to have a similar civic life) and the whole of society 
(perceived to be operating under civic nationalism). 
 
In an attempt to understand the motivation of members who engage in action with the 
community without identifying strongly with the group’s civic identity, one of the 
participant states: 
 
“The majority of people who work there all come for probably...are 
more there for the social side of things which obviously is a very 
important part of it but I think a lot of people just...I don't wanna put it 
down but they are there because it is a good way of meeting people 
when you first move to Bristol. But the kind of political ideology behind 
the Brik in that it is quite unique in being a completely volunteer run 
organisation that as a matter of principle does not take funding should 
also be very important to them.” (Patrick) 
 
Patrick recognises the social side of things as an important motivating force for all 
members of the group, yet one which should not overshadow the ideological roots of the 
community. Indeed, across the respondents’ accounts participation in the Brik seems to 
be motivated by numerous factors that I have mentioned above, including, sociability, 
entertainment, passing one’s leisure time and making a political statement, yet these 
factors do not carry equal “weight”. At the extremes of this heterodoxy, there are those 
 177 
 
who largely dismiss some of these motivations (at the one extreme prioritising the 
“political aspects” of the Brik and at the other the “entertainment” side of it), with the 
majority of participants giving at least some merit to the views of the “other side”. 
 
Heterodoxy is not limited in disagreements about the nature of the community but also 
extends to debates about what the main purpose that it should serve is. Devotees place 
an emphasis on creativity, experimentation and the challenge of conventional practices. 
For appropriators, on the other hand, while acknowledging the importance of “making a 
difference”, this is complemented by a perception of the community as an entertainment 
venue. Taking into account the latter, the corporate face of the community and its 
“responsibility” towards its publics get prioritised: 
 
“So there is a core group of people on the one side who would say it is 
an artist space, run by artists for artists, and that's the whole point of it. 
It is not there to serve any other purpose whatsoever, to create art and 
show art to the community. And then you get another group of people 
who probably say completely the opposite and that it is there to serve 
the audience.” (Neal) 
 
One of my participants provides her own interpretation of the ideological tensions 
occurring in the group: 
 
“There is a group of... let’s call them idealists, who are very big on “The 
Brik is for artists” and a group of pragmatists if you like. The 
pragmatists are basing their thinking on experience. And the idealists 
are basing it on their ideals whatever they might be. And it is like never 
the twain shall meet you know?” (Penny) 
 
The two groups whose views are described as “incompatible” in Neal and Penny’s 
accounts distinguish between those who place an emphasis on the prosumption of the 
offering (and incidentally those whose main jobs I have identified in the previous 
section as being primarily within the arts domain) as the main drive of the community 
and those who, while appreciative of the prosumption side of their role, view the 
delivery of the offering for consumption by the audience as of primary importance. In 
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other words, while the Brik is open to the public, openly inviting an audience to 
exchange their economic capital for cultural capital generated by the group, 
appropriators take a significantly more evangelical approach, whereas devotees are 
excluding. This is summarised in Mark’s account: 
 
“I think everyone has got a different idea of how the Brik works and 
how it should work. Some people are quite politically motivated and see 
that the Brik is a political mass and other people are looking at it as an 
entertainment venue, where we are getting people to pay to come and 
see events that we put on. So they expect a certain level of entertainment 
and value for money, whereas other people would say that we are 
opening people’s minds to other things so they should be happy to pay.” 
(Mark) 
 
Those evangelising an audience believe that they carry a responsibility towards their 
publics in relation to the delivery of a value for money offering, directed by the 
principles of commerce and, while not necessarily giving up the alternative nature of the 
group, look up to the operations of the more mainstream venues. Those excluding on 
the other hand, are not in strict terms preventing a wider (i.e. non-artist) audience from 
attending the venue, especially since the economic-cultural exchange is essential to the 
survival of the group, but deny any responsibility in serving those publics. That is, the 
evangelising group uses their experience and logic to offer a service that is “up to 
standard” for their audience, whereas the excluding group focuses on what their “ideals” 
dictate to be of worth for themselves, “allowing” those of a similar mindset to benefit by 
this production of cultural capital in exchange for a fee.  
 
 
9.6 Struggles of “Doings” 
 
Struggles of ideology inevitably transform to struggles about “doings”, in other words 
tensions arise when members are to decide upon the enactment and realisation of their 
ideas. Differences of opinion are not unrelated to the discourses that drive the 
distinction between the community and its dissociative others as was recognised in 
chapter 7. While these discourses constitute the community’s doxa, the degree to which 
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members insist on their flawless realisation varies significantly, resulting in intense 
disagreements that concern the group’s main offering and its running and operations. In 
other words, devotees idealise the normative system that guides their practice and 
enforces the group’s distinction, believing in the importance of its flawless execution. 
For them, any deviation from the regime threatens to jettison what are considered to be 
the collective’s “core values”, primarily its commitment to autonomy, radicalism and 
de-fetishisation of the domain. Appropriators on the other hand, described as 
“pragmatists” by some of the respondents in the accounts presented earlier, while in line 
with the same normative system and recognising its value in setting apart the group 
from “them”, argue in favour of a “looser” interpretation of the regime. These members 
take into account the pragmatic needs of the group, including financial viability, 
facilitation of operations, as well as their quest for entertainment and pleasure.  
 
Interestingly, all members consider their interpretation of the regime to be in the 
community’s best interest and the interpretation of their adversaries to be threatening to 
the group. Those “idealising” the normative system consider the practices of the rest to 
be compromising the Brik’s identity. Antithetically, from the standpoint of the latter, 
blind adherence to a regime is threatening to the collective’s survival. Consequent 
debates about “doings” and taste actualisations occur within the physical space that 
hosts the group, through informal conversations and in formally set volunteers meetings 
but equally, and perhaps most intensively, through the virtual forum for decision 
making, namely the volunteer mailing list. Debates, rather than being expressed through 
highly vocal quarrels take the form of the exchanging of well-informed arguments, 
which perhaps explains my inability to trace struggles during my first months as a 
volunteer. Respondent accounts from the in-depth interviews as well as from the 
mailing list are presented below, organised according to which aspects of the normative 
system members perceive that they serve or need to challenge on each occasion. 
 
 
9.6.1 Bureaucracy vs. Facilitation of Operations  
 
Similarly to what I described in chapter 6, when I sought access to the Brik and 
decided to volunteer in order to gain an “insider’s” perspective, I was first invited to 
attend an induction along with a dozen other newcomers. Inductions constitute an 
 180 
 
organised manner of welcoming new participants. For me, attendance served the 
purpose that an “orientation” at a new university or work environment would. It taught 
me what kind of roles I could get involved with and answered my questions as to 
whether I needed any particular skills in order to carry out aspects of those roles. It was 
also explained how I could sign up to help at an event of my choice and during the 
induction I was able see, at least to some extent, why existing volunteers enjoy being 
part of the group as well as why new members want to join in. Most importantly, having 
only been to the Brik once before and being a complete outsider to its social milieu, 
mingling with other newcomers who were previously unconnected to the space, eased 
my anxieties of not fitting in and facilitated my introduction to the group through the 
realisation that “outsiders” were also welcomed. Given the fact that individuals with 
previous connections to the group (via volunteer friends or by having performed there 
on previous occasions) would rarely formally attend inductions, the process in itself is 
an example of evangelising members and allowing access not only to those with 
sufficient amounts of social and cultural capital, but also to anyone wishing to join in. 
The role of the induction, however, is not interpreted by all as a facilitating, welcoming 
or appropriate praxis:  
 
“I think the sort of induction process has come out of someone coming 
in whose personal  passion is sort of bureaucracy and so they are sort of 
imposing that will, shaped in this certain way.” (Max) 
 
Max’s account dismisses any positive outcomes of the induction process and focuses 
on how its implementation signals an unwanted adherence to structured processes on 
behalf of the community. His branding of the process as distasteful and inappropriate 
has its roots in the group’s joint enterprise of radicalism, not only in relation to its 
creative offering, but also its manner of operation. Taking an extreme stance, Max sets 
aside any pragmatic need for the existence of the process and perceives it as 
compromising for the group. On a second instance, the complete dismissal of an 
induction process can also be interpreted as indifference against the attraction of 
newcomers who were previously unconnected to the space. According to Max, this is in 
line with the idea that volunteering should emerge naturally and only after interested 
individuals have been educated with regards to what the space is all about by often 




Similarly to the induction process, the “volunteers guide”, an informative leaflet 
distributed to all newcomers providing basic information about the running of the 
community as well as instructions on how to carry out various roles, has been under 
scrutiny. Contested meanings with regards to the purpose that the leaflet serves are 
present in the account below: 
 
“There was a member that was very angry that any documentation about 
how to run the Brik had been created. But I actually think that I don’t 
agree. Because, for instance they disagreed that we should have... - 
when you start becoming a volunteer, you get the guide on how to do 
Front of House - I don’t think that is really impacting any ideology I 
think that it is central to have instructions on how to open the doors and 
how to run the till. Realistically how would the Brik run without any...? 
You could say that we pass on the information and we do do that to an 
extent. But that is very time consuming and also sometimes not 
practical.  I find that guide very, very useful.” (Lisa) 
 
In contrast to what is perceived as “bureaucratic” by devotees, the induction process 
and leaflet is interpreted as “necessary” and “practical” by appropriators, seeing the 
former as wrongly construing it as threatening to the group’s distinction. In her account 
Lisa also expresses her inability to understand why the existence of such facilitating 
tools could dilute the community’s normative system and focuses entirely on a 
pragmatic reading of these matters. 
 
On a similar note, a major point of negotiation amongst members has been the role of 
technology in the facilitation of daily operations. This is exemplified in the example of 
the debate concerning the potential transferring of the paper rota (a document where 
volunteers sign up to carry out a particular role on a particular event/date) to being 
online, so that members are able to sign up for roles without the need to be in the 
building at the time of scheduling. The paper rota is a central tool in the management of 
daily operations as staffing for all events is dependent on it. It has traditionally been 
located in the Brik’s office, hanging on a nail on the wall, where it is accessible to 
anyone who wants either to sign up or check its status to trace possible instances of 
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understaffing that need to be managed (usually with urgent calls for roles to fill up via 
the mailing list). The suggestion of some members to create an online version of the 
rota was justified by the practicalities that such an action would serve, primarily, to 
simplify the signing up for roles, but would also prevent the occasional understaffed 
nights that could lead to cancelled events. I asked one of the participants who are in 
favour of the online rota to explain the profound resistance of some members: 
 
“People are against it, people are saying that it is the heart of the Brik 
and that people come in to look at the rota... I don’t think people do but 
you know, maybe they do. And there is this argument that if we go 
online it will somehow become less social because if people can log into 
it from home, they don’t have a reason to come to the Brik. But I don’t 
think that is true. I don’t think that people come in just to check the rota, 
I think people come in to see friends and hang out. So that is probably 
rubbish anyway.”  (Neal) 
 
As Neal suggests, the moving of the rota to a virtual environment is rejected by other 
members out of fear that it will prevent volunteers from physically going to the Brik to 
sign up for roles, thus threatening the social character of the community and its focus on 
operating collectively. In this case, it seems that the social character of online 
communities is not accepted by some members as a viable alternative and importance is 
placed on the physical space. At this point it is also worth considering why some 
participants perceive the rota to be “the heart of the Brik”. First, the rota and the 
clipboard to which it is attached constitute somewhat a surviving artefact that has 
transcended years at the Brik, having served generations of volunteers. When the 
clipboard is unhooked from the nail, the wall reveals a painted outline of the rota and a 
message within it reading “where is the rota?” indicating the importance of it in the 
running of the venue. From this standpoint the historicity of the artefact constitutes it an 
everlasting object that silently witnesses the evolution of the community, connecting in 
some metaphysical manner all members that have passed from the group. Second, the 
rota and the purpose it serves (coordinating which person will carry out which role) 
constitute a symbol of the cooperative and one of its main joint enterprises, namely 
working collectively. As such, its replacement by an intangible “convenient” version is 




Those focusing on the practical considerations of the migration indeed have grounds 
for their arguments, as on many occasions the physical rota proves to be compromising 
for the successful execution of events: 
 
“Someone had put on a bands night and he needed a projectionist cause 
they had visuals behind the band. But for whatever reasons when the 
rota got printed off it did not pull through a projectionist so no one knew 
that they needed one and he did not know he had a gap. Cause when we 
look at the rota we see where the gaps are. If there isn’t a gap you just 
assume you have one. And he could not get in during the week, so he 
came in on Friday, no projectionist, the band could have turned around 
and say we are not playing. You know they bring a visual person on tour 
with them, it is a big deal. And he said look if this was online, I could 
have logged in from home on Tuesday or Thursday or whenever, see 
there was no projectionist and deal with it. And for me that on its own is 
enough reason to do it. Because I don’t think it will change anything 
else in a positive or a negative way.” (Neal) 
 
Or acting as a motivation for volunteers to sign up: 
 
 “Not everybody lives in walking distance of the Brik, they can’t pop in 
and put their names on the rota which can put you off.” (Penny) 
 
From the viewpoint of devotees, however, the use of technology in the facilitation of 
operations should be applied with caution: 
 
“I see it as it (technology) needs to be. Very technical, very - we need 
the lights to go on, we need the doors to open and we need all the tech to 
really run very humbly and submissively in the background.  Just to 
work.  So the people can then organize themselves on top of that. There 
is a real danger from my point of view from the facebook generation, 
that people see this idea, that they can sit at home and do all sorts of 
stuff… the Brik is all about being together in the space and I see this 
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sort of like, it is a compromise clearly. When things can work with a pen 
and paper they should.” (Frances) 
 
Frances perceives the role of technology as “facilitator” to be threatening the group. 
She disassociates the “ideal” Brik volunteer, an active participant who contributes to the 
empowerment of the community by collaborating with others, from passive individuals 
of the “facebook generation”. Accordingly, her religious compliance to the normative 
system works in an “us and them” fashion by proclaiming the superiority of this mode 
of operation (as opposed to that of society), only the perceived “threat” in this instance 
is not solely to be located in “them”, but also in “some of us”.  
 
 
9.6.2 Experimentation vs. Hedonism  
 
Similar divisions occur when appraising the tastes of various members for putting on 
particular events. The programming team at the Brik, which is responsible for deciding 
which films/performances/exhibitions will be put on as well as for managing these 
events, is made up of a few older members who have given long-lasting service to the 
community and the programming stream in particular as well as numerous newer 
volunteers. The group is open for participation to everyone, complying with the 
principles of the Brik’s formally flat hierarchy, it informally requires, however, that 
anyone wishing to put on an event exhibits a certain amount of commitment, first by 
attending the relevant meetings in addition to shadowing event managers in order to 
become familiar with what is entailed when putting on an event, and last but not least, 
being able to provide a suitable rationale for the suggestion of a particular event for 
inclusion in the programme. The latter is required to make sure that the suggested 
spectacle “fits” with the community’s norms, that it is in fact a “Brik kind of event”, 
which sufficiently matches the group’s social position and signifies this to outsiders. 
Debates centred on the offering are of particular importance given the high visibility of 
the programming to outside actors.  
 
As suggested in the previous chapter, programming does not entail a straightforward 
approval or rejection of events, but a complex process of appraisal as to whether a 
suggestion can be appropriated sufficiently to match the community’s joint 
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enterprise(s). In this section, however, I focus on those cases when suggested events 
constitute an instant “red flag” for other participants, leading to intense debates about 
the nature of “what we do”. 
 
“I am particularly interested in history of cinema, classic films and I 
think that there is a large audience out there for those films. So for 
example “20th century flicks”4 generally get pretty good audiences and I 
have been showing 30s and 40s comedies and have been getting good 
audiences for those, people who come specifically to see the film rather 
than the stand up. When I suggested this I was bombarded with emails 
that kind of said to me “these ideas of yours are unchallenging, safe, 
predictable, boring and they don’t fit with the Brik, which is a radical 
experimental space. I have lost count of the number of times people 
have said to me “don’t do it like that, if you go look at the programmes 
for the last 2 years you will understand what we do”, which is a kind of 
bizarrely, rigid way to approach programming, that what was is what 
must be. I find it very odd. So essentially, those people yeah have been 
there a very long time and seem to feel this gives them a right to issue 
advice and instruction.” (Penny) 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, some members’ passion for old Hollywood 
movies only became acceptable when these were showcased as part of a comedy night 
event. In the above account, one of the members in support of the offering explains her 
frustration with the rejection of the idea by others, citing as a reason her belief that there 
is an audience interested in the offering without its stand-up comedy spin. The 
resistance faced on the matter can be traced to the belief that this particular offering 
would not be in line with a regime that directs radicalism and experimentation. In the 
words of one of the volunteers: 
 
“I think there is a problem with people coming in who want to do a sort 
of rep cinema thing and not understanding the sort of history and ethos. 
                                                          
4
 A monthly event held at the Brik, in conjuncture with a local video club. It showcases “classic” films, 
chosen by members of the video club. 
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And then being told “well this doesn’t really fit” and just being 
frustrated.” (Max) 
 
Opposing devotee members also use the “status quo” (in this case the history of 
programming) as an argument for their ruling out the suggestion (“this does not fit with 
what we have been doing so far”), which however, is dismissed by newer members who 
argue in favour of change and constitutes a source of frustration: 
 
“I just find it absolutely amazing that the whole history of cinema can 
be disregarded as predictable and unchallenging.” (Penny) 
 
In their accounts, appropriators in favour of altering – or to be more specific “opening 
up” the offering - believe that this should be feasible given that “if this is what some of 
us are passionate about then that should be sufficient reason to include it in the 
programme”.   
 
“If we filter everything down to this idea of what the Brik should be we 
will just have one boring... the programme would be the same every 
month and that for me is not very interesting or fun. But unfortunately 
the way it does work is that people shout and argue with each other for 
ages and it creates loads of discontent and you upset people, it is just 
pointless and stupid but it happens.”  (Neal) 
 
From the standpoint of devotees, however, acceptance of members’ tastes solely on 
the basis that these are enjoyed by members and a wider public, threatens the 
community’s distinction: 
 
“I think it's a mistake to aim to do or show things that would be 
considered classically "commercial" - especially when these are 
(increasingly) available elsewhere (…) I would say, if not in the short-
run, then definitely in the longer-term they have a negative impact on 
the perception of The Brik as something genuinely different.” (Account 




“We need to live up to our self-image, our self-reputation of really doing 
more inventive programming” (Account from Mailing List) 
 
The key division between experimentation and pleasure is not a solely internal 
discussion concerning the displayed status of the community via its offering, but 
extends outside the Brik family to its publics, bringing once again the 
excluding/evangelising debate into the picture. In the account below a participant 
describes what she perceives to be a controversy between the wide artistic offering (in 
terms of types of events, genres, activities etc) of the community and what some 
members consider to be a rather limited, appropriately “educated” audience: 
 
“If you look at the Brik from outside as a customer, the programme is 
very eclectic, there are many different kinds of events that appeal to 
many different groups of people, but actually the longstanding members 
of the film programming team, although they never articulated it at all 
until very recently, are aiming for a particular art house experimental, 
radical cinema. There is a view that we are programming for a kind of 
small, smallish in numbers, audience that is interested in experimental 
cinema. (…) I did point out recently that we had three documentaries 
about artists and that it was a bit samey. And I think they had a rethink 
after the meeting. Whether the programme changed, I don’t know. We 
tend not to think about the shape of the programme. Having a lot of 
documentaries all in one month, I personally think it is probably a 
mistake because you are appealing to a specific, smaller group of our 
audience. And so I have in my head that other people are picking it up 
and thinking “oh there is nothing to watch this month”.” (Penny) 
 
Penny’s evangelical approach questions why some of the members prefer to perceive 
their offering as “for a limited audience only” and why the diversity of the publics is to 
some extent negated. She also expresses a worry as to whether a very specialised 
programming mix might put off a wider audience. On the other hand, unsolicited 
accounts of members who place all their attention on this “limited audience” reveal that 
the existence of the wider publics is not negated, but is attributed to the occasional 
showcase of inappropriate, commercial films upon insistence of some volunteers. In the 
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words of one member, for anyone “not in the right mindset” the specialised offering of 
the Brik is not going to be appealing. Following the principle of “like attracting like”, 
the idealists fear that by having commercial events that attract a more mainstream 
audience there is a “real danger of losing the community’s experimental edge”. The 
debate between the two views is important in directing what kind of purpose 
programming choices are serving: 
 
“I mean, there is enough of a community there with 13.000 members, 
we got our audience just within that group, we don’t even have to go 
wider than that. Though what is interesting is how we constantly do get 
new members all the time, so there are still people arriving every week, 
despite the fact that it has been around 14 years, who have never been 
there before. And there is a bit of a tension sometimes between those 
two sort of ideas… the idea that we should be catering for our sort of 
base, existing base, or we should be reaching out to new people. I mean 
we do both and maybe it does not matter which one is more 
emphasised.”  (Johnny) 
 
Schau et al. (2009) have argued that evangelising practices of communities generate 
symbolic value by enlarging their human base and consequently cultivating a positive 
image for the group at the outset. Within the Brik community, however, a number of 
members see the evangelising approach as potentially destructive for the status of the 
group, retracting symbolic value and threatening to soften the boundaries from 
dissimilar actors with a “mass” human base. Similarly to what Bourdieu (1984) argues, 
distinction is defined by the very process of exclusion and inaccessibility. In cases when 
inaccessibility cannot be achieved through financial means (exclusion through 
affordability), it gets reinforced through outsiders’ inability to master the “code” (field-








9.6.3 Financial Security vs. Creativity 
 
The divide between catering to an existing audience or reaching out to new people, as 
described by Penny, while indicative of the attempts of some appropriators to 
evangelise wider publics in the community and of devotees to maintain a more 
exclusive social milieu for the group, is also touching upon another point of conflict that 
I encountered in the community, namely the prioritising of creativity over that of 
financial security. As explained in chapter 7, the autonomous nature of the group is one 
of the key practices that demarcates the community from a variety of dissociative 
others. Following this principle, while rejection of any form of external funding is a 
commonly accepted norm that leaves no space for misinterpretation, generating income 
from own practices is an idea that bears different degrees of importance for members 
and underlies taste making both in the selection of artistic offerings as well as in the 
services that form part of the offered experience. 
 
For some members the rule of thumb when programming is: “if it is artistically 
interesting then we will do it”. For others, this is a much more conscious process, 
bringing into the discussion the “voice of reason”, primarily through the idea that the 
group needs to make money out of its programming choices. Penny explains the 
necessity of including commercial and more popular films in programming that may be 
available in other cinemas in the city, and expresses her frustration with those 
dismissing that necessity: 
 
“Necessity requires us sometimes to show films that don’t quite fit. And 
the Brik has got to survive in the long term and it needs money. So those 
kinds of films are absolutely an essential part of the mix. So you got a 
film programming team that has blinkers on if you like and conducts all 
its debate in those terms, “its got to be experimental, mustn't be 
predictable”.”(Penny) 
 
Indicative of the divide is the controversy generated on the group’s mailing list when 
one participant expressed his reservation over members realising their “vanity projects” 
on the Brik platform. This refers to a member’s frustration over the booking of an 
obscure yet very expensive band by the programming team, which eventually did not 
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attract much response from the public, leading to a loss in finances. His rationale is that 
while it is fine to do something that interests you a few times, in the long run engaging 
in “vanity projects” means lack of collective responsibility for the Brik and ignores the 
fact that every single member is the Brik. He also argues:  
 
“What you don’t want to do is have really niche programming on nights 
of the week where you could be making money. The weekend we make 
money.” (Jack) 
 
Thus indicating that the usually quieter weekdays can be used for programming more 
experimental events, but the traditionally busier weekends should be reserved for events 
targeting a niche audience. His view provoked a strong response from other members: 
 
“Depending on your definition of "vanity project", I might disagree. I 
could perceive it being read as potentially discouraging of 
experimenting with ideas overall, especially to any newer volunteers 
unaware of the Brik history and ethos  (…) I realise the remark was 
made in reference to not squandering the days of the week that are most 
likely to bring in the money (which we absolutely do need), but The 
Brik is a resource - or group of resources - to which we are all entitled, 
and I strongly believe we should also encourage each other to use it to 
explore ideas, do interesting projects. (…) If something may be lucrative 
but culturally bland, unadventurous or redundant, the damage generated 
to the perception of The Brik could outweigh the benefit of money 
generated by it - this, to me, would be significantly worse than a 
unique/culturally valuable event within the overall programme not 
generating significant money. Though of course cultural and financial 
worth are both important, and can both be present in the same project.” 
(Max)  
 
Max criticises a hard-nosed capitalist perspective, which would see profit as the only 
measurement of value, thus complying with the anti-capitalist ethos of the organisation. 
From a capitalist standpoint, any not-for-profit organisation might find itself labelled a 
"vanity project" and in this sense the Brik is in its whole a vanity project, one that 
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constitutes a central component of the community’s status and one that members are 
proud of. Violating the ethos can damage that perception, threatening to reduce the 
community to the level of outsiders.  
 
The creativity vs. financial stability debate extends beyond the artistic offering to the 
manner in which other sources of income are handled. A major point of conflict while I 
was volunteering at the community started when the bar team noted that bar profits were 
down -approximately £2000 from the year before - and suggestions on how to resolve 
this came to the discussion table. I should clarify that drinks are sold to the public at 
very low prices, allowing however for a small profit margin, while volunteers are 
entitled to free soft drinks and alcoholic beverages at cost price. Based on the fact that 
volunteers prices hadn't changed in years, however, these were likely to be below cost 
price and taking into account the calculation that a third of bar sales are to volunteers, a 
proposal was made for a system that would give members a discount of £1 off the 
public price for any drink, with soft drinks remaining free. Instantly this generated a 
number of responses against the proposal based on the rationale that the “knocking off a 
pound” system might result in prices that are still above cost, effectively meaning that 
some, however little, profit would be made off of volunteer sales, a practice deemed 
inappropriate. Devotees against the proposal took it to the mailing list to express their 
opposition: 
 
“The Brik is not about making money. It is a 'Not FOR profit' enterprise 
in case anyone doesn’t realise or has forgot. Interestingly at Cinema 
Nova, our closest cousin in mainland Europe (Brussels), there is an 
entrenched culture of core volunteers getting beer FREE. So much so 
that when I tried paying for a beer (only E1.50) I was practically 
wrestled to the ground and had a beer token zealously thrust upon me.” 
(Daniel) 
 
Comparing the community with what is considered to be an associative group; Daniel 
disgraces the proposed practice and subtly discredits its supporters by suggesting they 
have forgotten what the nature of the community is. His tone is consistent with many 
members’ view (particularly those in favour of faithfully following a regime) that some 
of the participants fail “to get” what the space is all about and thus they are threatening 
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the community’s integrity. Those opposing the proposal also commonly state that 
finances are only important in supporting the group’s joint enterprise of experimentation 
and creativity. From this standpoint, talks about “money” are only appropriate insofar as 
they support other causes.  
 
 “We do need to generate income - of course - but I feel that if a 
perception has developed that this should be a main driving force or 
reason for being or doing, I would see that as unfortunate, and even 
potentially damaging. I would say this: the income that is (absolutely) 
necessary needs to be considered only as a component of facilitating our 
independence, which enables us to do interesting, culturally valuable, 
things.”  (Account from the mailing list) 
 
Contrary to these views, a relatively high number of appropriators were in favour of 
the “knocking off a pound” proposal, primarily due to its simplicity (no need to list all 
cost prices for all available drinks), but also due to a willingness to contribute 
financially to the group, especially given the benefits that are received in return: 
 
“I personally have no problem with paying a bit more for my drinks – I 
consider it a privilege to be able to volunteer somewhere where we all 
get so much back already – food, free screenings, volunteer only events, 
good company, the opportunity to design and run events with no 
guarantee they will do well. In principle I see no problem with the Brik 
skimming a miniscule amount of profit off my purchases.” (Billy) 
 
Volunteers expressing a “voice of reason” also highlight the importance of the 
community’s viability in their narratives: 
 
 “I said a fair amount about this - not because I want a bigger surplus 
(aka 'profit'), but because I want the Brik to continue. 
Circumstances/environment do not stay the same. The fact we can pay 




This willingness of appropriators to contribute financially to the community is rejected 
by devotees, not because of an opposition to the idea of helping out with the viability of 
the space, but due to an opposition to “profit making”, a capitalist principle that drives 
the operations of dissociative others. The community’s lack of formally established 
rules and lack of formal hierarchy further reinforces such division, by prompting those 
aiming to change the doxa to cite the absence of reification of the normative system to 
support their thesis: 
 
“Someone suggested that we establish the principle that the Brik should 
not make any profit at all from volunteers. People did not need that 
probably, cause that isn’t written down anywhere you know. People did 
not read that properly and began to respond to the debate as if it WAS a 
fixed principle.” (Penny) 
 
In other words, the intangible and abstract nature of the normative system allows those 
in favour of its alteration more ground to challenge it. 
 
 
9.7 Conceptualising Taste Heterogeneity within Collectives 
 
I earlier explained that with the passage of time, trial and error as well as repetition 
and multiple practices within the community eventually became established, leading to 
some commonly accepted norms, which significantly diminish the space of the 
disputable that continues to be up for debate. It is clear, however, from the divides 
presented in this chapter, that despite the establishment of practices, aspects of doxa are 
persistently challenged by some (usually, though not always, newer) members, who 
wish to alter it in order to accommodate their perceptions of tastefulness. The question 
that naturally stems from this is, what is it that is undisputed in today’s Brik community 
and what is the main drive behind intra-group tensions? Volunteers, despite having to 
deal with intense debates constantly, recognise a certain level of shared understanding 
amongst them that maintains their sense of belonging to the group:  
 
“If you have an idea for something to put on, it is unlikely you will put 
on something that is completely and radically opposed to the rest of the 
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programme, people just don’t seem comfortable doing that. I have never 
seen a volunteer come through that doesn’t broadly fit in with 
everybody else, to an extent you know.” (Neal)  
 
“I think people have a trust to common sense and assume that certain 
things go without saying.” (Billy) 
 
Notionally all members believe that they are fitting in with the regime of the group. As 
discussed extensively in the previous chapter, this system includes all the norms that 
distinguish the group from its dissociative others, drawing upon the principles of 
bohemianism, including autonomy, radicalism and romanticism, as well as the joint 
enterprise of de-fetishising the arts domain. What is clear in the accounts above is that 
the normative system underlying the community, along with the joint enterprise(s) 
served by the group, are commonly accepted both by devotees and appropriators, yet 
not interpreted in the same manner nor followed with the same intensity. On the one 
hand, the common acceptance of the regime is undisputed by all, which contributes both 
to the continuation and survival of the group (i.e. members have enough in common to 
co-run the collective) and its etic perception as an “underground, alternative arts venue”.  
 
On the other hand, the diverse interpretations and the faithful (or not) following of the 
regime constitute sources of struggle of both sayings and doings. Where autonomy 
means no profit and no external funding for devotees, it also means caution in relation 
to finances for appropriators. Where experimentation means only non-commercial 
events for devotees, it does not exclude events “for pleasure” for appropriators. And 
where a looser structure means no bureaucracy to devotees, it is overlooked by 
appropriators when facilitation operations come into play. 
 
Arsel and Bean (2013) argue that “a taste regime propagates a shared understanding of 
aesthetic order that shapes the ways people use objects and deploy the meanings 
associated with the material”. Instead, this study shows that while a taste regime indeed 
propagates a shared understanding as to what is the appropriate way of doing things, the 
application of it, actualisation in doings and interpretation in meanings, differs from 
actor to actor. There is a system of classification in place that distinguishes what is 
appropriate from what is to be avoided, but its implementation is ultimately the result of 
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negotiations amongst members whose interpretation of it differs significantly. These 
authors also state that “a taste regime problematizes objects by continually questioning 
how they align with the regime’s core meanings”, without addressing, however, what 
follows when the answer to this “questioning” is informed by actors’ personal values 
and goals (including life history, social and cultural capital), resulting in an array of 
responses that are not necessarily at peace with one another.  
 
Observations from the Brik community bear a number of similarities to the findings of 
de Valck (2007) in her study on e-wars occurring within online tribes. Within the 
community of culinary lovers described by de Valck tensions arise between “idealistic 
and passionate cooks”, who will never opt for ready-made products” (267) and 
participants who might occasionally engage in the use of ready-mades, justifying and 
contextualising their practice similarly to the Brik’s appropriators by focusing their 
narrative on the pragmatics of their life, including: busy schedules, work and children. 
On a similar note, Schouten and McAlexanger (1995) in their description of the various 
sub-groups within the Harley Davidson subculture state that “Each subgroup within the 
HDSC is committed to the same set of core values, but each group interprets them in a 
manner that is contextually consistent with the prevailing life structures (i.e. ages, 
occupations, family structure) of its members” (50). While in the latter case 
heterogeneity refers to differences amongst different groups (as opposed to within a 
particular collective), the principles that underlie it are not unlike what is described in 
this study. Taste heterogeneity can be conceptualised as differences in the interpretation 
of an otherwise commonly accepted regime. To rephrase this, the findings show that 
normative aspects commonly valued as doxa are undisputed and it is instead the 
actualisations of them to doings and justification through meanings by different types of 
followers that constitute the main cause of tensions. 
 
 
9.8 Strategies for Dealing with Taste Conflicts 
 
After it became apparent that the negotiation of heterogeneous tastes is a necessary 
process in the context of the collective, my focus shifted on observing how these 
struggles get resolved. In other words, if members share different, and occasionally 
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diametrically opposing views as to what is the “tasteful” way of operating and which 
offerings are considered to be in line with what the taste regime dictates, how are these 
differences dealt with and how are preferences actualised? In the Brik I found that many 
of these ideological and praxis struggles do not get resolved, in the sense that members 
do not necessarily reach consensus with regards to which of the purposes that the 
community serves should be prioritised nor in respect of what practices or type of 
offering best expresses that common purpose(s). Instead, those sharing similar views are 
likely to find ways of dealing with heterogeneity (without necessarily resolving it) by 
employing a number of strategies. Those is favour of a faithful execution of the 
normative system may symbolically narrow the boundaries of who they consider to be 
one of “us”, use the community’s structure to prevent the actualisation of tastes that 
they oppose, exclude others from participating in debates by exercising their increased 
amount of cultural capital or “turn a blind eye” to the execution of tastes that they 
consider inappropriate. On the other hand, those adopting a more flexible approach 
towards the normative system (and usually those with less power as established earlier) 
employ different techniques, including: physically narrowing the boundaries of “us” by 
engaging in sub-group activity, putting pressure through informal coalitions or 
compromising on some aspects of taste actualisations in order to reach an end. 
 
 
9.8.1 Strategies of Devotees 
 
Longstanding members, the majority of whom are in favour of maintaining the status 
quo, have been portrayed earlier in my accounts as often frustrated with newer 
participants who are perceived to lack comprehension about the community’s 
enterprise. In the words of one of them: 
 
“We are having this sort of transitory workforce, who aren’t necessarily 
understanding the kind of history and ethos. Then they cannot just come 
in and think “this is how you do a job” and just do that job and be fairly 
unthinking.” (Max) 
 
From this standpoint, those not “fitting in” with the existing regime are perceived to be 
a “transitory workforce” as opposed to those constituting “true” members of the group. 
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This “symbolic distinction” was, explicitly or implicitly, expressed to me by multiple 
devotees with a longstanding service. A distinction that started off as a realistic 
representation regarding the high turnover of volunteers (indeed there is a transitory 
workforce comprising those who volunteer on few occasions, never to return again and 
who offer their labour to the group without necessarily being understanding, on board or 
even “fussed” about its ideals) is also occasionally used to describe, and portray as 
inferior, active members of a different ideology (appropriators). In this case, 
paraphrasing Wenger (1998), the boundaries of the organisation do not necessarily 
coincide with the boundaries of the community, meaning that the number of people 
offering their labour in the organisation is not necessarily the same as what is perceived 
to form the “community”. On a similar note, de Valck (2007) argues that in-group and 
out-group boundaries not only occur between the community and dissociative others, 
but may also concern core members who set themselves apart within the group. By 
narrowing the boundaries of “us” in this symbolic manner, the faithful followers of the 
regime are able to distinguish themselves from “destructive” members, preserve their 
joint enterprise and dismiss any need for doxa adaptations. 
 
Following from this, core members are likely to “turn a blind eye” in those cases when 
the tastes of the perceived “transitory workforce” get actualised. While taste divides 
lead to intense debates, whether private or public during the meetings or in the mailing 
lists, once the perceived “inappropriate” ideas take place (e.g. the showcase of a 
commercial film), core members are likely to overlook the event rather than consume 
energy criticising it – in the words of one of them referring to the showcase of the 
King’s Speech: “this never happened for me”. My observations confirm that despite the 
intense division concerning decision making of any kind (operations, offering etc), once 
these took place, opposing members protected their perception of the regime by 
negating the idea that a breach had taken place. Following from this, their illusio 
(Bourdieu 1996 (1992), 228), or belief that “the game is worth playing” is maintained 
intact. 
 
While “narrowing the boundaries of us” and “turning a blind eye” are useful in dealing 
with the actualisation of inappropriate tastes and help the members that employ them to 
maintain their illusio, they still do nothing for aiding them to prevent the tastes of others 
from getting actualised or for their preferences to dominate during negotiations. To 
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achieve the first, core members are likely to rely on the Brik’s long established structure 
and informal rules. In other words, the “consensus” principle that I described in the 
methodology chapter can be used to prevent decisions being made, even if it is only a 
small minority that leads the opposition. Rejection of the voting principle (one man, one 
vote and the majority defines what decisions are being made) and its replacement by a 
consensus systems on the basis of the idea that a “majority cannot impose its taste on 
the minority”, constitutes a part of the Brik’s doxa that, perhaps surprisingly, has not 
been doubted by members. The principle, however, on most occasions seems to work in 
favour of longstanding volunteers, in other words, those expressing the most intense 
distaste against ougroup tastes and who are more likely to turn down a proposal for an 
event or an alteration to the existing processes of running the venue. As such, while the 
resistance for the transferring of the rota was only driven by a couple of individuals, the 
debate stayed in the “discussion table” for years as implementation would not have been 
possible without the acceptance of all. From this standpoint, the community’s structure 
that allows each member to have an “equal no” is used by devotees to maintain the 
doxa. 
 
Perhaps the greatest resource available to longstanding members, used to influence 
and dominate taste making actively, is their increased cultural capital, earned due to 
their affiliation with the arts field, and authority, partly earned due to their longstanding 
status. Exercising their intellectual resources, these members enter negotiations and 
defend their tastes in manners that are in some ways incomprehensible to those not 
possessing subcultural capital, for: vocabulary, assertion of arguments, articulation of 
the ideological underpinnings of the regime that they perceive is governing practice and 
writing tone, often prove to be unfamiliar ground for newer volunteers. One of them 
recalls: 
 
“There was this big thing that kicked off on the emails list where two 
people were in a fight with each other. I remember thinking that was 
very interesting, one part of the thing was sending out all those emails 
that were kind of dissing the other person but it was all sort of done like 
performance art. it was not just like slammering, it was a bit like reading 
newspaper articles which was quite weird because I actually read it and 
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thought it was part of the Evening Post and that someone had written 
about it and what was going on… It was quite surreal!”  (Billy) 
 
In his account, Billy describes how he mistook the email exchange on the mailing list, 
which in fact constituted a debate amongst members, as the description of an event by a 
newspaper article. He compares the exchange of opinions to performance art, to which 
he could only remain a silent observer, lacking capacity to express an opinion as “an 
equal”. Similarly he describes how participation in such intense debates is difficult for 
newer members who run the risk of being humiliated by the more powerful ones: 
 
“I have been in meetings and seen emails going around, which is 
probably worse because everyone sees the emails, and it is a bit more 
humiliating, or perhaps not humiliating but if it was me I would feel a 
lot worse for something that everyone is going to read as opposed to like 
few people in office space where you can kind of argue about it and is 
not going to be minuted or sent out to everyone. So I see a bit of that 
going on.” (Billy) 
 
Billy’s impression that other members share the same “fear” of contributing to debates 
against the more powerful members is confirmed by Lisa. In her account she describes 
how with her proposal for a “horror movie night” she was faced with a dismissive 
attitude that branded her idea as “a whim”: 
 
“I was quite embarrassed that I had been humiliated on the whole 
mailing list which is something that I think a lot of people are quite shy 
about. Kind of sending an email out and getting very negative 
feedback.” (Lisa) 
 
In sum, older members often use the authority they have earned through participation 
and the cultural capital they possess to “impose” their tastes on the group, excluding to 






9.8.2 Strategies of Appropriators 
 
Similarly to what has been observed with devotees, appropriators often employ 
strategies that narrow the boundaries of who is considered to be “one of us” in order to 
actualise their tastes within the Brik context. In contrast to that described earlier, due to 
their anemic influential power, these members are unable to exclude devotees 
symbolically – especially since the latter indisputably constitute the “core”, the 
foundation of the community’ existence -, they do however engage in sub-group 
activities that allow them to practice“safely” their tastes within the boundaries of a 
smaller group. Two groups of this kind were initiated while I was volunteering at the 
community: the film-making and the podcast initiatives. The purpose of the first is to 
allow volunteers to engage in the production of short films. There is no specific purpose 
that these films serve and no particular agenda that they follow. Rather, in line with 
those volunteers who prioritise hedonism and pleasure, the themes of the films are 
generated out of members’ passion for a particular genre and their quest to “have a good 
time” while doing something creative.  
 
While interviewing Billy, the initiator of the film making group, he explains with 
profound satisfaction that there are no specific skills required in order to participate and 
that people in the group don’t have any prior particular experience. In fact, this was a 
point that was constantly highlighted in the emails sent out that aimed to motivate 
people to participate in the initiative. Taking an evangelising approach, these emails 
encouraged members to come along to brainstorming meetings and amateur filming 
sessions, just bringing their ideas and enthusiasm. Billy explains to me why it is 
important to encourage those with fewer skills to participate: 
 
“I guess it comes from feeling intimidated by being around people who 
sort of think really interestingly and have really interesting backgrounds. 
There is lots of people who are involved with the place or have been in 
the past and have all these interesting connections through things in the 
entertainment industry. And I have kind of always found that kind of… 
I don’t think intimidating is the right word but kind of humbling. But at 
the same time there are a lot of people who kind of don’t have any of 
that, they kind of just turn up cause they are interested in film or music. 
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And they like the stuff that goes on but they are not necessarily that 
competent themselves. And I just thought, I guess cause that strikes the 
cord with me, I wanted to give people the opportunity to have a go I 
guess. And I guess if no one else there is talented it doesn’t make me 
look bad (laughs). I feel more comfortable in what I am doing, what I 
am contributing to it. So there is my selfish angle on it.” (Billy) 
 
As such, the group provides a safe platform for members lacking in social and/or 
cultural capital to express their tastes without the fear of being criticised or living in the 
shadow of those with high cultural capital who faithfully follow the regime. Discussions 
in the film-making group mailing list stand in sharp contrast to those in relation to the 
programming list (where devotees also participate, explicitly expressing their opposition 
to anything they deem non appropriate). Members encourage one another, responding 
with positive and welcoming comments to any idea or suggestion, for “This is 
awesome”, “it fits perfectly”, “good stuff”, are phrases that often appear in the emails. 
There is a shared understanding that the group’s purpose is “to have fun” and that the 
approach followed is one of motivation and reassurance. Some devotees “kept an eye” 
on the group by participating on the mailing list, but showed no interest in attending 
meetings or participating in the generation of content, effectively allowing the group to 
operate in any manner they chose.  
 
On one occasion I went along with the group to film a spoof of a commercial 
multiplexe’s membership card promotion video. The original video displays a group of 
confident friends having fun, promoting the slogan “be an insider” to a world of 
glamour by getting a membership card. We filmed a similar video where the actions and 
gestures of the original actors were repeated in an exaggerated fashion, ridiculing the 
original piece, while the appearance and fashion sense of the people in the Brik video, 
purposefully shabby, further contributed to the mocking of the original piece. Similarly 
to that explained earlier, this is an example demonstrating the common understanding of 
all members as to where the group stands in relation to a competing “them” (in this case 
the commercial multiplex). However, while this is a view shared by all, its actualisation 
through a parody performance would constitute a point of criticism for devotees, who 
believe that making a difference should be executed via experimentation, rather than by 
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mocking outsiders. On other occasions, the group would engage in the filming of short 
horror films, a genre of common interest amongst members. 
 
Similarly, the podcasting group was created for members to discuss cultural issues that 
concern them (e.g. the release of a new film, a review of the forthcoming programming 
in the Brik, a commentary of a particular show on offer) without regulations being 
imposed by members of the core. As Billy suggests in his account, the group is able to 
express themselves about films and performances that they like, without necessarily 
being competent in doing it and without the fear of being looked down upon, or worse, 
humiliated by others. 
 
On another note, when appropriators want to actualise a taste of theirs within the 
“conventional” boundaries of the community, they might compromise as a means of 
reaching their end. An example of this is to be found in the “comedy combo” nights that 
were extensively reviewed in chapter 8. Born out of some volunteers’ passion for 
showing classic comedy films from Hollywood’s golden era, these tastes are only 
accepted by the community as long as an appropriate justification can be negotiated for 
inclusion in the program. However, the resignification of those films from a 
“predictable oldie” to a “comedy combo night”, is seen as “means for achieving an end” 
by appropriators. More specifically, while discussing the matter with Penny, she 
explained to me that the resignification of the event is not necessary occurring to attract 
audiences:  
 
“I have been showing 30s and 40s comedies and have been getting good 
audiences for those, people who come specifically to see the film rather 
than the stand up.” (Penny) 
 
And subsequently explains the reason why, even though the comedy films 
should have been sufficient for inclusion in the programme as film-only 
nights, she accepted the addition of the “stand-up comedy” element: 
 
“The comedy combo, I‘ve got it. Me and other people suggested a film. 
Some people said it is not very exciting; you need to add something to 
it, there needs to be something extra about it. So I thought all right then, 
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let me show some comedies and my extra will be stand up. And so now 
I have booked films for the comedy combo, I don’t consult anybody 
about it, I just programme what I want to programme. And that’s it. But 
that’s you know, kind of a way for me of getting something that I want 
on the big screen. And people they haven’t realised yet that people are 
doing that. So for example there was going to be a Spanish night with 
dancers and dancing and singing. This was a way for somebody who 
was interested to show a Pedro Almodovar film. That was their 
motivation. They wanted to show women on the verge of a nervous 
breakdown and to do that, they turned it into an event. See what I 
mean?” (Penny) 
  
Penny’s perception of the resignification of the comedy combo event is perceived in a 
very different way to that of devotees. For her, the showcasing of the comedy is 
happening despite having to do it as part of an event. By contrast, devotees perceive this 
as taking control over the meaning of the film and altering the negative connotations 
generated from the manner in which  it is embraced by dissociative others. Similarly, 
resignifiying events in order to actualise tastes in spite of having to do what is perceived 
to be a compromise, is a relatively common strategy amongst the less powerful 
members that allows them to achieve their desired end while at the same time satisfying 
the objections of the core.  
 
Lastly, another strategy used by periphery members when dealing with the “consensus 
principle” is that of forming informal majorities. While, as it has been explained earlier, 
the voting principle is rejected by the group - and in fact devotees use this policy in their 
favour by vetoing any taste deemed inappropriate -, appropriators are still likely to try 
and actualise tastes that are under dispute by forming coalitions. One of them, referring 
to the bar pricing debate brought up earlier, explains: 
 
“We kind of had this deadlock. So then we had a meeting. So basically 
before the meeting I had a long conversation with 20 to 30 people to 
make sure that when we had that meeting it wasn’t just three people, it 
was 20 people.  So I had to use old school labour party politics. But it 
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was only when they were faced by 20 people bombarding them with 
questions that they finally gave in on that particular point.” (Jake) 
 
And in another similar case: 
 
“With the online rota, I said let’s see what other people think. And they 
said "so you are throwing down the gauntlet?". So I said yes I am. I am 
throwing down the gauntlet. And you know, we got in agreement to trial 
it. From the next layer out, the 20 to 30 core not the two to three core.” 
(Johnny) 
 
In both these examples, appropriators, aware of the weaker position in which they all 
are individually, form informal majorities with the goal of putting pressure on the fewer, 
yet more powerful, devotees. From this standpoint, the community’s “consensus” 
principle is deemed inadequate in the governing of the group, as it prevents the 
reversion of dominant practices that appropriators consider to be flawed or destructive 





This chapter has examined the negotiation of heterogeneous tastes amongst members 
of the collective, placing the emphasis on the internal dynamics of taste making. It has 
been argued that taste heterogeneity is to be traced in the evolution of the community 
from a closely knit group of friends to a much wider group that accommodates people 
from highly diverse backgrounds. More specifically, heterogeneity has been attributed 
to the different perceptions of members as to what purpose the community is there to 
serve as well as on their different motivations for joining the group. The chapter has 
subsequently provided a novel classification of participants, including: devotees (those 
who religiously comply to the community’s normative system), appropriators (those 
who whilst believing in the same norms interpret them by taking into account their 
personal needs as well as pragmatic issues related to the group’s survival) and 
marginals. The ideological struggles occurring amongst the different types of members 
have been taken into account and a detailed overview provided regarding the prevailing 
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themes in tensions concerning the actualisation of tastes, these being: bureaucracy vs. 
facilitation of operations, experimentation vs. hedonism and financial security vs. 
creativity. Finally, the chapter has provided an overview of the various strategies that 
members of a different standing employ in order to cope with taste conflicts. For 
devotees, these strategies are: symbolically narrowing the boundaries of who they 
consider to be one of “us”, use of the community’s structure to prevent the actualisation 
of tastes that they oppose, excluding others from participating in debates by exercising 
their increased amount of cultural capital and “turning a blind eye” to the execution of 
tastes that they consider inappropriate. For appropriators on the other hand, these 
strategies are: physically narrowing the boundaries of “us” by engaging in sub-group 
activity, putting pressure through informal coalitions and compromising on some 





10.1 Overview of Theoretical Framework 
 
This thesis was set out with three aims: First to contribute to our understanding of how 
communities of practice maintain the boundaries that distinguish them from dissociative 
others; second, to analyse the processes of appropriation through which distaste is used 
to endow meaning to practices of such communities; and third, to contribute to our 
understanding of intra-group heterogeneity, with particular focus on taste negotiations 
amongst members. The theoretical significance of these aims is to be found in the idea 
that consumption collectives are engaging in increasingly diversified and skilful ways of 
achieving distinction in fields where the market has tainted the possible alternatives. 
From this standpoint, taste-making is a complex process that takes into account the 
relevant status positions of actors within a field and entails intra-group negotiations with 
regards to what is the most appropriate way of symbolically demarcating the 
community from “them”.  The methodological approach of ethnography was chosen as 
the most suitable method in relation to achieving those aims and an “alternative” arts 
cooperative was selected as an appropriate context, due both to the intensity of taste 
wars within the domain of the arts, generated from passionate attachment of social 
groups to different genres, movements and styles expressions, as well as due to the anti-
establishment nature of the community that renders expressions of (dis)taste to be of 
grave importance.  
 
In chapter 2 I presented an overview of theories of taste formation, with particular 
emphasis on the work of Bourdieu (1984), and most importantly on taste as a 
classification mechanism that has the ability to demarcate symbolically collectives of 
different status. I subsequently (chapter 3) offered insights into contemporary, critical 
reconceptualization of the construct. These approaches redirected the focus of the study 
from the role of object of consumption in achieving social distinction, to (a) the 
symbolic interpretation of the manner of consuming and the contested meaning of 
practices (Holt 1998), (b) the actualisation and continual achievement of taste in 
“doings” that include the body and mind (Hennion 2001; 2004; 2007) and (c) the 
“recognizable and repeatable patterns” in one’s consumption choices which are 
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orchestrated by a particular taste regime (Arsel and Bean 2013, 902). Recognising that 
rejection is more determining in drawing social distinctions (Bourdieu 1984; Wilk 
1997), I subsequently explored the role of taste’s negative counterpart in the drawing of 
boundaries of an “us versus them” fashion (chapter 4). Consumer research works 
exploring the use of reference groups in the formation of tastes and distastes (Hogg 
1998; Hogg and Banister 2001; Banister and Hogg 2004; Escalas and Bettman 2005; 
White and Dahl 2007) were criticised for treating the construct as static when exploring 
reference group influence, thus failing to account for nuanced symbolic distinctions that 
are not solely based on differentiation of object of consumption. Chapter 5 subsequently 
clarified the importance of researching at the micro-social level, based on the principle 
that the meaning of market offerings is socially constituted and only significant when it 
exists as shared social knowledge within cultural groups (Berger and Luckmann 1967). 
A gap in the literature was then traced by suggesting that despite taste being an 
important aspect of consumer culture, the holistic outlook of the taste-making process 
has remained relatively underresearched. In addition to this and in line with Chalmers et 
al. (2013, 2011), the chapter criticised the idea that most studies on marketplace cultures 
have treated (either explicitly or implicitly) collective tastes as unified wholes that stand 
in opposition to the tastes of dissociative others, leaving the importance of intra-group 
dynamics in the process of taste-making underexplored. Finally, communities of 
practice have been justified as a well suited unit of analysis due to the need to focus on 
the social relations amongst members (Goulding et al. 2013). Tracing a relationship 
between communities of practice and taste formation, Gherardi (2009)  argues that 
passionate attachment of a community to its object of practice is the basis of taste-
making, and  entails the constant negotiation of practices that are appraised, contested, 
and refined until deemed to be “fitting” the group, and  thus acceptable (taste), or  
deemed unsuitable and thus rejected (distaste).  
 
 
10.2 Identifying the Gap in the Literature 
 
Accordingly, the theoretical background of the project dictates that taste-making in 
communities of practice is the outcome of two sets of dynamics: (a) the positioning of 
the community in the social space in relation to outgroups in an us versus them fashion 
(inter-group driven) and (b) intra-group negotiations as to what constitutes “appropriate 
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taste” driven by the inevitably heterogeneous nature of social groups. This means that 
collective taste is not only, as Bourdieu (1984), Wilk (1994, 1997) and Hogg (1998) 
suggest, relational to the tastes of others, but also dependent upon the different 
perceptions that members have of ‘tastefulness’. In attempting to frame taste making 
based on these dynamics, however, a number of gaps in the existing literature emerge. 
First, looking at the role of external reference groups, previous studies have portrayed 
ingroup taste as a mere binary opposite to the tastes of dissociative others (i.e. Hogg 
1998; Hogg and Banister 2001; Banister and Hogg 2004; Escalas and Bettman 2005; 
White and Dahl 2007), essentially grounding rejection behaviour in static models. These 
studies also fail to provide a framework of understanding as to who constitutes a 
dissociative other and as such how are the coordinates for what constitutes distaste 
emerging. While we know that groups located closer in the social space are more likely 
to be in competition with one another (Bourdieu 1984), it is not clear how the variant 
status of such aversion groups affects the ingroup’s taste making, or how the ingroup’s 
affiliation with more than one domain might increase the complexities of boundary 
making. Second, as it has already been mentioned, we currently know very little about 
the impact of intra-group dynamics in the negotiation of collective taste. While intra-
group heterogeneity is widely acknowledged outside the marketplace cultures literature 
(for example, in the fields of organisation studies, sociology and education), it has 
remained relatively underresearched within the realm of consumer culture (with the 
exception of Chalmers et al. 2013; de Valck 2007) and completely neglected in relation 
to collective taste-making. Lastly, the holistic outlook of how the identified dynamics 
interact together to provide the basis for taste-making remains unknown and constitutes 
the main contribution that this study is aiming to make. 
 
 
10.3 Inter-Group Dynamics of Taste-Making  
 
10.3.1 Maintaining Symbolic Boundaries from “Them” 
 
Communities of practice use the tastes of dissociative others as the basis for the 
formation of their own tastes, with the ultimate goal of achieving distinction. From this 
standpoint and as Hennion (2004, 135) puts it, taste “starts with the comparison with 
others' tastes”, because dissociative actors provide the co-ordinates and navigational 
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cues as to what it is that needs to be avoided (Ogilvie 1987). Not unlike what Bourdieu 
(1984) argues, the findings showed that the distinctive value of the ingroup’s taste is 
established relationally to judgements of taste exhibited by avoidance groups as well as 
to the conditions that lead to their actualisation. The community develops its sense of 
we-ness (Muniz and O’Guinn 2001) by complying with a normative system that 
demarcates the ingroup from its dissociative others. In line with one of the four disgust-
based strategies used by groups to gain symbolic distinction as identified by Wilk 
(1997), the ingroup has a subtle shared understanding that the normative system 
governing their practice would not be tolerated by avoidance communities (Douglas 
1996), creating a “we love what they hate” sentiment of group sovereignty. In this way, 
the community embraces tastes with radical and romantic connotations and engages in 
autonomous and de-fetishised practices in order to show their dissimilarity to outgroups 
in general (Escalas and Bettman 2005), but especially to those they wish to dissociate 
from  (White and Dahl 2007). As such, the findings confirm that an “undesired end 
state” (Hogg and Banister 2001) is helping the community define its position in the 
social space.  
 
As Hogg et al. (2008, 154) point out, “very little extant research focuses on the 
reciprocity of the relationship between positive and negative poles”. The findings reveal 
how the constant interplay between the favourable and that which causes disgust is used 
to legitimise ingroup practice. What would usually be perceived as a community 
“inadequacy” (e.g. last minute cancellation or change of event, a cold environment, and 
inadequate service) is overturned to a “tasteful” and human way of doing things by 
meticulously using a de-fetishisation narrative that criticises the “picture perfect” yet 
robotic and dependent “ways of them” and condemning the commodification of 
entertainment by outgroups. Similarly to what Douglas (1996) argues, the chosen way 
of doing things together (i.e. allowing for mistakes to happen and embracing potential 
adequacies as a sign of humanity) is praised, because it would be looked down upon by 
dissociative others and as such, hostility is implicit in its appraisal. By using that which 
causes disgust as an (external) negative reference point, the community favours its own 
practices by challenging their dominant meaning, even in cases when the practice in 
question has taken-for-granted-negative associations. In this case the community reverts 
to the original negative meaning of a certain way of doing things to positive, by 
uncovering the masked negativity of outgroup practices marketed by “them”. The 
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interplay between taste and distaste ultimately aims to strengthen the distinction of the 
community, by providing external supporting evidence to the superiority of ingroup 
practices that would otherwise be too difficult to dissimulate as ‘tasteful’. The ability of 
members who possess the necessary code (field-related capital) to untangle and 
comprehend these meaning subversions is enhancing their participation experience and 
contributes to their feeling of distinction from the massified market. 
 
Discussion over the “tasteful way of doing things” leads to another important point. 
The findings show that it is not only the offering of the group that is subject to 
juxtaposition, but of equal importance is the community’s management of practice as 
yet another way to maintain symbolic boundaries. In studying taste, Hennion (2001) 
prioritises the actualisation process, over that of the object of taste or its properties, but 
given that the selected context in this project is a collective (and at the same time an 
organisation as opposed to Hennion’s individual level) allows for a much wider 
interpretation of just what that actualisation might entail. In other words, aside from the 
object of practice of the community (the showcasing of art) and the manner in which 
this is carried out, the working practices of the group, including the management and 
running of the community, are also part of the performance of taste. Most importantly, 
the rationale behind both the particular choices for the object of practice (what type of 
offering should we have?) as well as for ways of running the group (including finance 
management, information technology in place, organisational structure and extended 
product offering including the bar) are based on justifications that have aesthetic 
properties.  
 
While the blurring of the boundaries between consumption and production has been 
established by numerous authors (e.g. Firat and Venkatesh 1995; Humphrey and 
Grayson 2008; Giesler 2006), taste has been extensively looked at from a consumption 
practice point of view within the consumer research literature, while little or no focus 
has been put on how modes of production in communities also play a crucial role in 
symbolic distinctions. More specifically, many previous studies have emphasised the 
manner of consuming as a way of gaining distinction (including Holt 1998; Hennion 
2001, 2003, 2007; Arsel and Thompson 2010; Arsel and Bean 2013). The prosumption 
nature of the context of enquiry in this study, however, demonstrates that manner of 
production is just as important in the distinction game and can assert this in subtle 
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manners that are difficult to be “copied” by outsiders. The aesthetic reading of 
organisational life and the aesthetics of management practice have been previously 
studied by Strati (1992; 1999; 2008; 2009) in the field of organisational studies, while 
Witz et al. (2003) refer to “aesthetic labour” to show how workers mobilize their 
aesthetic dispositions towards producing a particular “style” of service encounter. The 
management of practice may come as a surprise when thinking about matters of taste 
(for example one may wonder how the pricing strategy of the community or its funding 
policy may be considered for their aesthetic properties), yet many unconventional 
practices can be thought of in terms of their “tastefulness”. Strati (2008) for example, 
explains how mathematicians describe their objects of knowledge in aesthetic terms, 
noting that it is often very difficult to determine whether  or not ‘beautiful’ is being used 
as a synonym for ‘good’, or vice versa (Gherardi 2009). This “wider” consideration of 
practices as tasteful or distasteful (meaning here that the management of practice would 
not traditionally be considered for its aesthetic properties) is allowing consumers to 
enforce distinctions in novel and more complex ways, which are strengthening their 
social status and are largely inaccessible to/unachievable for outsiders (i.e. any cinema 
can showcase an indie film but very few can claim that they achieve this by being fully 
autonomous or volunteer run). 
 
Aside from offering an additional dimension to our understanding of taste, the 
management of practice is eventually able to alter the meaning of the main object of it 
as well. In the project, this becomes obvious in cases when the same film embraced by 
the community is also showcased by a dissociative other, yet the status of it is superior 
when in the context of the ingroup, because of the symbolic value infused to it through 
coproductive practices that led to its actualisation (Schau et al. 2009). As such, the study 
demonstrates that it is not only the main offering, but also the working practices of the 
community that are appraised, contested, and constantly refined in order to ensure that 
the ingroup’s “way of doing things” condemns that of outgroups as absurd and makes a 
practical demonstration of the emptiness of the values and powers that “they” pursue. 
 
The findings in relation to boundary-making also bring to the forefront the potential 
influence of economic resources in the process of proclaiming distinction. As discussed 
in chapter 7, given the community’s restricted financial resources and occasionally 
limited human capital, the extent to which a de-fetishisation narrative is part of the 
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normative system independently of lack of these resources is questionable. Stepping on 
an existing discourse on fetishisation of products and the commodification of 
entertainment in particular (Adorno and Horkheimer [1944] 1972), members achieve 
the legitimisation and resignification of their distinct lack of resources by socially 
externalising “them” and their robotic, near-perfect ways, which prevent the 
development of independent individuals being able to judge for themselves (Adorno and 
Rabinbach 1975). The study suggests that the pragmatics of prosumption when looking 
at taste as the normative system that drives practice (Arsel and Bean 2013) should not 
be neglected. In fact, Bourdieu (1984) puts forward a similar argument in describing 
how artists and intellectuals (with high cultural but low economic capital), unable to use 
the latter to differentiate themselves, engage in processes of subversion and 
appropriation, that usually aim to “shock” the bourgeoisie by denying them access to 
this particular way of “reading” or understanding the meaning of cultural products. 
When it comes to maintaining symbolic boundaries, inability to do so via economic 
means is likely to increase the subtlety of meaning subversions as a way of proclaiming 
distinction. However, the interplay between the amount of resources available and the 
formation of a normative system that legitimises their absence remains to be explored in 
more detail. 
 
The question that naturally stems next in the discussion of boundary-making is 
boundaries from whom? The literature has so far focused on inter-group competition 
amongst social groups within particular fields of operation (Bourdieu 1984; Berger and 
Heath 2007; Arsel and Thompson 2010 etc).   The study, however, shows that the 
dissimilar others who are used as focal points in taste negotiations are not strictly 
located within the main domain that the community’s object of practice stems from. In 
the findings, aside from the obvious field of the arts, and art venues, communities and 
audiences located within it, the ingroup is also observed drawing boundaries from other 
workers cooperatives, as well as from society as a whole and dominant economic 
systems in particular, placing an emphasis on its organisational structure and 
management of practice rather than its object of practice. In the respondents’ narratives, 
it also becomes obvious that members transcend field boundaries depending on which 
aspect of their normative system they wish to proclaim the sovereignty of. The reason 
why previous studies have focused on status competitions within particular fields of 
competition is to be traced in the affinity of cultural capital to specific fields. In other 
 213 
 
words, “it is the institutional logic particular to a consumption field located in a 
particular socio-historical setting that invests objects and activities with cultural capital” 
(Holt 1997, 99). This means that expressions of cultural capital exist as field related 
capital, which only has value within the particular field in question (e.g. an individual 
not interested in wristwatches is unlikely to appreciate another’s knowledge of fine 
craftsmanship). The findings do not dispute this framing since the fields of competition 
that the community transcends (namely the arts, the worker cooperative movement and 
society as a whole, if we accept society as an integrative all-encompassing field) are all 
domains that the community is active in. What this study adds to our knowledge is the 
idea that aside from a collective’s main domain of operation, potential secondary fields 
with which the group is affiliated, can play a significant and supporting role when 
proclaiming distinction. Transcending amongst these fields, the community further 
strengthens its social position, by providing “additional evidence” of sovereignty.  
 
 
10.3.2 The Use of Distaste in the Appropriation of Ingroup Practices 
 
The findings begin to mark out the appropriation processes through which members 
employ distaste to resignify and internalise meaning to their practices (a) by exhibiting 
tastes of outsiders if they can successfully negotiate their intent, (b) by negating tastes 
that are prevalent in the field in order to criticise subtly outgroup practices and (c) by 
negotiating the ‘tastefulness’ of objects that are not valued for their aesthetics by 
outsiders in order to provoke.  
 
Looking more closely at the first process and taking into account the occasional 
encompassing of practices that are clearly related to dissociative groups by the ingroup, 
while “them” and the negative end state (Ogilvie 1987; Hogg and Banister 2001; Hogg 
et al. 2009) is a focal point in understanding the community’s distinction, it is unable to 
provide the coordinates for what should be avoided. Instead, collective (dis)taste is a 
dynamic process of appropriation that is situated in practice and as such, the emphasis 
should be on its “making”. The findings extend previous claims that ingroup members 
engage in anti-choice (i.e. avoidance, abandonment and aversion behaviour) (Hogg 
1998; Escalas and Bettman 2005; White and Dhal 2007; Berger and Heath 2008; Hogg 
et al.2009) to achieve distinction. Not unlike Holt (1998) and Arsel and Thompson 
 214 
 
(2010) the study demonstrates that the manner of prosumption has more explanatory 
power over the object of consumption in describing how members are able to 
encompass tastes of outsiders without jettisoning their normative system. Nuanced 
symbolic distinctions are to be found in the appropriation of practices that, even though 
at a first glance may seem ill-suited, carry meanings detrimental to outgroups. As 
Heidegger (1999) argues, essence, or the attributes that make an entity what it 
fundamentally is and give character to it, can only been transferred to things through 
appropriation. In this study, the transferability of essence, or resignification of the exo-
cultural practice, is achieved by negotiating how the practice in question can become 
“proper to this particular context” (Boon 2007) through a change in the use of the object 
of practice and the construction of a sufficient justification for its inclusion.  
 
The second process of appropriation recognised in the findings, begins to mark the 
conditions under which anti-choice is conspicuous, by taking into account Arsel and 
Bean’s (2013) approach on the importance of the regime that drives practice. The 
findings demonstrate that non-appearance of an item in a particular context is only 
meaningful insofar as it is one that has powerful associations with the field within 
which the collective operates (and as such the ingroup is expected to encompass it). 
Anti-choice in this case may be out of the norm according to the dominant normative 
system of the field, but the manner in which the item is consumed by dissociative 
groups is in conflict with the ingroup’s common purpose or regime. In this case, it is 
non-appearance that carries meanings detrimental to outgroups. By removing the field-
dominant practice, the community is able to appropriate its object of practice (i.e. 
showcasing art) by removing its commercialised, commodified nature created by 
“them” and altering its essence to an experience that aims to “open up mindsets” and 
claiming it as the group’s “own” (Boon 2007). In other words, changing the cinema 
experience’s form (by removing certain items) at the same time ensures a change in the 
experience’s function. 
 
The final appropriation process demonstrates how even mundane product categories, 
used by the entirety of groups within a particular field out of necessity and for their 
utilitarian purposes that they serve, can be used in the actualisation of “us and them” 
tensions. Similarly to what Bourdieu argues (1984), there is no area of practice where 
aestheticization of life cannot take place and in fact it is particularly challenging and 
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rewarding to be able to apply aesthetics to the most commodified, every day practices. 
Subtly expressing contemptuousness against dissociative others through the use of 
mundane product categories makes distinctions harder to trace, as to understand the 
meanings of such practices one needs to be in possession of the necessary “code”, or 
subcultural capital (Bourdieu 1984; Holt 1997; Arsel and Thompson 2010). Ingroup 
members gain pride through the sharing of a common understanding about a practice 
that seems enigmatic to outsiders.  
 
The distaste-driven processes of appropriation demonstrated by this study: changes in 
the use of items and intent of practice, alterations in form to enforce changes in function 
and changes in the aesthetic status of commodities, all need to be collectively 
understood in order to acquire power and validity. These processes constitute skilful 
ways of achieving distinction because they presuppose the ability of members to 
manipulate the metaphysical function (i.e. meaning, use) of physical forms (e.g. films, 
pop-corn, coca-cola, IT-server). As Ostergaard et al. (1999) demonstrate, appropriation 
contributes to the feeling of “our” way of doing it, while the products involved in the 
process are transformed into a proper reflection of their owners and, in the case of this 
study, into a critique against those who define the ingroup’s distinction.  
 
 
10.4 Inter-Group Dynamics of Taste-Making 
 
10.4.1 Reconciling Inter-Group and Intra Group Dynamics of Taste 
 
As illustrated in figure 6, the linking ring between externally (inter-group) driven 
dynamics of taste, in other words those dynamics generated by the social positioning of 
the community to the external and often competitive “them”, is to be found in the 
manner in which “us versus them” juxtapositions provide the foundation both for the 
formation of the community’s doxa as well as for intra-group struggles. Arsel and Bean 
(2013) argue that taste as a practice is regulated by discursive regimes and that myths 
are used to script status consumption practices. Similarly, the findings in this study 
demonstrate that the community’s practices are directed by a particular normative 
system, one that is formulated by the boundaries that the group maintains with 
dissociative actors. The group has defined itself in opposition to the dominant consumer 
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culture, a relatively commonly observed phenomenon (Dobscha 1998), by relying on a 
Bohemianism inspired ideology and de-fetishisation narrative that demarcates the 
ingroup from the commercial and increasingly co-opted by the market actors within the 
domain of the arts, “impure” worker cooperatives and corrupted societal economic 
systems. In communities of practice terms, these symbolic juxtapositions are the basis 
of the group’s   joint enterprise. They do not simply constitute a stated goal, i.e. to 
decommodify entertainment, but are defined by the very process of pursuing them (for 
example, by negotiating the potential appropriation of practices) and they create 
amongst participants “relations of mutual accountability that become an integral part of 
the practice” (Wenger 1998, 78). The mutual accountability that members feel towards 
their normative system constitutes the community’s doxa. The community’s tastes are 
relational precisely because its normative system, joint enterprise and ultimately doxa 
are also relational to those that the group expresses disgust towards. It is the common 
acceptance of this relational normative system that creates an etic perception of the 
community as a unified, homogenous whole that stands in opposition to external actors 
and systems, because it constitutes “not only the group’s representation of the world but 
the group itself, which orders itself in accordance with this representation” (Bourdieu 
[1977] 2002, 163). In other words, members share a common understanding with 
regards to the social space they are in and their group’s position within it.  
 
The integrative figure proposes that while collectives understand their group 
relationally, in other words by notionally complying to a normative system that is 
comparable to and juxtaposed to that of outgroups, taste-making can only be understood 
by examining just how a joint enterprise is negotiated amongst members. Taking into 
account the inevitably heterogeneous nature of communities, the participants have 
different perceptions with regards to what is the most appropriate way of achieving 
distinction. The study attributes such discrepancies of opinion to members diverging 
interpretations of the normative system, suggesting that different members are valuing 
their experience of being part of the community in varying terms and seek to actualise 
























Figure 6: Integrative Framework of Taste-Making 
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10.4.2 Heterodoxy and Member Classification 
 
Intra-group struggle commences when the actualisation of this normative system to 
doings comes into play. The normative aspects of the community’s oppositional identity 
go without saying for all members (precisely the role of doxa as described by Bourdieu 
[1977] 2002), but perceptions as to how this normative system is best actualised in 
“doings” vary significantly amongst participants. In other words, while the regime that 
drives practice is shared as common knowledge amongst all as “that in which we 
believe in”, views with regards to the implementation of these beliefs constitutes a 
matter of struggle. Heterodoxy with regards to the implementation of doxa is due to 
differences in individuals’ amount of possessed social and field related capital, as well 
as due to discrepancies in background (primarily occupation) and in the reasons for 
joining the community. The contribution of these factors to group heterogeneity does 
not come as a surprise. Cultural and social capital have been extensively examined for 
how they influence one’s consumption choices as well as manner of consuming (for 
example, Bourdieu 1984; Holt 1997, 1998; Allen 2002; Henry 2005; Arsel and 
Thompson 2010), while the contributing role of different motivations for joining a 
community to heterodoxy has been previously identified by Chalmers et al. (2013) as 
well as Beverland et al. (2010). 
 
Similarly to Arsel and Bean (2013, 907), the study showed that “a taste regime 
problematizes objects by continually questioning how they align with the regime’s core 
meanings”. Community members were found to problematize constantly as to how their 
choices for particular objects of art, as well as ways of managing the community, are 
effectively signalling the group’s oppositional relationship to dissociative others. In 
addition to this, however, it was found that members do not necessarily come to an 
agreement as to what is the best way to align their practice to the followed normative 
system. The discrepancy amongst the views on the best way to implement the regime is 
attributed to the different levels of cultural and symbolic resources amongst members, 
with those possessing higher amounts (and as such have expertise in the field and are 
closely connected to one another) opting for a religious execution of the normative 
system that does not jettison any of the community’s core principles and those with 
lower amounts opting for a more flexible implementation that takes into account 
pragmatic factors (i.e. financial viability, facilitation of operations) as well as 
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occasionally prioritising self-relevant goals like pleasure. The study categorises the first 
profile of member as “devotees” and the latter as “appropriators”, with the existence of 
a third profile of “peripherals” that is only casually participating in the community 
without engaging in the problematisation of what is the best way to practice.  
 
The conceptualisation of community heterogeneity as a result of members’ different 
views on what is the most appropriate way to implement a normative system that they 
are faithful to finds application in a number of examples in daily life. A group of 
Christians are all having the same faith and the values dictated by it (which at the same 
time symbolically demarcate them from followers of any other religion), but their 
practice of it may well differ from person to person. Some may be carefully complying 
with all the norms, rituals and traditions dictated by Bible or the New Testament, while 
others, who are no less Christian, may be adapting their practice to account for other 
needs (for example, an ill person of faith may choose not to fast; taking into account his 
or her physical/health needs).  
 
The literature across various fields has sought to classify and “profile” members of 
marketplace cultures. Often these classifications are based on length of service, which 
distinguishes between those members who  have “proven themselves” and their 
commitment to a particular normative system and those who haven’t (Celsi, Rose and 
Leigh 1993; Leigh, Peters and Shelton 2006; Widdicombe and Wooffitt 1999; Schouten 
and McAlexander 1995), as well as based on authenticity of membership that 
distinguishes between those who are solely interested in iconic imagery and those 
encompassing a holistic lifestyle as dictated by the collective’s regime (Beverland et al. 
2010; Leigh, Peters and Shelton 2006; Wood 2000). Most commonly, however, the 
classifications refer to concentric social structures that reflect status hierarchies formed 
depending on the intensity of involvement of members, not unlike Wenger’s et al. 
(2002) core, marginal and peripheral division. Similar classifications have been 
identified in the study of various subcultures. Fox (1987) in his study of punk, Klein 
(1986) in the context of body-building and Schouten and McAlexander (1995) in their 
study of Harley Davidson bikers, all distinguish between an ideologically committed 
hard core, a slightly less committed soft core and marginals (also referred to as 
pretenders).  Aside from this status hierarchy, the latter study also presents a larger 
perspective that recognises sub-groups of practitioners (all with their own unique 
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hierarchies) that “have their own interpretation of the biker ethos” (48) informed by the 
different purpose that these groups serve (for example Christian biker clubs or Vietnam 
veteran bikers). The classification in this study, however, provides insights for cases 
when such different interpretations of ethos occur within the same collective. In other 
words, rather than distinguishing between authentic and inauthentic membership, this 
research offers a different interpretation of intra-group taste heterogeneity by accounting 
for the possibility of a common underlying system of beliefs (based on the community’s 
positioning in relation to outsiders), the interpretation of which, however, differs 
amongst members with diverse backgrounds.  
 
The co-existence of these different roles within the same collective also has significant 
implications in relation to taste making. Devotees and appropriators share common 
distastes but the intensity of rejection varies amongst them. Wilk (1997) recognises that 
consumers may be driven by a spectrum of distaste emotions, ranging from dislike to 
disgust, without however elaborating on the matter. In the study, rejection felt and 
expressed by devotees is naturally heightened; while their expressions of distaste (or 
disgust in this case) have a “protectionist” purpose that aims to make sure that the 
community not only maintains, but also increases its symbolic distance to aversion 
groups. Expressions of distaste by appropriators, on the other hand, serve a 
“navigational” purpose that provides cues as to how these members ought to think about 
their community and an indication as to how to their practices should be aligned to 
maintain that social position. From this standpoint, when discussing distaste at the 
collective level, it is important to take into account the existence of different types of 
rejection behaviour that co-exist within the group and the potential struggles that these 
might lead to.  
 
Having discussed the sources of heterogeneity within the collective, I should note that 
rather than having negative effects on the development of the group, on the contrary, 
taste conflicts act as a motivational force for members of different standing by giving 
them something “to fight for”. This motivation has its basis in the idea that participants 
value the purpose and activities of the community (what Bourdieu terms illusio or the 
idea that “the game is worth playing and the stakes created in it are worth pursuing” 
([1992] 1996, 228). Accordingly, protecting group-relevant enterprises (e.g. the 
community’s ethos for devotees or its financial viability for appropriators) and even 
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self-relevant goals (e.g. pleasure for appropriators) become tasks that incline members 
of all standing to participate, challenging the rest to stand up for the stakes they are 
protecting. It could also be argued that heterogeneity is a much needed condition both 
for improving the participants’ experience (by providing motivation for members to 
protect their stakes) and in the co-creation of value that is generated as a result of 




10.4.3 The Negotiation of Intra-Group Taste Heterogeneity 
 
The findings offer a novel insight into how members deal with taste conflicts by 
employing a number of strategies. These strategies differ depending on the classification 
of the member(s) that employ them and are aimed at either promoting own perceptions 
of “tastefulness” (appropriators: physically narrowing the boundaries of “us”, 
compromising for reaching an end, putting pressure through informal coalitions), to 
preventing the actualisation of tastes that are perceived as inappropriate (devotees: using 
the community’s structure as a prevention mechanism as well as exercising increased 
amount of cultural capital and appropriators: putting pressure through forming informal 
coalitions)  or helping to maintain motivation for participation despite disagreement 
with some of the tastes that get actualised (devotees: symbolically narrowing the 
boundaries of “us”, by turning a blind eye). Given the different levels of participation 
occurring in communities, devotees (who are more powerful due to their elevated social 
and cultural capital) are able to pursue their enterprises at the expense of appropriators 
through the control and manipulation of community resources by employing rhetorical 
and interpersonal devices (Coopey 1995; Coopey and Burgoyne 2000) that are outside 
the grasp of the latter. However, appropriators in their own respect are also able to 
assert a certain amount of influence by taking advantage of their collective power 
(informal coalitions), while most importantly, participation enables those members to 
learn how to perform their tastes despite disagreement in the community, by engaging 





In asking “how are collective tastes negotiated”, however, one cannot find the answer 
simply by seeking to find out which cluster of members dominates the negotiation 
process, precisely because this project was set out on the assumption that there can be 
no definite or static collective taste. Instead, what the process of negotiation 
demonstrates (illustrated in a circle in figure 6) is that taste-making at the micro-social 
level is an ongoing dialogue amongst members of various standings. This dialogue is 
not conducted on unrestrained terms, but is limited by the boundaries that are set by the 
community’s oppositional relation to dissimilar others and most importantly, by the 
normative system that sustains that opposition and which is commonly accepted by all 
members as doxa.  
 
As Wegner et al (2002) argue, participation is characterised by the mutual ability of 
members to negotiate meanings amongst them and influence each other’s experiences of 
these, even though this mutuality does not necessarily entail equality or similar levels of 
authority. Accordingly, collective taste is not reducible to the intentions of clusters of 
members bearing different ideologies, but emerges as dialogue between the different 
parties that constantly appraises objects and modes of production/consumption in terms 
of taste, without ever attributing to them a final or fixed interpretation. Unlike 
Beverland and Farrelly’s (2011) description of a dialectic conflict between opposing 
ideologies in the surf subculture, members do not navigate these tensions by engaging 
in “creative solutions” that protect the dominant ideology. On the contrary, it is the lack 
of synthesis and consequent constant negotiation amongst the various perceptions that 
constitutes collective taste and its dynamic nature. Bakhtin ([1981] 1994) uses the term 
‘inter-illumination’ to indicate that the meaning of an utterance is not reducible to the 
intentions of the speaker or to the response of the addressee but emerges between these 
two (Holquist 1981, 429 – 430). Taste-making is dialogic because the meaning of 
practices and objects cannot be grounded upon fixed identities, but is the product of 
difference: firstly, the relational difference between “what we are” as opposed to “what 
they are” and secondly, the different viewpoints of ingroup members on that first level 
difference. At the micro social level of interaction the making of taste refers to the 
interanimation of members’ voices and to the development of a unique perspective of 
the community’s object of practice and its mode of production, with no necessary 
“winning side”, overcoming or synthesis of the different viewpoints (an eventual 
synthesis would make taste making dialectic rather than dialogic) or overcoming of the 
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struggle. During the dialogic process, value is generated that is both negatively asserted 
(in relation to “them” and concerning the community as a whole) and positively 
affirmed (by actualising “doings” that are meaningful to certain types of members). As 
such, differentiation is achieved both collectively (“us and them”) and individually or 
sub-collectively when specific members achieve the actualisation of what they perceive 
to be tasteful. 
.  
 
10.5 Summary of the Theoretical Contributions 
 
The thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the theories of taste/distaste formation, 
negative symbolic consumption and marketplace cultures. 
 
First, although the extant body of literature discusses, both explicitly and implicitly,  
some unique contexts in which collective tastes are developed, maintained, contested 
and negotiated, (to name but a few: indie music consumers in Arsel and Thompson 
(2010), Apartment Therapy participants in Arsel and Bean (2013), Harley Davidson 
bikers in Schouten and McAlexander (1995), in-line roller skaters in Cova and Cova 
(2002), the rave culture in Goulding et al. (2002), Burning Man participants in Kozinets 
(2002), dance cultures in Thornton (1996) etc), the holistic outlook of such community-
based practice (accounting both for the status of the collective’s taste in relation to 
outsiders and its interplay with intra-group taste dynamics)  has seldom been discussed. 
In addition to this, unlike the majority of studies on taste that focus on the role of the 
construct in the perpetuation of class structures (Holt 1998; Allen 2002; Henry 2005; 
Üstüner and Holt 2010 etc), the thesis offers insights as to how tastes operate and are 
practised within one social strata. Such an approach comes in response to calls for 
research on cultural and horizontal, rather than social, stratifications, as directed by 
Thornton (1996) and Frith (1996). Indeed, few scholars (Arsel and Bean 2013) have 
empirically examined those systems of distinctions that divide contemporary culture, 
with subcultural capital and subcultural taste - as opposed to class taste - becoming all 
the more relevant (Thornton 1996) to the construction and contextualisation of 
consumer experience. Conducting an exploratory study on what has been 
conceptualised as inter-group and intra-group dynamics of taste, I have put forward an 
integrative framework of collective taste-making that accounts both for the 
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community’s status position in the social space and intra-group heterogeneity. The 
suggested framework contributes to our understanding of taste as a dialogical process, 
taking into account the construct’s dynamic nature (Holt 1997; 1998; Hennion 2001; 
2003; 2007; Arsel and Bean 2013) and placing all emphasis on the “making”. 
 
Second, taking a closer look at how communities determine their status position in 
relation to competitive actors, the study demonstrates how community practices can 
create symbolic value in relation to “what else is there” within a given dominant field of 
operation and in extension within secondary relevant domains. More specifically, while 
rejection behaviour has been identified as more determining in understanding symbolic 
distinction (Wilk 1997), “very little extant research focuses on the reciprocity of the 
relationship between positive and negative poles” (Hogg et al. 2009, 154). The work 
demonstrates how distaste is mirrored in the community’s collective taste as a shared 
understanding about the meaning of positive ingroup practices that are detrimental to 
those of dissociative others. Contributing to literature on negative symbolic 
consumption, it proposes that anti-choice (avoidance, abandonment, aversion 
behaviour) (Hogg 1998; Escalas and Bettman 2005; White and Dhal 2007; Berger and 
Heath 2008; Hogg et al. 2009) is not the only manner in which distaste operates. 
Instead, disgust is to be found in the appropriation of practices that, even though on a 
first instance may seem ill-suited, have been resignified to become  “proper to this 
particular context” through a change in the use of the object of practice and the 
construction of a sufficient justification for its inclusion. By looking at the manner in 
which participants of the community manage their production/consumption practices, 
the thesis suggests that negatively asserted value may be more efficient in enforcing 
status distinctions, while accounting for distaste through subtle meaning subversions is 
essential in understanding the surrounding social system, positions and roles of 
audiences or followers of a particular style or genre. 
 
The study also proposes an embryonic framework of understanding as to who 
constitutes a dissimilar other when discussing tensions of an “us versus them” fashion. 
Starting from Bourdieu (1984), who argues that groups located closer in the social space 
will be in more intense competition and Holt (1998), who explains that taste wars occur 
within a particular field because it is the particular logic of that field that invests 
practices with meanings, the majority of studies on marketplace cultures have focused 
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on describing status competitions contained within particular cultural boundaries (for 
example indie consumers versus hipsters (Arsel and Thompson 2010), Harley bikers 
versus car drivers (Schouten and McAlexander 1995), Burning Man participants versus 
Disneyland goers (Kozinets 2002), Americans versus Canadians (White and Dhal 
2007), competition amongst football team fan subcultures (Banister et al. 2005) etc. The 
findings from this research, however, demonstrate that in proclaiming their sovereignty, 
members of communities are likely to transcend field boundaries and compete with a 
very diverse range of dissociative others in order to strengthen the ingroup’s distinction. 
The focal actors used for juxtapositions in each case were found to be related on the 
aspect of the normative system that the community wishes to glorify on each occasion. 
Rejecting the massified, fetishised experience offered or lived by dissociative actors 
across diverse fields, critical consumers attempt to produce themselves authentic 
diversified experiences for their own consumption. Through communities that are 
constantly moving between the formal and the informal they are creating an 
environment which skilfully rejects the industry and society’s way as “distasteful”.  The 
crafting of this experience, however, and the specification of the community’s social 
position are neither straightforward nor harmonious, but instead comprise an ongoing 
dialogue amongst heterogeneous voices. 
 
Third, the thesis contributes to the literature on marketplace cultures by offering 
insights into the relatively underresearched issue of intra-group heterogeneity. Chalmers 
et al. (2013, 1011) point out that “traditionally, research on community has been 
dominated by a perspective that privileges the homogeneity of groups”, while Martin 
(1992) also states that research has so far focused on the unifying characteristics of 
communities. Although multiple authors acknowledge the existence of intra-group 
differences (for example Beverland et al. (2010) point out the diversity of identity goals 
sought from membership amongst members of surfer, snowboarder and skater 
collectives, while Fischer et al. (1996) bring our attention to the utopian view of 
community as an expression of human solidarity), we still know little about how intra 
group dynamics impact on the development of communities, in general, and taste-
making practices, in particular. With regards to the heterogeneous nature of collectives, 
the study contributes by shedding light on how members are not necessarily engaging in 
practices in harmony with one another but despite pursuing varied goals (as Beverland 
et al. 2010 describe) are able to achieve the continuity of the community and its joint 
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enterprises. The latter is achieved because heterogeneity of goals generates in 
participants the feeling of having something “to fight for”. As such, findings provide an 
alternative explanation comparing to that of Chalmers et al. (2013) as to why 
heterogeneity can have positive outcomes for the group. 
 
This study also extends our understanding of intra-group heterogeneity by unpacking 
the interplay amongst the varied voices present in the group. Fragmentation is 
conceptualised as the result of members’ different interpretations of a commonly 
accepted normative system. Accordingly, while communities are bound together and set 
apart from others through shared consumption meanings and practices, a more careful 
look in intra-group dynamics demonstrates that some of these practices are commonly 
accepted, some simply co-exist, while others are under dispute (de Valck 2007). By 
adopting a view of taste-making as a dialogue amongst heterogeneous actors, conducted 
within the boundaries of a shared understanding in relation to the community’s position 
in social space, the thesis uncovers the dynamic nature of collective taste and documents 
how this dialogue is sustained through a number of strategies that allow fragmented 
members to either actualise their preferences or to protect their illusio by overlooking 
those aspects of the dialogue that are not in accordance with their views. Participants are 
in each case “rationalising” these views, drawing upon well-established narratives 
(devotees) or the pragmatics of life (appropriators), thus maintaining in the process an 
ongoing dialogue of taste. This conceptualisation of taste-making not only departs from 
the current emphasis on collective taste as a harmonious, homogenous unit (e.g. Wilk 
1997; Arsel and Bean 2013) but it also negates the idea that heterogeneous voices 
within the collective ultimately get synthesised in a static, distinguishable “communal 
taste” (Beverland and Farelly 2011). As a result, a fuller understanding of taste-making 
practices in heterogeneous communities is achieved; one that suggests that the outcomes 
of taste negotiations can only be temporary and relating to execution of preferences in 
“doings” (e.g. recontextualisation of exo-cultural elements is the outcome of 
negotiations amongst different members), while the taste-making process in itself is an 






10.6 Limitations  
 
Apart from the methodological limitations discussed in chapter 6, there are several 
limitations in the study that are summarized below: 
 
First, in order to focus on the construction of meanings at the micro-social level of 
interaction and the existence of cultural or horizontal  hierarchies, any consideration of 
tastes as unconscious or structure dependent (similarly to Bourdieu 1984) were set 
aside. However, despite attempts to exclude any discussion about class from this 
project, the participants’ habitus (including social and cultural capital as well as 
occupation) was found to be the main driver of intra-group heterogeneity and 
consequently significant in our understanding of dialogical taste, even when examining 
horizontal (as opposed to class) hierarchies. As such, it is acknowledged that in 
theorising group heterogeneity it is important first to explore individual’s lifehistories 
(Bertaux and Thompson 2007) in detail, something which was omitted in this study.   
 
Second, the treatment of (dis)taste in this paper has been primarily instrumental, 
treating the construct as a resource that can be manipulated and used to the group’s 
advantage. This approach ignores individual and group psychology in aesthetic 
preference, but does so in favour of isolating and studying the conscious and strategic 
processes of boundary-making. 
 
Third, focus on a particular research question and on achieving specific goals that 
were set both at the beginning and during the process of collecting data, I had to 
purposefully ignore a number of emergent issues in the field. Of these, the most 
important is the group’s embarking on a fundraising campaign with the ultimate goal of 
buying the building that hosts the community (which has been rented for the past 12 
years) in December 2013. More specifically, during the last months of my ethnography 
the group was faced with a major dilemma: leaving the building that has hosted them 
since the conception of the Brik or raising a large sum of money to buy the property that 
the landlord had decided to sell. Given that the community is closely bound to the 
particular space in which it operates (something which was demonstrated throughout 
this report in relation to the importance that the building plays in taste-making and 
asserting “us and them” differences) a fundraising campaign was initiated, which 
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included writing a proposal for a grant to the arts council. During interviews with 
respondents the matter came up a few times when discussing the community’s informal 
“no external funding policy”. Some members were confident that getting money from 
sponsors like the arts council would in no way affect the autonomy (and most 
importantly, identity) of the community, while others were less persuaded about the 
result of this initiative. The role of this “critical incident” in taste-making was excluded 
from the analysis, because it would require the extension of the fieldwork for at least 
another year, which was not possible due to time limitations. However, leading back to 
the discussion about the role of pragmatics and resources in relation to taste, it leaves 
unanswered the question of how taste-making is affected in extenuating circumstances. 
 
Lastly, on a similar note, the suggested classification of members in devotees, 
appropriators and marginals can be questioned under the light of such critical incidents. 
In other words, these positions cannot be assumed to be “fixed” or permanent since 
there is evidence that devotees might turn to appropriators if circumstances require them 
to do so (e.g. threat of extinction of the community as described above). The fluidity of 
roles and the conditions under which devotees, appropriators or peripherals may assume 




10.7 Directions for Future Research 
 
The question “how does the organisational structure of communities influence 
collective taste-making?” is one that could further enhance our understanding of 
collective taste. More specifically, the chosen context has been renowned for its 
seemingly flat structure and lack of formal rules (something which was found to be 
taken advantage of by members of a particular standing). This bears similarities to 
multiple marketplace cultures (e.g. tribes, subcultures etc), where hierarchies of power 
are primarily informal status stratifications rather than formally assigned roles. 
Examining taste-making in a more structured context, however, could enhance our 
understanding of the interplay between taste and organisational structure. While 
Bourdieu (1984) has extensively explored the relationship between legitimisation of 
tastes and class hierarchies (with those at the top defining the dominant tastes of each 
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era), formal organisational (as opposed to class) hierarchies have not previously been 
taken into account in matters of taste. In fact, after concluding the ethnography at the 
cooperative, I negotiated access and conducted two interviews with members of a 
privately owned golf-club. The purpose of this was to make a comparative study 
between the not formally structured co-op and the golf club, which while having a 
formal team of managers responsible for all (including taste) decisions, is also 
informally managed by its powerful, long-serving members. The comparative study was 
not completed as part of the PhD due to time limitations but is an avenue for future 
research. 
 
Most importantly, the study concluded that taste-making at the micro-social level is a 
dialogical process. However, a lot remains to be done with regards to how this dialogue 
is sustained and evolving in the collective context. In other words, the dialogical circle 
illustrated in figure 6, requires closer observation and analysis to increase our 
understanding of the interaction amongst members, potential “conversions” of 
participants assuming one role to another,  power dynamics as well as the changing of 
individual members’ perceptions of tastefulness as a result of the dialogue. 
 
In relation to the latter, while the project was focused at the micro-social level of 
interaction and aimed to understand collective taste, significant space for research 
remains in exploring how inter-and intra-group dynamics affect taste at the individual 
level. Findings in chapter 9, similarly to Arnould and Price (2000) and Beverland  et al. 
(2010), indicate that members seek to satisfy a number of goals by participating in the 
community, some of which are individual and others collective oriented. While the 
thesis focused on the collective orientation, the effect of participation at individual 
members’ tastes could provide us with interesting insights as to how dialogic taste-
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2. Interview Questionnaire Guide 
 
Note: This is an approximate guide of the questions most often asked during the in-
depth interviews. The guide does not represent the order that the different matters were 
discussed in, nor it is exhaustive. Multiple questions were the result of improvisation in 
response to particular points made by the respondents and as a result are not included in 
the sections below. 
 
Opening Questions 
- When did you start volunteering at the Brik? How did you come across the Brik 
community? What made you join the group? What was your impression of the 
community before joining? How has your role evolved throughout this time?  
 
The Nature of the Community 
- What is the Brik? How would you describe it? What are the community’s aims? 
How does the Brik work? How would you describe the Brik participants? What 
do you enjoy most about the Brik? What do you dislike the most about the Brik? 
How would you describe the programming mix? How would you describe the 
space? What is special about the Brik? In what ways is the community 
dysfunctional? 
 
Collective Decision Making 
- How are decisions being made? How are programming decisions made? Are 
there any requirements for joining the programming team? How are ideas put 
forward? How are ideas selected/rejected? What happens when the group 
disagrees on a particular point? Do members have an equal say in the running of 
the venue? If not, why is that the case? (Additional questions specific to events 




- Can you describe your audience(s)? Are you programming with a particular 
audience in mind? How does the Brik audience compare to the audience of other 
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art venues? Are there any social groups that you would like to reach out to? Are 
there any social groups you would prefer to not see in the audience? What does 
the audience think about the Brik? 
 
Comparisons with Outgroups 
- How does the Brik compare to other arts spaces in the city? Do you visit other 
venues in the city? Which ones? Can you compare your response to the Brik? 
What are the similarities/differences amongst them? 
 
Questions Directed at Longserving (>4 years) Participants Only 
- Can you take me back to the time when the Brik first started operating? What 
was the motivation behind it? What was its purpose? How did it get to grow? 
What changes were brought on in its mission/operations with the passage of 



























Highest Level of 
Education 
Occupation Age 
Patrick 5 Years BA Modern History Artist, unemployed at 
time of interview 
41 
Jake 2 Years BA Anthropology Musician, no steady job 43 
Jane 2 Months 
BA Sociology  
Secondary School 
Teaching Assistant  25 
Neal 2 Years 
BA Philosophy 
Project Manager for 
Insurance Company 34 
Penny 1,5 Year BSc Finance and 
Accountancy Retired Accountant 64 
Johnny 8 Years BSc Electrical 
Engineering Electrical Engineer 42 
Billy 1,5 Year BA Film Studies Administrative  Assistant 27 
Jack 7 Years 
MSc History 
Secondary School 
Teacher  39 
Max 12 Years BA Fine Art Artist 40 
Frances 10 Years BA Fine Art Artist 44 
Mark 10 Years Secondary School, 
Short Course in 
Cultural Media and 
Film Administrative  Assistant 48 
Alex 2 Years BA History Administrative  Assistant 41 
Lisa 1 Year BSc Care 
Management Carer  28 
Daniel 12 Years BA Film Studies Artist 45 
Robbie 4 Months PhD Epidemiology Doctoral Student  28 
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